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This work comprises four essays in two related areas: labor and development economics. On the
labor side, two essays study (i) the effects of sizeable policy reforms over labor informality and (ii)
the relation between productivity and wages in a context of substantial informality and high turnover
rates. On the development side, two essays provide a comparison between developed and devel-
oping countries in the following aspects: (iii) the degree of complementarity of production factors
and their capacity to translate R&D investments into economic growth and (iv) the effects of ﬁscal
redistribution over income inequality.
Within the context of Latin America - the most income-unequal and labor-informal region in the
world - this work intends to augment the understanding of the behavior, dynamics, interactions and
contributions of productive factors (labor and innovative capital) and the effects that policies aimed
at formalizing labor, innovating capital or redistributing factors retributions may have. The study
applies recent measurement techniques and exploits rich novel datasets which combined with refor-
mulated models help us to propose alternative appealing explanations.
Lessons learnt from these four essays suggest that (i) job dynamics play a fundamental role in
the success (or failure) of policies aimed at promoting labor formality. Against the conventional
wisdom, we contend that reductions in hiring rather than increases in separation rates are the main
determinants of informality increases following protectionist policies. (ii) Job dynamics also play a
differentiating role in the determination of wage-productivity elasticities and income risk (with new
hires reacting more than incumbents). (iii) Yet, returns of labor and physical capital are constant
across countries and periods regardless the stage of development whereas they exhibit an inverted
U shape for technological capital (this is, highest returns observed for mid developed cases). (iv)
Comparable private returns of productive factors are mirrored in comparable market income inequal-
ity measures observed across some developed and developing regions. However, while in Europe
ﬁscal redistribution helps to achieve better distributed disposable income, in Latin America ﬁscal
redistribution has meager or even countervailing effects.
vii




Essays on Labor and Development Economics is the result of a long journey dated back to late
nineties when I started doing applied economic research.
Experience gathered doing applied research in the academic and public sectors in Peru and in the
headquarters of The World Bank shaped my academic and professional interests, technical and topic
wise. Among others, these interests comprise the study of labor markets and economic development
from an applied perspective, exploiting novel techniques and rich empirical sources.
A reason to pursue this approach is that far-from-orthodox economic outcomes in emerging and less
developed countries (LDC) challenge continuously the prescriptions of canonical theoretical models.
Many of such unconventional outcomes were difﬁcult to address inside and outside the scope of the
mainstream of the literature -conceived as a set of theories and models aimed at explaining a world
endowed with particular givens1. This was the case until recent emergence of very rich sources of
information or novel technical methods developed to better exploit such an information. Nowadays
to think outside the box of the conventional mainstream with some grounds stronger than just the-
oretical assumptions is becoming more likely. To this end, empirical sources are proving to be a
nontrivial complementary input to produce knowledge and understanding of several economic phe-
nomena, especially in the insufﬁciently explored world of LDC, or even to revisit and reformulate
canonical models that have failed to show a correspondence between predictions of their essential
components and its actual observed values in the vastly explored developed world.
This work is aimed at contributing to the understanding of some relevant issues in economies that
cannot necessarily be seen through the lens of the canonical models provided by the mainstream but
through the lens of contesting means, namely rich novel data and recent measurement techniques
which combined with reformulated models help us to propose alternative appealing explanations to
such issues. As it happens with those endorsing more conventional and theoretical approaches, our
intention is to see what we can learn from the outcomes of our approach eventhough the caveats and
limitations that every method comprises.
The result of this research is presented in four essays (chapters):
Chapter 1 presents the results of exploiting dense rotational labor panel data sets in order to under-
stand the effects of radical policy reforms2 on the dynamics across employment and unemployment
states3 into a market with high labor informality and within the context of a Search and Matching
model. OurﬁndingssuggestmeagereffectsofTradeReformsbutnoticeableeffectsofConstitutional
Reforms in the size and volatility of the ﬂows of different labor sectors. Against the conventional
1Initial conditions such as the rule of law, institutional framework, market imperfections, initial quantities of factor
endowments, initial qualities of factor endowments, etc. which can inﬂuence dramatically the feasibility of the assumptions
imposed in most of the canonical models when generally applied to LDC.
2Namely, Constitutional Reforms comprising dramatic changes in labor regulation and Trade Reforms.
3And consequently on the size of different labor sectors.
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determinants of these effects.
Chapter 2 extends the analysis of Chapter 1. This chapter explores the role of marginal workers4
in the explanation of the the poor correspondence found between volatilities of productivity and
wages5. Consistent with very recent contributions regarding the US economy we ﬁnd that wage and
productivity volatilities are more strongly related for those moving between distinct employment
(or unemployment) categories than for those remaining in their same jobs. Our work adds to the
existing literature by emphasizing the asymmetric reactions according to worker’s mobility (new
hires, sector movers, stayers) and formality (formal, informal) groups in both, the determination of
wage-productivity elasticities and the income volatility process6.
Chapter 3 presents the results of applying Instrumental Variable Varying Coefﬁcient techniques in
order to measure the contribution of R&D investments to the process of economic growth. Our
ﬁndings contend the existence of a non linear relation between such a contribution and the level of
economic development. This contribution departs from the conventional approach that treats homo-
geneously to all the observations of a pool of countries comprising developed and less developed
economies. By using an advanced semiparametrical approach, our contribution also conﬁrms and
extends existing parametrical attempts conveying the message of nonlinearity in the contribution of
R&D investments into economic growth of developed economies.
Chapter 4 takes a more aggregate perspective to study the implications of heterogeneity between
observed units in the application of economic policy. This chapter presents the results of combining
and exploiting national accounts information and government income and expenditure data of Eu-
ropean and Latin American economies to see the differences of the redistributional impact of ﬁscal
policy between these regions. Our ﬁndings show that while in Europe Fiscal redistribution helps to
improve income equality, in Latin America ﬁscal redistribution seems not to work or worse, to have
countervailing effects.
All of these results may be appealing for applied economists or policy makers interested in the
functioning of LDC. The ﬁrst two chapters shed some light to the understanding of how policies
intended at ﬁrst to improve quality conditions for workers in labor markets with non-negligible infor-
mal sectors may end up encouraging such informal labor arrangements. The asymmetric response of
different type of ﬂows (hiring, job to job, separation) in different sectors (formal, informal) play an
important role in the determination of the ﬁnal size of those sectors. Asymmetric reactions are also
found in the way in which wages are set across sectors7 or in how productivity shocks impact into
workers’ income risk according to their formality status. Chapter 3 extends our attention beyond
the study of the labor factor and it analyzes the contribution of other productive factors to the pro-
cess of economic growth. Departing from the microeconometric approach employed in the ﬁrst two
chapters, Chapter 3 operates at a more aggregate level and, using cross country multiperiod data, it
stresses the importance of the asymmetric response of economic growth to R&D investments accord-
ing to the development level of each observation. In spite of this apparent heterogenous composition
of the factors or of the observations under study, Chapter 4 shows that compared to more developed
countries, a sample of LDC (speciﬁcally some Latin American economies) fares similar high levels
of market-income inequality. The difference between inequality of incomes at disposal of European
and Latin American households relies in a great extent on the effectiveness of the redistributive role
4Those who do not stay in the same work category between two periods of analysis, say for example new hires or job
movers.
5When measured at aggregate levels.
6Especially in its transitory component.
7Wages of newly hired or job movers show higher productivity elasticities than those of non-movers.
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DOI: 10.2870/27875of the Government through ﬁscal policy (namely taxes and transfers). Such effectiveness is notice-
able in Europe and still poor in Latin America where disposable-income inequality hovers around
much higher levels than in the European region.
In this sense, these essays provide provocative ﬁndings that - I hope - will contribute to the discus-
sion about both, the implications of policies aimed at promoting development in distinct dimensions
(regulation of labor markets, investment in innovation and ﬁscal redistribution) and about some of
the remaining challenges left for research striving to reconcile such ﬁndings with the theoretical
mainstream.
The Author
Florence, London and Washington DC, 2011.
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Trade Liberalization, Labor Reforms and
Formal-Informal Employment Dynamics 1
Mariano Bosch2
Edwin A. Go˜ ni-Pacchioni3
William Maloney4
Abstract
This paper studies gross worker ﬂows to explain the rising informality in Brazilian metropolitan
labor markets from 1983-2002. In particular, we examine the impact of trade and constitutional
reforms, (that include increased ﬁring costs, tighter restrictions on overtime work, and fewer restric-
tions on union activity) occurring during the period. We ﬁnd aggregate sectoral movements to be
driven largely by changes in the hiring rates which, in turn are driven largely by the constitutional
reforms. Trade liberalization accounts for roughly 1% of the increase in informality, while the con-
stitutional reforms account for 40-50%.
1.1 Introduction
A growing literature explores the insights that labor ﬂows can shed about how regulations and insti-
tutions affect the functioning of labor markets. On the theoretical side, Bertola & Rogerson (1997);
Alvarez & Veracierto (1999); Mortensen & Pissarides (2003); Pries & Rogerson (2005) have all an-
alyzed the impact of policy reforms on labor market ﬂows in a search and matching context. These
modeling efforts offer well-deﬁned predictions of gross labor ﬂows and hence a disaggregated view
of the processes underlying observed trends in unemployment stocks. For the developing world, the
impact of regulations on what is perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of poor country labor mar-
kets, the large unregulated or informal sector, has recently been explored by Kugler (2004); Zenou
(2008); Albrech et al. (2009).
1We are very grateful to Francisco Carneiro, Marcello Estevao, Gustavo Gonzaga Lauro Ramos, Jose Guilherme Reis
and Gabriel Ulyssea, to participants in the NBER workshop on informality, October 2006 in Bogota, and to those at the
University of Michigan conference on Labor Markets in Developing and Transition Economies, May 2007, in particular Gary
Fields, Ann Harrison, Ravi Kanbur, and Jan Svejnar, for helpful advice and reality testing of ideas. We are grateful to Lauro
Ramos for providing the old PME dataset for 2002. All conclusions are, of course, our own.
2Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante (m.bosch@merlin.fae.ua.es)
3Department of Economics, European University Institute (Edwin.Goni@EUI.eu) and London School of Economics
(E.A.Goni-Pacchioni@lse.ac.uk)
4Development and Economic Research Group, The World Bank (wmaloney@worldbank.org)
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On the empirical side, the advanced country literature has looked at the impact of employment
protections on worker and job ﬂows (see, for example, Messina & Vallanti 2007, for Europe, Kugler
& Pica 2008, for Italy). Although data is less easily available5, developing countries often offer
more extreme policy experiments. Indeed, the evolution of the Brazilian labor market from 1990 to
2000 offers an especially dramatic experiment. Across this single decade, the share of the metropoli-
tan area work force unprotected by labor legislation and thereby classiﬁed as ”informal” rose an
astronomical ten percentage points. Dramatic outcomes often spring from dramatic innovations and
Brazil offers several signiﬁcant policy changes across the period. The end of the 1980s saw a far
reaching trade reform, and the establishment of a new constitution in 1988 that had substantial im-
pacts on labor costs and ﬂexibility. In particular, it increased overtime costs, raised substantially the
penalty for ﬁring workers, and importantly relaxed restrictions on union activity.
However, the empirical work to date has been surprisingly indeterminate. Looking at separations
from formal sector work, Paes de Barros & Corseuil (2004) found, unexpectedly, no impact of the
very large rise in ﬁring costs. Looking at the impact of the reduction in trade protection, Menezes-
Filho & Muendler (2007) ﬁnd mixed results on outﬂows from formal employment and into informal-
ity, depending on speciﬁcation, while Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003)’s work ﬁnds no impact on the size
of the informal sector.
We revisit this experiment, analyzing the impact of a set of trade and labor reforms. We argue
that, conceptually, the effects of these policies on the overall level of informality work through both
relative informal/formal inﬂows and outﬂows and that the overall impacts can be ambiguous. This
underscores the need to look at the full set of adjustments when evaluating the impact of reform.
We then estimate the impact on the overall level of informality as well as the relative ﬂows using a
detailed and extensive rotating panel data set. Taking advantage of the differential impact of reforms
across industries, we ﬁnd little compelling evidence that trade reform was the prominent or even
statistically signiﬁcant factor. All three labor related dimensions of the constitutional reform how-
ever, appear more important. In all cases, the effect comes more through lower formal job ﬁnding
rates as opposed to the separations that Paes de Barros & Corseuil (2004)investigated. We estimate
that around 40% of the trend in informality can be explained by changes related to the constitutional
reform while changes in trade can explain no more than 1% of the trend.
1.2 Data and Context
The period from the late 1980s to the ﬁrst half of the 1990s was a turbulent one, comprising a persis-
tent hyperinﬂation and six major stabilization plans designed to control it, a constitutional change,
andseveralotherreformsincludingadramaticreductioninbarrierstotrade. Acrossthewholeperiod
Brazil experienced the 1990 crisis and slowdowns in 1999 and 2001 with corresponding recoveries.
We draw on the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, hereafter PME6) that
conducts extensive monthly household interviews in 6 of the major metropolitan regions (S˜ ao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife and Salvador) and covers roughly 25% of the
national labor market. The questionnaire is extensive in its coverage of participation in the labor
market, wages, hours worked, beneﬁts received, and other variables that are traditionally found in
5Boeri & Burda (1996) found a limited impact on job matches of active labor market policies in the Czech Republic
during the transition from socialism. Hopenhayn (2004) found that the introduction of ﬁxed term contracts and of special trial
period provisions in Argentina led to higher separations from formal employment. Kugler (1999, 2004) found the reduction
of ﬁring costs in Colombia led to greater exit rates in and out of unemployment as well as a reduction in unemployment
6For descriptions of the methodology of the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, see Sedlacek et al. (1990); IBGE (1991);
Oliveira (1999).
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such employment surveys. We also draw on the National Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por
Amostra de Domicilios or PNAD) for selected cross checks. The PNAD covers the entire country,
but lacks any panel dimension and hence is not suitable for the study of gross labor ﬂows.
The PMEs structure as a rotating panel allows us to create time series of gross labor market ﬂows. It
tracks workers across four consecutive months, then drops them from the sample for 8 months, and
then reintroduces them for another 4 months. Each month one fourth of the sample is substituted
with a new panel. After 12 months the initial sample is re-interviewed. Over a period of two years,
three different panels of households are surveyed, and the process starts again with three new panels.
Regrettably, the PME was drastically modiﬁed in 2002 and it is not possible to reconcile the new and
old deﬁnitions for unemployment and job sectors7. Hence, our analysis begins in 1983 and stops at
2002.
We follow the literature in dividing employed workers into three sectors8. The formal salaried (F)
are those public and private employees whose contract is registered or signed (asinada) in his/her
work-card (carteira de trabalho) as dictated by Brazilian law. This registration entitles the worker
to labor rights and beneﬁts including 30 days of paid holiday per year, contributions for social se-
curity, the right to request unemployment beneﬁt in case of dismissal, monetary compensation if
dismissed without a fair cause, and maternity and paternity paid leave among others beneﬁts. The
informal salaried (I) are those employees whose work card has not been signed (sem carteira or
without carteira). Finally, the informal self employed (S.E.) are workers who are not employees and
hence are not covered by the beneﬁts afforded by a signed work card. Ideally, we might also employ
a deﬁnition of informality based on ﬁrm size as well, focusing on establishments of fewer than 5-10
as informal employees. However, the PME until 2002 does not tabulate this information9. That said,
Henley et al. (2009) ﬁnd that there is a close correspondence between access to protections, our
measure of informality (employment registration), as well as size.
Figure 1.1 plots the share of informal employment (comprising both informal workers and self-
employed) over total employment from 1983-2002. The share of informal employment remained
relatively constant around 35% of the work force during the 1980’s despite major macroeconomic
shocks. However, as has been documented by numerous previous studies (See for example, Ramos
& Reis 1997; Ramos 2002; The-World-Bank & IPEA 2002; Ramos & Brito 2003; Goldberg & Pavc-
nik 2003; Veras 2004; Ulyssea 2005; Ramos & Ferreira 2005b,a the share begins a major secular
upturn at the beginning of the 1990s that levels off at 45%, 10 percentage points above its level at
the beginning of the 1990s.
These movements in formal sector size are necessarily a function of inﬂows and outﬂows into each
sector relative to the other. The next two panels of ﬁgure 1 present the evolution of these two series
that compactly and completely capture the relevant dynamics: inﬂows into informal employment
relative to those into formal; and outﬂows from informal employment relative to outﬂows from for-
mal employment. We calculate relative inﬂows for each year the number of workers transiting into
7The unemployment rate jumps from 8% to 14% after the change in methodology of the PME.
8There is broad consensus in the literature on the deﬁnition of informality in the Brazilian literature. A comprehensive
survey of work studying the size and evolution of the Brazilian informal sector in the labor market can be found in Ulyssea
(2005) and a summary of stylized facts of the eighties and nineties is detailed in Ramos & Reis 1997; Ramos 2002; Ramos
& Brito 2003; Veras 2004; Ramos & Ferreira 2005b,a
9TheILOforaperioddeﬁnedinformalityasconsistingofallown-accountworkers(butexcludingadministrativeworkers,
professionalsandtechnicians), unpaidfamilyworkers, andemployersandemployeesworkinginestablishmentswithlessthan
5. In fact, Bosch & Maloney (2006) ﬁnd that in Mexico, the criteria of small ﬁrm size and ours of lack of registration are
similar in motivation conceptually and lead to a great deal of overlap. 75% of informal workers are found in ﬁrms of 10 or
fewer workers. Since owners of ﬁrms or self-employed are not obliged to pay social security contributions for themselves,
we in fact consider them as informal self-employed with no social security contributions (and hence without the beneﬁts that
are perceived by salaried workers holding a carteira).
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an informal sector job (from unemployment, out of the labor force or formal jobs) relative to those
transiting to a formal sector job (from unemployment, out of the labor force or an informal jobs).
Analogously, we calculate the relative outﬂows of informal jobs relative to formal jobs. It is clear
that relative inﬂows into informality (formality) were strongly countercyclical (procyclical) until the
beginning of the 1990s. However after 1992, the relationship breaks down with relative accessions
into formality no longer tracking the economic recovery of the next ﬁve years. Relative outﬂows
from informality (panel 3) also show a secular decline across the entire period.
Table 1.1 suggests that only a small part of this is due to changes in economic structure. Consis-
tent with Figure 1.1 , there are virtually no changes in either the share of total employment by sector
or the sectoral degree of informality in the 1983-1988 period. The 1990s, by contrast, saw a fall in
the share of tradables (manufactures) of 10 percentage points, a phenomenon labeled the tertiariza-
tion of the Brazilian economy. However, the impact of this reallocation on informality is dwarfed
by the intra-sectoral evolution: formality decreased within 28 of the 30 sectors in the table, falling
16% in manufacturing overall, and reaching 23% in some sectors10. This is broadly consistent with
Ramos (2002); Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003) who ﬁnd that the vast majority, of the increase in the in-
formal employment, in the latter study eighty-eight percent, arises from movement of workers from
formal to informal jobs within industrieswithin industries11. Hence, the source of the secular rise in
informality is largely working through the within composition of subsectors of workers, formal and
informal and our modeling strategy reﬂects this.
1.2.1 Decomposing gross ﬂows
We can generalize the preceding discussion at the industry level. In practice transitions into an
informal job in a given industry may occur not only from other employment sectors, but also from
other jobs within the same industry or from other industries. The law of motion of the number of
informal workers in a given industry, m is given by















Equation (1.1) indicates that the change in the total number of informal jobs in industry m is de-
termined by four sets of ﬂows. First, unemployed and out of the labor force workers (u) ﬁnd informal
jobs in industry m at rate fm
i . Second, within industry m, formal jobs, nf;m, are downgraded into
informal jobs at a rate dm
m. Third, from other industries informal (ni;j) and formal (nf;j) workers
transit to informal jobs in industry m at rate jm
j , and dm
j respectively. Finally, the last term of equa-
tion (1.9) represents the outﬂow of informal jobs from industry m. This outﬂow may occur towards
unemployment (and out of the labor force) at rate sm
i , towards other informal jobs within industry
m, gm





The analogous law of motion for formal jobs in industry m is:















Where in this case tm
j and tj
m denote the job to job transition rates of formal workers between
industries j and m respectively. The steady state relative sizes of the formal to informal sectors in
10The share of formal employment only increases considerably among domestic workers. This probably happened be-
cause the Union of Women Domestic Employees (UWDE) in Brazil - which originally was established as an association -
won the status of a trade union in 1989. In 1992, UWDE became an afﬁliate of the Central Workers Union (CUT), which
considerably increased the number of its members Ulku (2005)
11Similar results are reported by Bosch & Maloney (2006) for the Mexican case.
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Figure 1.1: Size and Relative Informality Flows: Brazil 1983-2002
Size of Informal Sector (% out of employment)
Relative Inflows to Informality

























































































































































































































































































Note: The dash line represents the HP detrended Brazilian log GDP (right axis). The solid lines represent the
values of the size of the informal sector, the relative inﬂows and the relative outﬂows to and from informality
for the overall country.
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Where RIi;m and ROi;m represent the relative inﬂows and outﬂows of informal workers in
industry m. In steady state, these are given by,
RIi;m =
u  fm




j + nf;m  dm
j )
u  fm
























Using the panel structure of the PME and equations (1.4) we can compute the steady state values of










These steady state values are remarkably similar to the actual series. Figure 2a shows the scatter plot
of the actual share of informal workers and its steady state derived from equation (1.5) by industry
for all years from 1983 to 2002. Virtually all data points lie close to the 45 degree line. Furthermore,
we aggregate across sectors to show how the evolution of the steady state share of informal workers
tracks the actual share over time. This is shown in ﬁgure 2b. The message is the same. Because the
magnitude of ﬂows is relatively high the steady state value of the share of informal employment is a
very good approximation to the actual series.
In addition, this exercise allows us to decompose the changes in the share of informal employment
by industry into changes in the relative inﬂows and the relative outﬂows. In particular, the growth
rate of 
ss















in our sample. On average around 76% of the changes in the share of informal employment were due
to the increased entry into informality relative to inﬂows into formal employment. The remaining
24% was due to changes in the relative outﬂows from informality. The rest of the article examines
how the trade and labor reforms affected these ﬂows and hence the aggregate rise in informality.
1.3 Policy Innovations
We explore two major policy shocks that were at play in Brazil across the period and which are
likely to have had a major role on these ﬂows, and hence in the reallocation of the work force from
formal into informal employment: the opening of the Brazilian economy to foreign trade, and the
1988 constitutional reforms. Appendix 3.9 presents an illustrative model in the matching context
that offers some structure for thinking through these effects in a matching context. For the most
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Figure 2a: Steady State Informality by Industry 
 
Notes: The figure shows the actual % of Informal workers by sectors and its steady state valued calculated from 






Figure 2b : Steady State Informality 1983-2002 
 
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of the actual series of the % of informal workers and its steady state valued 
calculated from inflows and outflows of workers. The steady state value is computed by calculating the steady state 























































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
(mean) ano1
% Informal workers Steady State % Informal workers
part, however, the effects are straightforward heuristically and the model mostly helps in showing
whether we may expect an impact on relative ﬂows in or out of formality (or both) and where net
effects may be ambiguous.
It is worth highlighting that conceptually, these effects can occur in a context of a competitive or
integrated labor market where, at the margin, workers are indifferent between formal and informal
sectors. Hence the model in Appendix 3.9 works more in a context of informality as discussed by
9
Goñi-Pacchioni, Edwin Antonio (2011), Essays on Labor and Development Economics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27875Bosch, Go˜ ni-Pacchioni and Maloney / Trade Liberalization, Labor Reform and Formal-Informal Employment Dynamics
Maloney 1999; Bosch & Maloney 2010 among others where the market is not necessarily segmented
and hence informality is not intrinsically inferior to formal employment. In very simple terms, any
policy innovation that causes formal ﬁrms to see lower productivity per worker implicitly ”shifts in”
the demand for formal labor, but does not imply segmentation, since the marginal worker is indif-
ferent between working in the formal or the informal sector. Similarly, changes in labor regulations
may lead to a shifting up of the labor supply curve in such a way that less formal labor is hired,
but, again, there is no segmentation. Clearly, this approach does not exclude segmentation emerging
from the reforms as well.
1.3.1 Trade Liberalization
Far reaching trade reform began in the mid 1980s but intensiﬁed around 1990. Figure 1.2 plots
two variables measuring the degree of trade protection of the Brazilian economy during the period;
Muendler (2004)’s import penetration ratio, and Kume et al. (2003)’s real effective trade tariffs
rates12. The trade opening translated into a dramatic reduction to one third of the level of effective
protection (from 1988 to 2002) and to a doubling of imports penetration rates (during the same pe-
riod).
As Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003) argue, the fact that Brazil had not participated in the tariff-reducing
GATT rounds prior to the trade reforms implies that the usual concerns about the endogeneity of
trade policy changes and political economy of protection are attenuated. As they argue, the govern-
ment’s objective when reducing tariff rates across industries was to achieve the relatively uniform
tariff rate negotiated with the WTO and hence policy makers were accordingly less concerned with
catering to special lobby interests. This is supported by ﬁgure 1.3. We compare the tariff levels of
1988 against those in the year 2000. We conﬁrm Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003) ﬁndings that tariff
declines in each industry are proportional to the industry’s pre-reform tariff level in 1988.
The impact of trade liberalization is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, lower barriers
increase the competition that an industry exposed to trade faces. The lost formal proﬁtability both
reduces hires into, and increases separations from, the formal sector. Both effects work in the same
direction of a reduction in the share of formal employment. However, reducing tariffs and quotas
also permits greater access to imported capital goods and other intermediate inputs that may increase
productivity, or improve the quality of output that may enhance competitiveness relative to imports
or in export markets. This implies exactly the opposite effects.
To date, the most thorough test of the hypothesis of a relationship between trade liberalization and
informality was undertaken by Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003) who, exploiting sectoral variation in
protection across time, found no relationship with the share of informality in Brazil, and a modest
relationship in Colombia. More recently, Soares (2005); Menezes-Filho & Muendler (2007) ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant effects of trade liberalization on the labor market although the impact on the size of the
informal sector is sensitive to the inclusion of ﬁxed effects.
We follow Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003) in exploiting the inter-industry variation of the impacts
of trade liberalization over time using the Muendler (2004) and Kume et al. (2003) proxies. The
variation is large across sectors especially since we expand our coverage beyond the manufacturing
sectors and include non-tradable sectors services which, in principle, are less directly affected by the
opening of the economy. Panel (a) in ﬁgure 1.4 plots the log change in the share of informal workers
by industry against the log change in tariffs and import penetration from 1988 to 2000, suggesting
an unconditional correlation between the change in informality with changes in effective tariffs and
virtually zero correlation with changes in import penetration.
12Effective protection is preferred to nominal tariffs as before 1988 non-tariff barriers implied that most tariffs were
redundant, That is the tariffs exceeded the differential between internal and external prices (see Hay 2001; Kume et al. 2003)
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Effective Tariffs Imports Penetration
Note: Figures correspond to weighted averages of all industrial sectors (with weights given by the size of each
industrial sector). Tariffs are obtained from Kume et al. (2003) for 1987-1998; Pinheiro & de Almeida (1994)
for 1983-1986. Imports penetration corresponds to weighted imports/consumption by industry and are obtained
from Muendler (2004) for 1987-1999; Pinheiro & de Almeida (1994) for 1983-1986; Nassif & Pimentel (2004)
for 1999-2002.
1.3.2 Constitutional changes
The 1988 Constitutional changes had important implications for the labor code in several areas that
theory predicts could lead to increasing informality. First, there was a generalized increase in labor
costs and reduction in formal employer ﬂexibility. Maximum working hours per week were reduced
from 48 to 44, overtime remuneration was increased from 1.2 to 1.5 times the normal wage rate;
vacation pay was raised from one to 4/3 of the monthly wage, and maternity leave increased from
90 to 120 days13. Second, the power of organized labor was expanded. Unions were no longer
required to be registered and approved by the Ministry of Labor; decisions to strike were now left
purely to union discretion, and the required advance notiﬁcation to the employer cut from ﬁve to
two days; and strikes in certain strategic sectors were no longer banned. Finally, ﬁring costs were
raised. The penalty levied on employers for unjustiﬁed dismissal, a category encompassing most
legitimate separations for economic reasons in the US, increased by four times from 10% to 40%
of the accumulated separation account (FGTS, Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Servico). These
are private funds into which the employer by law must contribute, every month, the equivalent of
8% of the employee’s monthly wage. The accumulated value is thus a function of tenure and the
average wage of the worker over that tenure. Workers only have access to the fund if dismissed, but
on dismissal, they receive the entire fund, plus a penalty in proportion to the accumulated fund in the
job from which they are being dismissed (See Paes de Barros & Corseuil (2004) for more detail).
13Paes de Barros & Corseuil (2004) among others also note that the maximum continuous work day was reduced from 8
to 6 hours although the exact meaning of this is unclear given that 8 hours remains the standard work day.
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Effective Tariffs 1988
Note: The ﬁgure shows the Effective Tariffs in 1988 vs Tariffs in 2000. The solid line is a 45 degree line. Tariffs
are obtained from Kume et al. (2003) for 1987-1998; Pinheiro & de Almeida (1994) for 1983-1986.
To date, the most comprehensive work relating these changes to the functioning of the labor mar-
ket was undertaken by Paes de Barros & Corseuil (2004) who ﬁnd that separation rates decreased
after the constitutional changes for short employment spells and increased for longer spells, but ﬁnd
inconclusive results about impacts on ﬂows into informality from the formal sector. However, again,
matching models such as that sketched in Appendix 3.9 suggest that several of these reforms would
lead to a reduction in hiring (job ﬁnding) rates as opposed to the separations that Paes de Barros &
Corseuil (2004) study.
We ﬁnd very strong impacts through this second channel as well. The constitutional reform was
implemented one off and simultaneously for all sectors. This implies that we must rely entirely on
the cross industry variation in the impact of this shock for identiﬁcation.
Overtime Pay:
An increase in overtime pay raises labor costs and this leads both to reduced formal hiring relative
to informal hiring, and an increase in the relative separation from formal jobs (see Appendix 3.9).
Both forces imply a reduction in the share of formal employment. Further, we argue that the impact
will be greater in those industries where the use of overtime (prior to the reform) was greater. Hence,
we expect that industries with a higher share of their working hours above the post constitutional
maximum hours a week would see the greatest impact.
It is important to note a potential countervailing numeraire effect: Though total hours worked by
formal workers may fall, the fewer hours that each employee may legally work implies that the
number of workers may actually rise. Determining the net effect requires knowledge of the number
of overtime hours, the cost imposed by the overtime legislation, and especially the elasticity of for-
12
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Figure 1.4: Unconditioned Correlations
Panel (a): Trade Variables Vs. Size of the Informal Sector 
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Union Density (in logs, 1983-1988)
Note: The graphs plots he changes in the share of informal workers from 1988-2000 against our 5 policy
variables. Bubbles’ sizes reﬂect the relative size of the particular sector (in terms of workers). See Table 1.1 for
sector deﬁnitions.
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mal/informal labor demand, two out of three of which we do not know.
We use the pre-reform share of workers above the 44 hour limit as a proxy for the incidence of
the reform in a given industry. Here again we ﬁnd substantial variation in the data. For instance,
while the non-metallic mineral goods industry was employing 60% of their workers above 44 hours,
technical services were only employing 18% in 1988. These overtime workers were mostly formal
(between 80% and 90%). After the constitutional reform, there was a substantial reduction in above
44 hours week in all industries indicating the strong reallocation effect of the policy. Panel (b) of
Figure 1.4 plots the pre-reform share of share of workers working above 44 hours against changes in
informality. It suggests that, unconditionally, the numeraire effect dominates, with industries with
more pre-reform overtime showing a reduction in informal share.
Firing Costs:
As has been observed in the literature, increases in ﬁring costs reduce both entry and exit and hence
have ambiguous effects on formal employment (see for example,Kugler 2004). Raising the costs
of ﬁring a worker reduces formal sector. However, it also increases the cost of formal separations
thereby decreasing the relative outﬂows from formal jobs.
Since the penalty ﬁrms have to pay upon dismissal is proportional to the wage of worker and the
time the worker has spent in the ﬁrm, we are able to exploit the variation of the increase in Fm
across industries. Translated into the parameters of the model this is
Fm = Tm  wf;m (1.7)
whereistheshareofthegrosswagethatgetsaccumulatedintotheFTGS(8%),  wf;m istheaver-
age formal wage in industry m,  is the penalty imposed by the government for unjustiﬁed dismissal
and Tm is the average years of tenure of formal workers in the industry. As noted, the constitutional
reform engineered a fourfold increase in  from 10% to 40%. This increase applied equally across
sectors. Since the relevant ﬁring cost must be standardize by the productivity of the worker being
dismissed and hence wages, we exploit the only remaining source of variation across industries, the
pre-reform variation in average turnover, Tm. We expect that industries with higher turnover will
face higher penalties for dismissal and hence are more likely to be affected by the change in the
penalty fee, . In particular, we use the average pre-reform tenure of ﬁred formal workers at the
industry level as our source of variation. Intuitively, we argue that those industries that, on average,
ﬁre workers at with longer tenure, after the constitutional reform, faced signiﬁcantly higher prices to
do so.
Consistent with the discussion above, panel (b) of Figure 1.4 suggests an unconditional positive
relationship between average pre-reform tenure of formal workers, and the change in the informal
work force between 1988 and 2002.
Unions:
Finally, the degree of unionization may capture how the increased union power enhanced the bargain-
ing position of workers and changed the incentives for ﬁrms to hire (and dismiss) formal workers.
This can be shown to have a similar effect to an increase in overtime pay: lower formal hiring, higher
formal ﬁring and overall, a lower overall formal sector. We exploit the pre-constitutional variation in
the unionization rate as a proxy for how the changes in the treatment of unions differentially affected
sectors. This varies from 15% in some service sectors to 40% in heavy manufacturing. Panel (b)
of Figure 1.4 suggests that unconditionally higher union density is correlated with higher levels of
14
Goñi-Pacchioni, Edwin Antonio (2011), Essays on Labor and Development Economics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27875Bosch, Go˜ ni-Pacchioni and Maloney / Trade Liberalization, Labor Reform and Formal-Informal Employment Dynamics
informality.
1.4 Estimation
We investigate the relationship between informality and our policy variables by estimating
Yjt = t + j + TRADEjtTRADE + D  CCjDCC + ujt (1.8)
Where Yjt represents one of three dependent variables relating to industry j: the share of infor-
mal workers in total labor force, which we include as a reference, and the two variables of interest,
relative informal inﬂows, or relative informal outﬂows, as deﬁned in Equation (1.4).
The scalars t and j represents year and industry ﬁxed effects, respectively, TRADEjt is a vector
containing both the log of effective tariffs and the log imports penetration as deﬁned above. Though,
in theory, the two trade variables are imperfect proxies for the same phenomenon, since we are inter-
ested in capturing as much explanatory power from the trade liberalization that might be correlated
with the constitutional variables, we include them both.
The effect of the constitution is captured by the vector CCj which contains the log of unioniza-
tion, the log of average ﬁring cost by industry (proxied by pre-reform average tenure of ﬁred formal
workers), and the log of average overtime costs by industry (proxied by the pre-reform share of
workers working more than 44 hours). Each variable is computed yearly for each of the 30 sectors
(industrial and non industrial) from 1983-2002 based on the PME. D is a dummy variable with zeros
up to 1988 (included) and ones thereafter.
Table 1.3 reports unit root tests for the various series. The Levin, Lin and Chu, and the Britung
tests impose a uniform AR1 process across all panels while the Im Pesaran and Shin, ADF and
Philips Peron tests allow different panels to exhibit different dynamics. The effective tariff is bor-
derline I(0) and import penetration appears I(1) in the constrained tests but I(0) at the 10% level
where the panels are allowed independent dynamics. For our reference dependent variable, the un-
conditional sector size, we cannot reject the presence of unit roots. Further, we ﬁnd no evidence of
cointegration with our explanatory variables so the reference speciﬁcations with these variables are
under some suspicion of spurious regression. However, with the exception of the PP test (the least
appropriate to our sample), for the two dependent variables on which our inference and simulations
are based, the relative outﬂows and inﬂows series, are I(0)14. Algebraically, it is straightforward to
show of the two I(0) series interaction allows them to generate the I(1) properties of the aggregate
series. Though our analysis is focused on these ﬂows, we report the results for the size variable for
reference purposes, fully cognizant of the unreliability of the standard errors.
Our estimation strategy is twofold. As a ﬁrst cut, we begin with a simple static speciﬁcation.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 1.4 present OLS estimations and suggest that both the trade vari-
ables and our proxies of constitutional reform played a role in increasing the share of informality
by increasing relative inﬂows into informality (import penetration, ﬁring costs, unionization) and de-
creasing the relative outﬂows of informality (import penetration and unionization). Consistent with
the unconditioned correlations plotted in Figure 1.4 sectors with higher shares of overtime workers
show smaller increases in informality after 1988.
However, these estimates are subject to Betrand & Mullainathan (2004)’s critique of the validity
of the standard errors in situations where the observations across time on either side of the discon-
14The PP test is best suited to longer t panels and hence is the least appropriate here.
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Table 1.3: Unit Root Tests
Sector Relative Relative Effective Imports GDP
Size Inflows Outflows Tariff Penetration
Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.29 0.00
Breitung t-stat 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.37
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  0.16 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.00
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.26 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.00
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.98 0.17 0.00 0.18 0.28 0.00
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Note: The table shows the p-values of the respective tests.
tinuity cannot be taken as independent. Since our constitutional variables are not continuous, but
depend on the cross sectional variation across the discontinuity at 1988, this is a concern. We pursue
two different approaches to correct for this. First, closely following Betrand & Mullainathan (2004)
we abstract from the time dimension of the data and average the observations pre-1988 and post
1988. The results are presented in the second three columns of Table 1.4. As expected, the stan-
dard errors increase substantially, although though the point estimates are not substantially altered
compared to the OLS results. We now ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of trade liberalization in the shap-
ing of informality trends during the 1990s, consistent with Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003). In contrast,
we still ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects of the constitutional variables albeit with somewhat lower levels of
signiﬁcance. Both a rise in ﬁring costs and unionization increase the share of informality. While
both ﬁring costs and unionization increase relative informal hiring, only the prevalence of unions
seem to have generated lower (higher) relative outﬂows from informality (formality). Restrictions
on overtime, continue to lower the share of the workforce in informality (albeit only marginally sig-
niﬁcantly) through increased relative informal outﬂows.
The second approach allows for dynamics in the model by introducing the lagged dependent variable
which is our preferred speciﬁcation for several reasons. First, it allows for a more realistic modeling
of the adjustment process. Second, it increases the number of observations usable in the regression
while controlling for serial correlation across observations that would bias the standard errors. Third,
it more efﬁciently uses the information from the continuous trade protection which is lost in the pre-
vious speciﬁcation. We estimate a GMM system estimation model using internal instruments for the
lagged depending variable. In particular, following Arellano & Bover (1995) we use lagged levels
of the dependent variable dated t   2 and earlier as instruments for the equations in ﬁrst-differences
and lagged ﬁrst-differences of the dependent variable as instruments for equations in levels.
The dynamic speciﬁcations are shown in columns (7) to (9) of table 1.4. The very signiﬁcant and
large coefﬁcient on the lagged dependent variable suggests the importance of its inclusion. Further
the test statistics for second order serial correlation reject the presence of serial correlation in the
differenced residual in all three cases increasing our conﬁdence in the reliability of the standard er-
rors and the validity of the internal instruments. Overall, the results are broadly the same as those in
columns (4) to (6). The short run coefﬁcients conﬁrm the roles of the ﬁring costs and unionization
variables. We now ﬁnd that the overtime variable enters as a factor that increases (decreases) inﬂows
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Table 1.4: Effects of the Trade Liberalization and Constitutional Reforms. 1983-2002
Size Relative Relative Size Relative Relative Size Relative Relative
Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows
Trade Liberalization
Tariffs -0.030 -0.017 -0.002 -0.035 0.028 0.013 -0.012** -0.008 0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.121) (0.095) (0.052) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Import Penetration 0.110*** 0.103*** -0.055*** 0.056 0.092 -0.019 -0.008 -0.005 0.003
(0.022) (0.020) (0.013) (0.100) (0.101) (0.041) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
Constitutional Change
Firing Costs 0.478*** 0.340*** -0.084 0.532** 0.374** -0.098 0.064** 0.059* -0.000
(0.096) (0.081) (0.068) (0.210) (0.172) (0.125) (0.031) (0.033) (0.040)
Unions 0.191*** 0.182*** -0.155*** 0.195*** 0.188*** -0.157*** 0.018** 0.020** -0.013
(0.025) (0.023) (0.019) (0.040) (0.031) (0.037) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Overtime -0.221*** -0.063* 0.161*** -0.198* -0.036 0.154*** -0.003 0.015* 0.008
(0.044) (0.035) (0.030) (0.097) (0.059) (0.050) (0.013) (0.008) (0.018)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.824*** 0.683*** 0.597***
(0.047) (0.044) (0.030)
Long Run Effects
Tariffs -0.068** -0.025 0.002
[0.035] [0.016] [0.011] 
Import Penetration -0.045 -0.016 0.007
[0.070] [0.024] [0.014]
Constitutional Change
Firing Costs 0.362** 0.185* -0.001
[0.178] [0.105] [0.097]
Unions 0.101** 0.063** -0.032
[0.051] [0.026] [0.026]
Overtime -0.018 0.047* 0.021
[0.077] [0.027] [0.044]
First Order (p-value) 000
Second Order (p-value) 0.712 0.611 0.15
R2 0.644 0.664 0.497 0.870 0.895 0.826 0.936 0.873 0.763
Observations 600 600 600 60 60 60 540 540 540
Ignoring Time Dimension Dynamic Structure Baseline Specification
Notes:
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Sector size corresponds to the share of informal (I) workers (both informal salaried and self-employed) in an
speciﬁc industry. Relative Inﬂows and outﬂows correspond to the new informal entries and exist into and from a
particular industry relative to formal (entries and exits) according to equation (19). All pooled by year. Imports
penetration corresponds to weighted imports/consumption by industry Firing costs corresponds to a dummy
variable (active since 1989) interacted with the pre-treatment tenure (log of average months 1983-1988) of
workers ﬁred in the speciﬁc industrial sector. Unions correspond to a dummy variable (active since 1989)
interacted with union enrollment - understood as % of unionized workers in the speciﬁc industrial sector (log
of average 1986 and 1988). Overtime corresponds to a dummy variable (active since 1989) interacted with the
proportion of workers working more than 44 hours in the speciﬁc industrial sector (log of average 1983-1987).
The Baseline speciﬁcation includes all years and industries (number of observations 600: 30 industries x 15
years). Ignoring time dimensions estimations takes average of all variables before and after the constitutional
reform (number of observations 60: 30 industries x 2 time periods). Standard errors are clustered at the industry
level. TheDynamicsspeciﬁcationshowsaGMMsystemestimatorusinglaggedlevelsofthedependentvariable
dated t   2 and earlier as instruments for the equations in ﬁrst-differences and lagged ﬁrst-differences of the
dependent variable as instruments for equations in levels, as suggested by Arellano & Bover (1995). In all
dynamic estimations the Sargan Test cannot reject the exogeneity of the internal instruments.
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to informality (formality) and the counterintuitive ﬁnding on relative outﬂows disappears. This sug-
gests that previous results were potentially capturing serial correlation and hence were inconsistent.
We now do ﬁnd effects of the tariff variable on the size of the informal sector. However, again, we are
not entirely conﬁdent of these standard errors due to the non-stationarity of the series and because
the estimates from the two stationary ﬂows series suggests no effect. The bottom panel of the table
presents the long run coefﬁcients and the joint measures of their signiﬁcance. The results remain
largely unchanged although the magnitudes are only a third to one half compared to the previous
exercise
In all, we ﬁnd very little evidence that trade liberalization played a major role in shaping infor-
mality trends in the 90s. However, the constitutional variables appear consistently signiﬁcant in our
regressions. Importantly, as in Paes de Barros & Corseuil (2004), we ﬁnd no impact of higher ﬁr-
ing costs on relative outﬂows. However, we do ﬁnd an increase in relative inﬂows into informality
consistent with a fall in formal hiring suggesting that this heretofore unexamined hiring channel is
important.
Robustness checks
Tables 1.5 reports a series of additional robustness checks of our main results for our preferred
dynamic speciﬁcation. First, we revisit Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003) concern that changes in the
composition of the workforce are partly driving the trend. For instance, if formalization is related to
educational attainment of the labor force, the observed rise in average years of education of workers
rose across this period from 6.23 to 8.68 may change the propensity of workers to become formal.
Though we do not postulate a reason why such shifts should be correlated with our covariates, we
repeat the analysis controlling for shifts in observable worker characteristics by including a set of
gender and education dummies as well as age and age squared. None of these controls enter signiﬁ-
cantly. Overall, the results stand.
Second, ideally, we would have a control of ﬁrms unaffected by both reforms to ensure that the
variation in our variables is not picking up other effects, most notably the aggregate movements in
the economy that might have affected high exposure and low exposure industries differently. To
approximate this, we rerun our exercise over an arguably similar period, the 1982-83 recessions and
the subsequent expansion. In this case we set the dummies underlying the proxies for CC equal to 0
for the period prior to 1985, a time in the cycle similar to that where the constitution was approved,
and 1 for the three years after. The second panel of both tables shows that none of the variables in the
speciﬁcation emerge signiﬁcantly with the exception of the overtime variable which enters weakly
in the suspect aggregate size regression, Our proxies do not appear to be picking up any systematic
correlations with periods of high or low growth.
Third, thus far, in the interest of explaining the overall increase in informality we have included
the entire sector, both informal salaried workers and the self employed. The third panel of Table 1.5
removes the self-employed from the sample focusing only on the salaried sector. We obtain very
similar results for the informal salaried alone in both orders of magnitude of the coefﬁcients and
degree of signiﬁcance.
Another confounding factor determining hiring/ﬁring decisions at the sector level is the evolution
of sector productivity. However, for two reasons we do not include a proxy in our main speciﬁca-
tions. First, several of the reforms are thought to have impacts through productivity and hence, we
do not want to short circuit those effects by controlling for them. Second, the relevant measure of
formal sector productivity should be complemented by the equivalent in the informal sector data
which does not exist. Hence the inclusion of an overall sectoral output variable should be seen as a
rough proxy for shared cyclical ﬂuctuations that may be correlated with our proxies. The results of
18
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including a sectoral output variable are shown in column four. The results do not change. Finally,
we rerun the regression without weighting by sector size. Again, the results do not change.
It is possible that sectors with less formal ﬂexibility in the face of trade liberalization may have
recurred more to informal employment. Alternatively, those sectors that were most affected by
constitutional reforms would have found themselves affected more if they faced high or increasing
competition from abroad. In Table 1.6, we interact each one of our three constitutional variables
with the two trade variables. We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant interactions between ﬁring costs and tar-
iffs, and between overtime pay and import penetration for both the overall size of the sector and for
relative inﬂows. A consistent effect is found on the relative outﬂows side that ﬁrms more affected by
overtime legislation increased their relative outﬂows with trade liberalization. Hence, there is some
evidence that the two reforms taken together exacerbated the impact on informality that either would
have had separately or if they had been designed to be complementary. However, as we show below
quantitatively, trade reforms can explain little of the overall change in informality.
In sum, the impact of the constitutional variables appears robust to a variety of speciﬁcation changes.
1.5 Explaining the Rise in Informality
We can now use our preferred estimates in Table 1.4 to ask how much each of the two sets of reforms
analyzed in this paper may explain the increase in informal employment. We generate the counter-
factual increases in the share of informal employment, relative informal inﬂows and relative formal
outﬂows had imports and tariffs remained at its level in 1988 (in the absence of trade) and, second,
had the constitution not being approved (in the absence of constitution).
Table 1.7 shows this exercise for our preferred dynamic speciﬁcation15. The ﬁrst row shows the
actual trends from 1988 to 2002 for the size, relative inﬂows and relative outﬂows from informality.
The share of informality over total employment increased by 0.90 percentage points a year, while the
relative inﬂows into informality increased by 2.6 percentage points a year and the relative outﬂows
from informality decreased by 3.4 percentage points a year. The next rows present the counterfactual
changes in these three variables accounting for the effects of the reforms. We ﬁnd that, had the trade
reforms not taken place the relative inﬂows into informality would have increased by only 0.8% less,
and relative outﬂows by 0.23%. By contrast, the constitutional reforms can explain up to 52% of the
relative increase in inﬂows into informality although as expected, substantially less of relative out-
ﬂows. The coefﬁcients on the size variables suggest that trade can explain 1.2% and the constitution
43% of the increase. However, given our concerns about the non stationarity of this variable, we
also present the simulated impacts on the steady state levels of informality using the counterfactual
predictions of the relative ﬂows and their contributions to changes in the level of informality from
Table 1.2. We ﬁnd that around 39% of the changes in the steady state level of informality can be
attributed to the constitutional reform and less than 1% to trade. The changes occur, essentially,
through changes in the hiring patterns of ﬁrms. The results show that trade can actually explain very
little of any of the dynamics we observe in the data. The effect of the constitutional reforms again,
on within sector informality, is sizeable.
Two sources of healthy skepticism have emerged about these results. First, Kucera & Roncolato
(2008) argue that both real wages and unionization experienced falls across the period of magni-
tudes that potentially dwarf the cost implications of the constitutional reforms. On the ﬁrst count,
when the correct deﬂator is used (see Corseuil & Foguel 2002), real wages average roughly the same
15Very similar quantitative results are obtained if instead we use the estimates of Tables 1.5 and 1.6
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Tariffs 0.005 -0.017 -0.002
(0.010) (0.016) (0.017)
Import Penetration -0.029 -0.012 0.008
(0.018) (0.011) (0.013)
Constitutional Change
Firing Costs 0.009 0.044 0.034
(0.037) (0.040) (0.051)
Unions 0.018** 0.020** -0.014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Overtime -0.019 0.011 0.014
(0.014) (0.011) (0.017)
Interactions
Firing Costs X Tariffs -0.032** -0.032* -0.002
(0.014) (0.018) (0.012)
Unions X Tariffs 0.003 0.010 -0.014
(0.018) (0.023) (0.014)
Overtime X Tariffs 0.066 0.074 0.052**
(0.050) (0.052) (0.024)
Firing Costs X Imp. Pent.  -0.025 -0.033 -0.020
(0.024) (0.029) (0.019)
Unions X Imp. Pent. -0.006 0.006 0.009
(0.029) (0.035) (0.018)
Overtime X Imp. Pent. 0.116*** 0.085* 0.017
(0.038) (0.046) (0.026)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.789*** 0.678*** 0.847***
(0.049) (0.044) (0.061)
First Order (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Second Order (p-value) 0.99 0.60 0.15
Observations 540 540 540
R2 0.646 0.69 0.473
Dynamic
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. In all estimations the Sargan Test
cannot reject the exogeneity of the internal instruments. See also Notes in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.
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Table 1.7: Actual and Latent Trends
 
Size Relative Relative Explained
Inflows Outflows Changes in SS 
Actual 0.909*** 2.596*** -3.467***
(0.092) (0.831) (0.190)
Latent (in the absence of Trade) 0.898*** 2.575*** -3.459***
(0.090) (0.827) (0.192)
Explained by changes in Trade 1.2% 0.8% 0.23% 0.65%
Latent (in the absence of Constitution) 0.516** 1.250 -3.447***
(0.177) (0.715) (0.290)
Explained by changes in the Constitution 43% 52% 0.6% 39.15%
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
The table shows the trends in the size, relative inﬂows and relative outﬂows of the informal sector. The actual
coefﬁcients are obtained from regressing the appropriate variable on a linear trend for the period 1988 to 2002.
The latent trends are obtained by subtracting from the actual data the effect of either trade of constitutional
variables using the dynamic speciﬁcation in Table 1.4 and then regressing the resulting series on a linear trend.
The last column shows the explained changes in the steady state level of informality using the results from
relative inﬂows and relative outﬂows and the estimates from Table 1.2 on the contributions of each ﬂow to the
changes in the steady state.
level in the pre- and post-reform periods16. On the second count, our calculations with the PNAD
conﬁrm the ﬁndings from others that union density indeed fell across the period (see, for example,
Arbache (2004)) and this presumably led to a decrease of indeterminate magnitude in the bite of the
reforms. That said, our estimates rely on the variance of union density across sectors and this was
preserved: the overall decline occurred remarkably uniformly leading to a correlation of the 1984
and 1999 sectoral densities of .93 and a rank correlation of .92. Hence, the pre-reform values of
unionization that we use are well-correlated with ongoing cross-sectoral variation in union power,
and are unaffected by the reforms which is precisely what we need for consistent estimation. Hence
neither concern weakens our results.
The second concern is that 2000s witnessed a signiﬁcant recovery of formality despite the persis-
tence of the reforms above and, in fact, a sustained rise in the minimum wage. Though falling
outside of the coverage of our panel and analysis, this evolution merits a brief comment.
First, the central fact about this period is the sustained expansion of roughly 5% after 2004. Infor-
mality is highly responsive to the business cycle and hence, raw comparisons of its evolution across
periods might be misleading. Bosch et al. (2009) show the cyclical formal employment elasticity of
0.5 with respect to the cyclical component of output and we may expect the long run elasticity to
be somewhat larger. Since this elasticity is effectively conditional on extant labor distortions, this
implies a secular increase in the formal sector of at least 2.5% per year.
Second, kernel density plots (available on request) conﬁrm that, indeed, the minimum wage became
increasingly binding from 2002 to 2010. However, there are reasons to believe that this is consistent
16The ofﬁcial CPI implies a dramatic increase in real wages across the post reform period, a phenomenon discussed by
Chamon (1998). However, Corseuil & Foguel (2002) argue that the ofﬁcial CPI series badly understates inﬂation in 1994 due
to mishandling the coexistence of the Real and the Cruzeiro in that year. When their deﬂator is used and correctly centered in
the series, the real wage, while showing some volatility, is roughly equal in the pre and post reform periods.
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Table 1.8: Measures of Informality by Geographical Division
Table 8a: Employment Shares by Geographical Division 
 
 
Table 8b: Relative Growth Rates of Population by Geographical Division 
 
 
Table 8c: Relative Growth Rates of Employed Labor Force by Geographical Division 
 
 
Sector Survey Year Urban Rural Metropolitan
Non-
Metropolitan
Formal PNAD 1981 57.37 18.51 65.57 38.92
PME 1983 63.25
Informal PNAD 1981 42.63 81.49 34.43 61.08
PME 1983 36.75
Formal PNAD 1990 54.57 26.68 61.04 42.16
PME 1990 61.34
Informal PNAD 1990 45.43 73.32 38.96 57.84
PME 1990 38.66
Formal PNAD 2001 46.78 20.00 51.52 38.95
PME 2001 52.96
Informal PNAD 2001 53.22 80.00 48.48 61.05
PME 2001 47.04
Survey Year Urban Rural Metropolitan
Non-
Metropolitan
Millions of Inhabitants PNAD 1981 55.12 19.56 24.81 49.87
PNAD 1990 70.20 22.52 30.07 62.66
PNAD 2001 102.80 18.21 39.87 81.14
Growth (in %) 1990/1981 27.36 15.17 21.19 25.64
2001/1990 46.45 -19.16 32.61 29.51
Survey Year Urban Rural Metropolitan
Non-
Metropolitan
Millions of Workers PNAD 1981 29.53 8.70 13.78 24.45
PNAD 1990 40.87 11.05 17.79 34.13
PNAD 2001 57.26 8.93 22.22 43.97
Growth (in %) 1990/1981 38.38 27.09 29.10 39.60
2001/1990 40.11 -19.22 24.86 28.84
Notes: The ﬁgures consider to individuals above 15 years of age only. PNAD has national coverage. PME cov-
ers 6 major metropolitan areas only, but has a panel dimension. Panel (a) shows that both surveys yield similar
employment shares in metropolitan areas. Panel (b) shows that, while there is clearly rural/urban migration this
does not translate to substantial non-metropolitan to metropolitan shifts. Panel (c) is the counterpart of (b) for
the employed labor force.
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with the observed rise in formality. First, as has been found in other studies17, the minimum wage is
often more binding in the informal sector than the formal sector, leaving some ambiguity about the
degree to which relative wages have moved against formal employment for low wage workers. Sec-
ond, Lemos (2009) ﬁnds no impact of the minimum wage on employment, although Neumark et al.
(2004), more pessimistically, ﬁnd that an increase that binds an additional 10% of the workforce
reduces employment of household heads by 1.56 percentage points, with no or positive impact on
non-household heads18. The rise from 13% to 17% bound from 2002 to 2010 would therefore lead
to a maximum of 2.5 percentage points (assuming that half of the formal employed are household
heads) decrease in formality, a fraction of our minimum estimate of the rise caused by growth.
Other possible explanations
In the simulations above, the trade variables with substantial variation explain around 1% of the
secular movements in informality. The constitutional reform is able to explain around 40%. Ideally,
we might have more time series variation that could concretely rule out other possible phenomena
not related to labor market legislation. We brieﬂy review two possible candidates.
First, along with the Constitutional reforms affecting labor markets were initiatives changing the
nature of health system implemented in the early 1990s that granted universal access to health ser-
vices19. Carneiro & Henley (2003) suggest that uncovered employment may have risen because
employees and employers collude to avoid costly contributions to a social protection system that is
perceived to be inappropriate, inefﬁcient and poor value for the money20. In principle, then, a univer-
salization of health care de-linked from the labor market may have changed the cost beneﬁt analysis
of being enrolled in, and hence contributing to, formal sector beneﬁts programs. In the end, they
conclude that this is unlikely, not only because public health services continued to be thought of as
substantially worse than the formal sector product21, but also because the effective supply of these
services was available even for non contributors several years before the reforms took place: As
early as 1981 roughly 49% of self employed and 59% of the informal salaried compared to 48% of
the formal salaried report that they received attention from a public health provider22. Further, little
progress had been made on implementing the measures contemplated in the 1991 Social Security
Reform.
17This ”efeito farol” or lighthouse effect where norms in the informal sector are set in the formal has been documented
earlier in the Brazilian case by Souza & Baltar (1979), Neri et al. (2000), and Latin America more generally by Maloney &
Nunez (2001).
18Second, much of rise represents catch up from declines across the post reform period (see Lemos 2009). We ﬁnd that the
share of workers at the minimum wage in 2010 is 17%, up from 8% in 1998, but not so far above the 15% in the immediate
post reform (1990-1994) period. Hence, viewed as an extension of our previous analysis, the net change in the minimum
wage from the beginning of the reforms to the present is relatively small.
19Among the changes contemplated in the Social Security System Reform of 1991 (which comprises pensions, health, and
social aid), health related amendments are the only candidates to be considered as possibly determinants. Although pensions
reforms loosened the requirements to perceive a pension (age for eligibility and required years of services were lowered) and
increased the beneﬁts of recipients (see De Carvalho (2002) for a summary of the characteristics of the Brazilian security
system before and after the reform), two reasons reduce its suitability to explain the composition and dynamics of the labor
market: ﬁrst, beneﬁts are computed as a function of documented past earnings over the cumulated time of services except
for those perceiving the minimum pensions hence in any of those cases there is no incentive for workers to move between
formality or informality because of potential gains in switching due to pensions; second, the reforms should have exerted
more effects over the elder population close to retirement which is not the critic mass driving the size and dynamics of the
labor sectors.
20Their estimates suggest that the earnings premium needed in the marketplace to compensate covered workers for having
to make social security contributions varies between 7.5% and 12.2% of the mean uncovered hourly wage.
21The public system acts as a ﬂoor, available to all but used primarily by the lower classes (Jack, 2000). Although
evaluation of standards for minimum quality in infrastructure, human resources, ethical, technical and scientiﬁc procedures in
hospitals have been implemented, these practices are far from being universal in the services network, (Pan-American-Health-
Organization, 2005).
22PNAD 1981. Non urban dwellers excluded.
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Second, there was an increase in the magnitude of ﬂows from the rural to the urban areas across
the 1990s that, in principle, were it all directed toward the informal sector, might explain part of the
rise23. Table 1.8 suggests that this is not the case. Panel (a) shows that the PNAD survey, which
covers the entire population, yields very similar formal and informal sector shares when the sample
is restricted to the metropolitan regions covered by the PME24. This cross check suggests that our
two surveys are telling very consistent stories. The PNAD also shows that the rural sector is far less
formal and hence the idea that migration to the city might lead to urban informalization is plausible25.
However, panels (b) and (c) show that, while there was substantial rural to urban migration across
the period, this did not map into a large shift in metropolitan-non metropolitan shares of population
or of the work force. For the 1990-2001 period, the employed rural work force contracted by 19%
(2 million workers) while the urban growth rate rose 40%. However growth rate of the metropolitan
and non-metropolitan areas was a very similar 25% and 29% respectively reﬂecting far small real-
locations. Even under the extreme and unsupportable assumption that those 2 million rural workers
who moved to urban areas were informal and had migrated exclusively to metropolitan areas (which
are a subset of urban areas), they could explain at most half of the 4 million observed increase of
the informal. Further, this would imply no increase in the number of informal workers in the non-
metropolitan areas which actually rose from 20 to 27 million as can be inferred from panels (a) and
(c). In short, most of the rise in informality must be due to reallocation of labor within geographical
sub regions.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper has sought to explain the dramatic rise in the size of the informal sector over the decade
of the 1990s by studying the impact of trade and constitutional reforms on gross labor ﬂows. We
establish that trade liberalization played a relatively small part in this increase, but ﬁnd suggestive
evidence that several dimensions of the constitutional reform, in particular, regulations relating to
ﬁring costs, overtime, and union power, explain much more. Both effects work mostly through the
reduction in hiring rates, rather than separation rates that have been investigated most in the literature
to date. Overall, the ﬁndings conﬁrm the importance of labor legislation to ﬁrms’ decisions to create
new formal sector jobs in Brazil.
1.7 Appendix
1.8 An Illustrative Model
As a way of organizing thinking on the impacts on gross ﬂows of the innovations discussed above,
we build a highly stylized search and matching model of interactions between the formal and infor-
mal sector. We assume that ﬁrms can hire workers under two production technologies. The ﬁrst is
suitable for relatively low productivity workers and is difﬁcult to monitor by the government. Get-
ting the most out of intrinsically more productive workers requires, however, a technology that is
easier to monitor by the government and hence the ﬁrm must comply with all regulations and make
23See Ramos & Ferreira (2005b,a) for a comprehensive description of the regional patterns of the Brazilian workforce.
24A Metropolitan Region is a group of speciﬁc limiting municipalities. By Constitutional prerogative, such a group is
deﬁned by each speciﬁc State of the country with the purpose of improving the planning and the execution of public functions
of common interest. As a point of reference, according to PNAD, about 97% of the population and of the employed workforce
older than 15 years living in Metropolitan Regions is classiﬁed as Urban.
25Dwellers are classiﬁed either as Urban or Rural according to the geographical location of their residences. A residence
is classiﬁed as Urban if it is located on a city (municipal level), on a village (distrital level) or in isolated urban areas. A
residence is classiﬁed as Rural if it is located outside the aforementioned locations.
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the worker formal. We might think of subcontracting jobs that are able to be done at home, or that are
simply not very visible compared to work that involves specialized machinery and a ﬁxed location
or plant. The model focuses on the hiring and ﬁring decision of ﬁrms, as they are confronted with
high and lower productivity applicants and their decision at the margin between choosing formal or
informal labor.
Let V be the present discounted value (PDV) for a ﬁrm of the expected proﬁt from posting a vacancy.
The total number of matches between ﬁrms and workers, m, is given by the matching technology
m = m(u;v), where u and v represent the number of unemployed workers and vacancies respec-
tively. Firms ﬁnd workers at an average rate q() = m=v, where  is the vacancy to unemployment
ratio (v=u). Similarly, workers ﬁnd ﬁrms at an average rate of q() = m=u
We assume that once the ﬁrm and the worker have met, the ﬁrm observes the true idiosyncratic
productivity of the match, x, which is drawn randomly from a known c.d.f. G(x). Given x, the ﬁrm
decides to hire the worker formally or informally. Here we greatly simplify the decision by assuming
that only formal workers can take advantage of the idiosyncratic productivity of the match. If the
ﬁrm hires the worker formally the productivity of the match is given by pfx where pf is an over-
all productivity parameter for formal jobs. If, instead the ﬁrm uses an informal contract the match
produces pi, independently of the value of x. This mechanism generates that, consistent with the
data, the most productive matches give rise to formal contracts. Jf(x) and Ji represent the PDV for
the ﬁrm of occupied formal and informal jobs respectively. It is straightforward, then, to show that
there is a reservation productivity xf that will make the ﬁrm indifferent between hiring the worker
formally or informally. Hence, we can write the ﬂow value of a vacant job for the ﬁrm as




(Jf(x)   V )dG(x) + G(xf)(Ji   V )
#
(1.9)
where r is the interest rate, c is the instantaneous cost of keeping the vacancy open. Similarly, the
value for the ﬁrm of occupied formal and informal jobs can be expressed as
rJi = pi   wi   i(Ji   V ) (1.10)




(Jf(s) Jf(x))dG(s) fG(xd)(Jf(x)+F  V ) (1.11)
The production technology of informal workers is very simple. A worker hired produces pi in
an exchange for wi. Exogenous shocks arrive to informal jobs at rate i, at which point the match is
destroyed.
Formal ﬁrms have to abide by labor codes, so that, on top of the wage wf, they have to pay an
overtime premium , in case they have to work over the legal maximum hours per week. This ex-
cess in hours is represented by h, which is considered exogenous in the model. The last two terms
of equation (1.11) capture the continuation value of the job. We assume that ongoing formal jobs
are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks a la Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) that modify the
productivity of the match. These shocks arrive at rate f. However, in this case the jobs are not
automatically destroyed. Upon the arrival of a shock, a new value for x is drawn from G(x). The
matches are only destroyed if the new productivity value renders the match unproﬁtable. Let this
idiosyncratic productivity be xd. If the new productivity is above xd the match persists. If is below
xd the ﬁrm destroys the relationship paying ﬁring costs F.
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The workers problem is similar of that of the ﬁrm. The present discounted value of unemploy-
ment, U, can be written as




(Wf(x)   U)dG(x) + G(xf)(Wi   U)
#
(1.12)
where b is the ﬂow of income when unemployed and q() = m(u;v)=u is the rate at which workers
meet ﬁrms and Wf(x) and Wi are the present discounted value for the worker of a formal and infor-
mal job respectively. Again, the contract will be formal if the idiosyncratic productivity is above xf.
Once the contract is signed the worker enjoys wf(x) or wi depending on whether the contract is
formal or informal, until the job is destroyed endogenously for formal workers or exogenously for
informal ones26.
rWi = wi + i(U   Wi) (1.13)




(Wf(s)   Wf(x))dG(s)   fG(xd)(Wf   U) (1.14)
As is standard in the literature, wages in this model maximize the joint surplus and determine
the following sharing rules for formal and informal jobs27.
Jf(x)   V + F =
1   






where  is the workers bargaining power.28 Using this sharing rule and equations (1.9) to (1.14)
we can obtain the two wage equations for formal and informal jobs respectively,
wf(x) = (1   )b + pf(x + c + rF   h) (1.16)
wi = (1   )b + pi(1 + c)
In this framework the equilibrium of the model must satisfy three conditions that determine our
three endogenous variables; how many vacancies to post (which would determine ) when to hire a
formal worker (xf) and when to ﬁre formal worker (xd). As usual in search and matching models,
the free entry condition determines that there cannot be any proﬁtable opportunities from vacancy
posting, hence V = 0. Second, optimal hiring of formal workers must satisfy that the ﬁrm is indiffer-
ent between hiring the marginal worker formally or informally, that is Jf(xf) = Ji. Finally, optimal
26Note, that neither overtime pay, h, or ﬁring costs, F, accrue to the value of a formal job for the worker. This is due to
the nature of wage negotiation in this framework. Since ﬁrm and worker share the surplus of the match any transfer between
the two parties will not have an impact in equilibrium. This is standard in the literature, see Pissarides (2000).
27It can be argued that the initial bargaining rule should not consider ﬁring cost in the threat point of the ﬁrm since they
are still not operational. This would give rise to two different wage equations for formal workers. This variation leaves the
results qualitatively unchanged.
28One could argue that the bargaining power of formal and informal workers, , is different. This has no consequences in
the model.
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ﬁring of workers must satisfy that the reservation productivity xd makes the formal job unproﬁtable.
This happens when Jf(xd) + F = 0.
Using equations (1.9) to (1.16) and our three equilibrium conditions we obtain the three equilib-


































pfxd = b +

(1   )






pf (s   xd)dG(s) (1.19)
It is straight forward to show that the equilibrium in this model exists and it is unique (see Ap-
pendix 1.8.1 for details).
With knowledge of , xf and xd we can derive the evolution stock of workers. Formal employ-
ment, n + f, is determined by the law of motion
_ nf = q()(1   G(xf))u   fG(xd)nf (1.20)
Similarly, informal employment follows the law of motion
_ ni = q()G(xf)u   ini (1.21)
Normalizing the labor force to one, unemployment is given by,
u = 1   nf   ni (1.22)
The share of informal employment, is given by i = ni
















Equation (1.23) states that the share of informal employment in the model is a composite of the
relative inﬂows into informality
G(xf)
1 G(xf), and the relative outﬂows from informality i
fG(xd). These,
along with the sectoral shares, are the dependent variables whose movements we seek to explain in
this study.
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1.8.1 Equilibrium and Effect of Policies
The equilibrium of the model is determined by free entry, optimal hiring and optimal hiring condi-
tions. These determine the three equilibrium equations in our model (equations (1.17) to (1.19)).
It is straightforward to show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in this model. Higher
, increases the left hand side of the free entry condition since more vacancies per unemployed in-
creases waiting time for ﬁrms and hence the expected cost of posting a vacancy. Furthermore, it
lowers the right hand side this same equation since the formal separation threshold in equilibrium
(xd) depends positively on . Note that in equilibrium, the formal/informal threshold, xf, does not
alter the expected proﬁts from posting a vacancy due to in the virtue of the envelope condition it sat-
isﬁesJf(xf) = Ji. Hence, thereisa uniquevalueof thatsatisﬁesequationthefreeentrycondition.
Effects of policies
Trade liberalization: We model trade liberalization simply as a change in the relative productivity of
the formal sector relative to the informal. On the one hand, lower barriers increase the competition
that an industry, and reduces the wedge between formal and informal productivity (formal sector
rents) within an industry (for a given pi, pf decreases). This shifts hiring towards informal labor
(increase in xf) and increases the threshold of separations in the formal sector (increase in xd). Both
effects generate a reduction in the share of formal employment formal sector. However, in a contrary
effect, reducing tariffs and quotas also permits greater access to imported capital goods and other
intermediate inputs that may increase relative formal sector productivity.
Firing Costs: Raising the costs of ﬁring a worker enters into the overall cost calculation in a manner
similar to that of the overtime pay and shifts hiring from formal to informal employment (higher xf).
However, in this case the increased cost of formal separation decreases the relative outﬂows from
formal jobs (lower xd). As has been observed in the literature this implies that increases in ﬁring
costs, by reducing both entry and exit, have ambiguous effects on formal employment (See Kugler
2004).
Total differentiation of equations (1.17) to (1.19) allows us to unambiguously sign the effect of



















































Overtime Pay: Our model suggests that that an increase in the overtime pay () will reduce de-
mand for formal labor. This translates into a reduced formal hiring relative to informal hiring, higher
xf, and an increase in the relative separation from formal jobs, higher xd. Both forces imply a reduc-
tion in the share of formal employment. Further, we argue that the impact will be greater in those
industries where the use of overtime (prior to the reform) was greater, greater h in the model. Hence,
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we expect that industries with a higher share of their working hours above the post constitutional
maximum hours a week would see the greatest impact.

















































It is important to note that while our model captures the depressive effect of increased costs
on formal labor demand there may a countervailing numeraire effect: Though total hours worked
by formal workers may fall, the fewer hours that each employee may legally work implies that the
number of workers may actually rise. Determining the net effect requires knowledge of the number
of overtime hours, the cost imposed by the overtime legislation, and especially the elasticity of for-
mal/informal labor demand, two out of three of which we do not know.
Unions: Finally, the degree of unionization may capture how the increased union power enhanced
the bargaining position of workers and changed the incentives for ﬁrms to hire (and dismiss) formal
workers. This effect is captured in the model by the parameter . We can show that an increase
in , under some regularity conditions (that the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
unemployment is equal to ), has a similar effect to an increase in overtime pay: lower formal hiring,
higher formal ﬁring and overall, a lower overall formal sector.





































(1   )2 r+fG(xd))
(r+f)
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In this case, we cannot unambiguously sign the effect of unions on the hiring and ﬁring margin.
However it can be shown that assuming () = , as it is standard in the literature, we can prove
that marginal changes in  do not change the ﬁring margin but shift the hiring margin towards hiring
informal workers.
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Formality, Labor Productivity, Wage Setting and
Income Risk1
Edwin A. Go˜ ni-Pacchioni2
Abstract
One possible explanation for the modest correlation observed between wages and productivity
in most of the existing related literature is that such lack of correspondence holds for workers in
ongoing work contracts -the group with bigger participation in the labor workforce- but not for
workers starting new labor relationships. Recent studies have shown that wages for this last group
correlates to aggregate productivity with elasticities close to one. Our paper adds to this tradition
with some distinctive aspects. First, it revisits the hypothesis of rigid wages (understood as barely
responsive or non-responsive to productivity shocks) for job stayers and ﬂexible wages for new hires
(or job movers) in a LDC context, for the biggest Latin American economy. Second, it exploits
ﬁner measures of productivity coming from ﬁrm surveys rather than just traditional aggregates such
as GDP per unit of aggregate labor. Third, it expands the conventional approach from the formal
sector to the informal one. Fourth, it attempts for a variance decomposition of earnings for workers
groupedaccordingtoseveralcriteria(mobility, formality)aswellasforameasureofthecontribution
of productivity shocks to income volatility. Our ﬁndings are consistent with those observed in the
US economy and suggest that in the Brazilian manufacturing sector, wages elasticities are higher for
newcomers than for incumbents and that such elasticities are close to one for new hires in the formal
sector. We also ﬁnd that transitory income shocks are dominant in workers earnings volatility with
productivity shocks being fully insured by ﬁrms for formal workers and not for the informal ones.
2.1 Introduction
Recent contributions to the unemployment volatility puzzle literature have focused in the theoretical
role of the marginal worker in the process of wage setting and in the empirical correlation between
1This study has beneﬁtted from invaluable discussions with Mariano Bosch, William Maloney, Alan Manning and Mas-
similiano Marcellino. We thank to Marc-Andreas Muendler for sharing his data on productivity, to Barbara Petrongolo and
LSE Labor-Seminar participants for helpful insights and to Luigi Guiso, Salvador Ortigueira and Moritz Meyer for their
comments during the EUI 2010 Third Year Forum. The usual disclaimers apply.
2Department of Economics, European University Institute (Edwin.Goni@EUI.eu) and London School of Economics
(Edwin.Goni@EUI.eu) and London School of Economics (E.A.Goni-Pacchioni@lse.ac.uk)
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this wage and broad productivity measures. Before these contributions, the mainstream of the lit-
erature suggested poor empirical correlation between aggregate measures of wages and aggregate
measures of productivity. Indeed, the traditional view that wages are sticky over the cycle3 was com-
monly derived from aggregate time-series4. This convention has been recast recently. Signiﬁcant ef-
forts in the labor market literature have been devoted to appeal for some mechanism5 able to improve
the performance of labor market models with search frictions in order to match the business cycle
facts that are found in the data (Haefke et al., 2008; Pissarides, 2009; Carlsson et al., 2009; Gertler &
Trigari, 2009; Costain & Reiter, 2008; Menzio, 2005; Rudanko, 2008; Farmer, 2006; Moen & Rosen,
2006; Blanchard & Gali, 2008; Hall & Milgrom, 2008; Shimer, 2009). Most of these contributions
stress the importance of marginal workers (or equivalently, workers transiting from unemployment
into employment in the ﬂows of job creation or, simply, the new hires) in the wage bargaining pro-
cess. For instance, Pissarides (2009) shows that the job creation condition that drives the volatility of
the job ﬁnding rate depends on the wage bargain in new jobs. Moreover, he claims that time-series
or panel studies on the cyclical volatility of wages show considerable stickiness, but this evidence is
dominated by wages in ongoing jobs and it is not relevant for job creation in the search and matching
model. He also claims that an examination of panel data evidence on the volatility of wages in new
jobs shows that volatility is about the same as in the Nash wage equation of the canonical search
and matching model. In a related vein, Haefke et al. (2008) ﬁnd that US data is consistent with the
conventional argument that wages are rigid but just in ongoing jobs. More interesting, they also ﬁnd
that this is not longer the case when focusing on wages of newly hired workers or new matches. In
fact, such wages, unlike the aggregate ones, are volatile and respond one-to-one to changes in labor
productivity. We build mainly upon these two contributions.
Our study adds to this literature and makes a number of contributions. First, it shows consistency
between the ﬁndings for the US market and those observed in the biggest Latin American labor
market, where wages paid to newly hired formal workers (or to job movers) in the manufacturing
sector are strongly correlated to the ﬁrms productivity of that sector. Second, it exploits ﬁner mea-
sures of productivity -and hence it exploits cross sectional industrial variation- coming from ﬁrm
surveys rather than just traditional aggregates such as global GDP per aggregate unit of labor. Third,
it expands the scope of the seminal contributions by introducing the analysis of the informal labor
sector which roughly represents half of the Brazilian labor force Bosch et al. (2009) and therefore
merits attention. In addition, we decompose the wage volatility observed in different sectors (formal,
informal, stayers, movers) into their permanent and transitory parts and we attempt for a quantitative
approximation of the contribution of the productivity volatility to the determination of these compo-
nents.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the source of infor-
mation used in this study, Section 2.3 explains the relevance of new hires and job to job transitions
and its role to understand the wage and productivity volatility puzzle, Section 2.4 provides a brief
summary of the Brazilian institutional framework for wage settings and a description of the estima-
tion technique, Section 2.5 reports the empirical results, Section2.6 explains the methodology for
the permanent and transitory decomposition and delivers the results, Section 4.4 concludes.
3Keynes-Tarshis-Dunlop controversy.
4Series which in turn pick up the dominating effect of less-volatile incumbents’ earnings.
5usually consisting of wage rigidities
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2.2 Data
2.2.1 Labor allocation and wages
We draw from the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, hereafter PME6)
that conducts extensive monthly household interviews in 6 of the major metropolitan regions7 cov-
ering roughly 25% of the national labor market. The questionnaire is extensive in its coverage of
participation in the labor market, wages, hours worked, etc. that are traditionally found in such em-
ployment surveys. The PME is structured as a rotating panel, tracking each household during four
consecutive months and then dropping them from the sample for 8 months, then reintroducing them
for another 4 months. Each month one fourth of the sample is substituted with a new panel. Thus,
after 4 months the whole initial sample has been rotated, after 8 months a third different sample is
being surveyed, and after 12 months the initial sample is interviewed. Over a period of two years,
three different panels of households are surveyed, and the process starts again with three new panels.
Regrettably, the PME was drastically modiﬁed in 2002 and it is not possible to reconcile the new
and old deﬁnitions for unemployment and job sectors. Hence, analysis done with this data can at
best begin in 1983 and stop at 2002.
From this dataset we can also identify the formality or informality of the labor force. There is broad
consensus in the literature on the deﬁnition of informality from a labor market perspective both in
the mainstream and Brazilian literature. A comprehensive survey of the literature studying the size
and evolution of the Brazilian informal sector in the labor market can be found in Ulyssea (2005)
and a summary of stylized facts of this sector covering eighties and nineties is detailed in Ramos
& Reis (1997); Ramos (2002); Ramos & Brito (2003); Veras (2004); Ramos & Ferreira (2005b,a);
Bosch et al. (2007, 2009). We follow this literature in deﬁnition by dividing employed workers into
three sectors: formal salaried (F)-public employees and workers whose contract is not registered in
his/her work-card or carteira de trabalho8 that entitle the worker to labor rights and beneﬁts; infor-
mal salaried (I), without carteira; and informal self employed (S.E.). Ideally, following the ILO we
would distinguish by ﬁrm size as well, focusing on establishments of small number of employees as
informal employees, however the PME does not tabulate this information and hence, we rely purely
on the basis of lack of signed carteira- as the critical distinguishing characteristic9.
We match workers observed in four consecutive monthly datasets. This allows us to identify newly
hired workers as those workers that were not employed for at least one of the three months before
we observe their wages. In a similar fashion, we can also trace job to job movements (deﬁned as
displacements from one labor sector or industrial sector to another between periods). Non-mover
workers are deﬁned as those who are not classiﬁed as new hires or job to job movers. In addition,
we have information on worker characteristics (gender, age, education, race, marital status, etc.),
industry, occupation and labor sector so we can control for these covariates.
6For descriptions of the methodology of the PME, see Sedlacek et al. (1990); IBGE (1991); Oliveira (1999).
7S˜ ao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife and Salvador.
8According to the Brazilian legislation, registered workers are the ones whose labor contract is registered on their work-
card. This registration entitles them to several wage and non-wage beneﬁts such as 30 days of paid holiday per year, contri-
bution for social security, right to request unemployment beneﬁt in case of dismissal, monetary compensation if dismissed
without a fair cause, maternity and paternity paid leave and so on.
9The ILO deﬁnes informality as consisting of all own-account workers (but excluding administrative workers, profes-
sionals and technicians), unpaid family workers, and employers and employees working in establishments with less than 5.
In fact, Bosch & Maloney (2006) ﬁnd that in Mexico, the ILO’s criteria of small ﬁrm size and ours of lack of registration are
similar in motivation conceptually and lead to a great deal of overlap. 75% of informal workers are found in ﬁrms of 10 or
fewer workers. Since owners of ﬁrms or self-employed are not obliged to pay social security contributions for themselves,
we in fact consider them as informal self-employed with no social security contributions (and hence without the beneﬁts that
are perceived by salaried workers holding a carteira).
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2.2.2 Firms Productivity
Our data of ﬁrms10 comprises a random three-ﬁrm aggregate of the Annual Manufacturing Survey
(Pesquisa Industrial Anual or PIA)11. This is because IBGE’s (the Brazilian Statistical Bureau) pub-
lication rules allow data from PIA to be withdrawn in the form of tabulations of cells having at least
three ﬁrms. The random three-ﬁrm aggregates are formed within a continuous sample presence pat-
tern after excluding discontinuous spells12. A unit of observation is drawn then from each Industrial
Sector 13, calendar year 14 and location (metropolitan S˜ ao Paulo15 or rural). If the total number of
ﬁrms within such a group (sector-year-location) is not divisible by three, a single four- or ﬁve-ﬁrm
group is formed.
In this dataset, ﬁrms output is deﬁned as sales (excluding resales) plus inventory buildup. We also
dispose of employment grouped in blue and white collar work (separately used for productivity esti-
mation). Log total factor productivity comes from an estimation using the Olley-Pakes method at the
individual ﬁrm level16. Brieﬂy, if the conventional Total Factor Productivity (TFP) approximation







where Yi;t represents the levels of output Y of ﬁrm i in period t, M represents the level of
intermediate inputs, L represents the level of labor, K the level of equipment and  is a exogenously
set parameter 17 and if the OLS estimate of the same object is given by:
lnTFP OLS
i;t = yi;t   (^ Kki;t + ^ Ssi;t + ^ Mmi;t + ^ Lli;t)
where variables not stated in capital letters represent the natural logarithm of the corresponding
value in levels, then the TFP results from the Olley and Pakes estimation procedure takes this last
expression and extends it by allowing to the managers of the ﬁrms to do an efﬁciency-choice adjust-
ment.
Once log TFP is computed, log labor productivity is inferred by substracting the capital stock mea-
sures, weighted with their production-function coefﬁcients, from log TFP at the ﬁrm level.
It is important to mention that we got access to both, the estimates of the ﬁrm-level log TFP series
and log labor productivity series, but not to the intermediate inputs necessary for its computation.
Nevertheless, provided that we got access to the measures of output and of labor, we also compute
the ratio output/labor for each three-ﬁrm aggregate as an additional proxy for productivity.
Finally, we draw from Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) series of aggregate in-
dustrial productivity (ratio of real industrial production index and workers in the industrial sector)
and of aggregate real GDP.
10We thank to Marc-Andreas Muendler for sharing the data of ﬁrm productivity.
11For a detailed description of data construction, see Menezes-Filho et al. (2008).
12As explained by Menezes-Filho et al. (2008), exclusion of discontinuous spells means that ﬁrms are retained starting
with their ﬁrst observation in the sample and through all subsequent years until a year of absence occurs for a ﬁrm. From the
ﬁrst year of absence on, the ﬁrm is kept out of the sample. This way, discontinuous spells are effectively precluded. The idea
behind forming aggregates only within continuous sample presence patterns was to lump similar ﬁrms regarding entry and
exit.
13Nivel 50 Sectors consist of 31 manufacturing sectors corresponding roughly to the two digit ISIC3 sectors
14The dataset covers the period 1990-1998. The calendar year 1991 is missing from the PIA sample because a federal
austerity program suspended the survey in 1991.
15S˜ ao Paulo state hosts roughly half of Brazil’s manufacturing value added during the sample period.
16See Muendler (2004) for a detailed description of the method
17Usually 1=3
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2.3 New hires, job stayers and job movers
Yet this study is mainly focused into the analysis of wages, it is still closely related to the behavior of
allocations. This is not only by virtue of obvious equilibrium conditions 18 but also because the clas-
siﬁcation of workers according to their mobility group (new hires, job to job movers, incumbents)
implicitly carries a process of allocations and reallocations within and between sectors.
Moreover, and due to the differentiated patterns one ﬁnds in the ﬂows fueling the expansion (or
contraction) of those sectors, it is possible to distinguish the relative importance of creation ﬂows
(new hires) in the determination of the size of the employment sector and not only in wages as this
study is aimed at showing.
For instance, Bosch & Maloney (2007) explain “Shimer (2005a) -studying the US labor market-
ﬁnds that there are substantial ﬂuctuations in unemployed workers job ﬁnding probability at business
cycle frequencies, while employed workers separation probability is comparatively acyclic. Such an
observation is particularly true in the last two decades, period in which the separation probability has
steadily declined despite two spikes in the unemployment rate. Thus, Shimer found that virtually all
of the increase in unemployment and decrease in employment during the 1991 and 2001 recessions
was a consequence of a reduction in the job ﬁnding probability.”19 Shimer (2005a) concludes that
if one wants to understand ﬂuctuations in unemployment, one must understand ﬂuctuations in the
transition rate from unemployment to employment, the outs of unemployment20.
In this context, Figure 2.1 -borrowed from Bosch et al. (2007)-, depicts cyclical movements of
Brazilian gross worker ﬂows. As documented in Bosch et al. (2007), two top panels of Figure 2.1
show creation and destruction ﬂows (transition probabilities) in the Brazilian labor market. In partic-
ular, destruction ﬂows are understood as those taking workers from each of the employment sectors
into unemployment (ins of unemployment). For all sectors, as found for the US by Blanchard & Di-
amond (1991); Hall (1995), ﬂows into unemployment are clearly countercyclical and dramatically
so during the 1983 and 1999 crisis. More interesting, the distinctive behavior of formal and infor-
mal ﬁgures become apparent already in the analysis of the ﬂows: formal separations are relatively
invariant while the informal show the largest volatility in separations. Similarly, creation ﬂows (top
panel) suggest a mirroring asymmetry: the job ﬁnding rate in the formal sector is highly procyclical
and very volatile. However, the job ﬁnding rate in the informal sector although noisy is reasonably
constant, including during the crisis. Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 2.1 shows the probabilities
of transiting between formality and informality and it suggests pro-cyclical patterns of job allocation
across all sectors of employment with movements that are highly correlated within pairs of bilateral
ﬂows.
More interesting and stemming from these ﬁndings is the observation that Bosch et al. (2007)
make by adapting Shimer (2005a)’s simulation exercise21. They observe that it is the job creation
the most inﬂuential ﬂow in the determination of the sector size. This conclusion is also validated by
parametrical results coming from experiments of different nature conducted by Bosch et al. (2009).
18Allocations are endogenously driven by workers compensations and exogenously affected by productivity shocks in the
distinct formal/informal sectors (see Bosch et al. (2009)).
19Related empirical contributions focusing in Latin American markets can be found in Bosch & Maloney (2007) for
Mexico and Paes de Barros & Corseuil (2004); Bosch et al. (2007) for Brazil.
20This conclusion was striking as it is in direct opposition to the conventional wisdom, built around research byDarby et al.
(1985, 1986); Blanchard & Diamond (1991); Davis & Haltiwanger (1990); Darby et al. (1992), that recessions are periods
characterized primarily by high job loss rates and opened a vast cascade of research stressing the importance of transition
probabilities and worker ﬂows.
21The exercise consists into simulating the size of the employment sector at steady state when it is reconstructed upon the
combination of all the worker ﬂows and checking the response of the size after shutting down one by one each ﬂow.
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F to S.E. S.E. to F
Note: Transitions rates are inferred from a Markov transition matrix for each period using monthly data from
the Monthly Labor Survey (PME) from Jan 1983 to Dec 2002 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986)
as it is explained in Bosch et al. (2007). Computations are based on 10,000 Monte Carlo replications. The series
have been averaged per quarter, de-trended using a HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 10
5 and smoothed using
a3quartermovingaveragesmoother. Depictedpointscorrespondtothemiddleperiodoftheserollingwindows.
Source: Bosch et al. (2007)
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All of these studies are focused into gross workers ﬂows and labor reallocation, stressing the im-
portance of job creation and job to job transitions but paying little or none attention on their effects
over the behavior of wages. In this sense, this study is aimed at ﬁlling part of this gap by exploiting
the particular dynamics of workers ﬂowing from various employment categories (unemployment,
formal salaried and informal salaried) as a distinctive characteristic to understand the differences
in the volatility of their wages. Thus, we put special attention to the role of new hires (outs of
unemployment) and job-to-job movers in the wage-productivity elasticity determination.
2.4 Wages and productivity
The asymmetric response of entering and outgoing ﬂows of unemployment described in the previous
section can help to explain -both theoretically and empirically- differentiated effects of productivity
shocks to unemployment volatility22. Such an asymmetry can also help to distinguish the links be-
tween productivity volatility and wage volatility for workers with different mobility23 and belonging
to distinct labor sectors24. The theoretical challenge still needs to be addressed as part of what is
known as the unemployment volatility puzzle25 (Shimer, 2005b; Pissarides, 2009) and its implica-
tions over wage determination. This study contributes to this debate with an empirical exercise for
the case of Brazil and leaves the theoretical work for future research.
To understand the context in which this exercise operates, we start by providing some institutional
background.
2.4.1 Institutional Background
Brazilian wages -and in general, prices- were not free to be set according to real fundamentals during
the immediate precedent years to those we analyze. In contrast, they were induced by considerable
unionized bargaining power and then by binding nominal pressures. Carneiro (1999) documents
and explains that, prior to 1964, collective wage adjustments were deﬁned as part of a collective
labor contract between workers and employers unions. Between the 1964 military coup and 1985,
collective bargaining was replaced by a centralized state wage indexation which provided for a state
minimum wage to be annually indexed based on the average real wage of the previous two years.
However by the end of the 1970s, Brazilian inﬂation was growing rapidly and this provoked an
upsurge in strike activities in the most organized sectors of the economy which in turn provoked
(i) an immediate reduction in the period between salary adjustments from 12 months, until 1979,
to six months thereafter; and (ii) the return of direct negotiations between unions and employers,
which opened the door for wage adjustments above the past rate of inﬂation. The re-emergence of
democracy in the 1980s combined with labor dissatisfaction with the state wage policy led to the de-
velopment of a new unionism26. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, control of inﬂation became much
more problematic in Brazil. One consequence of the generally unsuccessful counter-inﬂationary
22Related to this, Pissarides (2009) claims that the recent literature has either ignored the inﬂow rate when studying the
cyclical dynamics of unemployment or treated shocks to the inﬂow rate as one of the exogenous forces driving changes in
the outﬂow rate. But because more low-productivity jobs are destroyed in recession, at least some part of job separations
is driven by endogenous decisions in response to aggregate productivity shocks. This entails a signiﬁcant difference in the
understanding of ins of unemployment (and its volatility) as if all job destruction were driven by exogenous separation shocks,
the jobs destroyed in recession would be a random draw from the productivity distribution.
23job movers, new hires and job stayers
24Formal, Informal
25The observation that the response of unemployment to cyclical productivity shocks is bigger than implied by the canon-
ical Search and Matching model).
26Trade unions slowly increased their role in the wage determination process and experienced an enhancement in their
bargaining ability at both the regional and industrial levels. In terms of degree of bargaining centralization, an intermediate
level of collective bargaining had emerged.
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policy shocks was an increased defensiveness on the part of labor unions, keen to protect real wage
levels in the face of deﬂationary shocks. This contributed to the breakdown in coordination and
synchronization of wage determination, and the development of a structure for collective bargaining
much more akin to that prevailing in western Europe.
After the structural reforms implemented during early nineties and especially after the Plan Real
(1994), Brazil entered into a phase of recovery and competitiveness in which fear to ﬂoat and in-
dexation were not longer the prevailing conditions and in which price settings (including wages)
were subject to less distortions. Nonetheless, unionization still played a role. For instance, Carneiro
(1999) ﬁnds that wages in the Brazilian industrial sector respond mainly to insider effects27. Accord-
ing to him, this is indicative that the Brazilian wage-setting structure is far from conforming to the
traditional description of competitive models and appears rather conducive to rent sharing. In a sim-
ilar vein, Carneiro & Henley (1998, 2001) examine wage determination in Brazilian manufacturing
during the 1980s and early 1990s and show that the reduction in state regulation of collective bargain-
ing led to the development of a system of wage determination which is increasingly characterized
by rent sharing and insider trade union bargaining power. Even with by-now-outdated analytical
tools they concluded that “real wages appear increasingly inﬂexible with respect to movements in
open unemployment, with a large informal sector disciplining formal sector wage bargaining and
cushioning the impact of broader labor market conditions.”
Our work complements this analysis from a refreshed perspective by using updated estimation tech-
niques (together with data of higher quality) and referring to a more suitable theoretical framework
(stemming from the wage-productivity volatility puzzle and from the unemployment volatility puz-
zle).
2.4.2 Estimation Methodology
In essence, we exploit the dynamics of labor allocation in order to see how closely related the volatil-
ity of wages bargained between ﬁrms and new hired workers (or job to job movers) and the volatility
observed in ﬁrms’ productivity28 are. Given that the volatility of wages can be driven by other fac-
tors besides factor productivity retribution (namely speciﬁc worker’s characteristics) our analysis
distinguishes between conditional and unconditional wages.
In this context, heterogeneity among workers can arise at least in two dimensions. In the individ-
ual dimension, heterogeneity exists because workers have different characteristics. In the aggregate
dimension, heterogeneity can exist because wages for different groups are bargained under different
schemes along the business cycle. For instance, newly hired workers signing formal contracts will
bargain differently than those without signing a contract or than those with already long tenures. At
the same time, workers with a formal status might have bargaining prerogatives that informal work-
ers lack (or maybe informal workers might renegotiate their salaries more frequently). In addition
to this, and given that our attention is mostly focused on the new hires and on the job movers, an
additional source of heterogeneity bias stems from the fact that newly hired workers may not be rep-
resentative of the whole labor force (see Figure 2.229) or even worse that the composition of newly
27Insider variables are usually represented by different measures of productivity, union density, relative prices, and ﬁnan-
cial factors, such as liquidity and the ﬁrms ability to pay. Outsider variables, on the other hand, usually include alternative
wages and measures of the state of the outside labor market, such as the level of unemployment.
28In particular, labor productivity.
29How important are non-stayer workers (those for who we contend that productivity measures should be better related)?
Figure 2.2 sheds some light about this. It shows that sector non-stayers workers constitute a nontrivial group, more noticeable
among informal workers (a half of them being sector movers and a third being new hires). It also shows that the composition
of the labor force by transition groups is not constant across employment groups and across time with decreasing trends
among incumbents in favor of increasing shares of job-to-job movers.
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hired workers varies over the business cycle, as is also pointed out by Haefke et al. (2008).
Such sources of heterogeneity would generate a bias in the estimate of wage cyclicality30. We
follow Haefke et al. (2008)’s approach to take into account individual heterogeneity31 and we cope
with aggregate heterogeneity partly by distinguishing among mobility groups and labor sectors and
partly by analyzing the wages after controlling by characteristics. Thus the wage w
j
it of an individual
worker i of the group j at time t, depends in part on worker i individual characteristics and in part
on a residual that may or may not depend on aggregate labor market conditions.
lnw
j











it is a vector of individual characteristics (education, working experience, and their
squared values), ln ^ w
j
st is a vector of s industries ﬁxed effects and  
j
it is the residual wage that is
orthogonal to those characteristics. In other words, to obtain composition-bias corrected wages, we
regress log wages on observable worker characteristics and take the average non stochastic compo-
nent (ﬁxed effects by industry) non attributable to workers characteristics. We call Conditioned and
Unconditioned to the composition-bias corrected and uncorrected speciﬁcations respectively.
Using data described in Section 2.2, we construct monthly time series for the wage index ln ^ w
j
st.
We do this for the j groups32 and start comparing the cyclical properties of each series with those ob-
served in aggregate productivity measures. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 depict the cyclical relation between
productivity and unconditional (Figure 2.3) and conditional (Figure 2.4) wages for the aggregate
manufacturing sector. A number of interesting patterns can be observed. First, unconditional ﬁgures
are slightly countercyclical before 1994 and very acyclical afterwards33 whereas the conditional
series look quite procyclical during the whole period. Second, informal compensations are more
volatile, especially in the conditional case. Third, new hires and job-to-job movers earnings are
more volatile among formal workers while new-hires and incumbents earnings are more volatile
among the informal ones.
Our interest remains, however, in how wages covary with ﬁrms annual productivity variables
(and not just with aggregate manufacturing productivity series). Since the two main sources of infor-
mation providing wages and ﬁrms productivity are not the same34 we attempt to preserve as much
cross sectional and intertemporal variation as possible. The best it can be done is to collapse infor-
mation coming from both sources at yearly frequency and at industrial level of aggregation. Thus
we aggregate monthly data on wages of workers at speciﬁc industrial sectors into yearly averages
for the j different subgroups of workers. Then we collapse the yearly ﬁrms productivity values into
industrial averages. An informal glimpse is provided by Figure 2.5 where we observe that ﬁrms’ pro-
ductivity distribution shares a signiﬁcant portion of its domain with the distribution of incumbents’
unconditional earnings. That is not the case for unconditional wages of new hires or job-to-job
movers. After conditioning, the distribution of productivity shares a more signiﬁcant part of its do-
main with that of the distribution of new hires earnings.
30Solon et al. (1994) claim that composition is an important source of cyclical aggregate wage variation.
31On a related note, Menezes-Filho et al. (2008) ﬁnd that Brazils high wage inequality cannot be explained by factors
operating at the ﬁrm or industry level. Explanations must be sought in the characteristics of workers, both observable and
unobservable.
32The subgroups belong to two dimensions: employment sector (All Salaried, Formal, Informal) and mobility group
(Sector Stayers, Sector New Hires, Job to Job Sector Movers)
33A similar pattern of moderation during the nineties can be observed in the ﬂows reported in Figure 2.1.
34In spite of the existence of a matched worker-ﬁrms dataset (Relac ¸˜ ao Anual de Informac ¸˜ oes Sociais or RAIS), regulations
to disclose this information require coauthorship with a public ofﬁcer of IPEA and a long process to get ofﬁcial authorization
(as this dataset also identiﬁes individuals and ﬁrms for taxation purposes). Thus the best subset of information we have access
to is that of ﬁrms solely and of wages solely.
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Cycle Hires Stayers Movers
Note: The shaded area (right axis) depicts the aggregate manufacturing productivity series de-trended using a
HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 14400. The lines (left axis) depict the yearly growth of MA(12) smoothed
unconditional wages in the aggregate manufacturing sector.
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Cycle Hires Stayers Movers
Note: The shaded area (right axis) depicts the aggregate manufacturing productivity series de-trended using a
HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 14400. The lines (left axis) depict the yearly growth of MA(12) smoothed
conditional wages in the aggregate manufacturing sector.
42
Goñi-Pacchioni, Edwin Antonio (2011), Essays on Labor and Development Economics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27875E. Go˜ ni-Pacchioni / Formality, Labor Productivity, Wage Setting and Income Risk




















1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Hires Movers
Stayers Productivity
Note: The distributions represent dispersions across months within each year for aggregate measures of wages.
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To proceed formally, once the wage index and our indicator of ﬁrms productivity are measured
in an homogenous frequency and for common observed units (manufacturing industries), we regress
the change of log real wage index on the change of log real labor productivity. Among new hired
workers, we expect to see the more ﬂexible wages, this is, wages that would respond with the higher
elasticities to changes in productivity. The opposite is expected among incumbents (higher sticki-
ness or low elasticities)35.










s + j ln ~ w
j












st represent industry ﬁxed effects and normal i.i.d. residuals respectively and ~ X
denotes instrumented variable X36. Equation 2.1 represents a log log static model of wages against
productivity which coefﬁcient captures standard elasticities. Equation 2.2, our preferred speciﬁca-
tion, allows for dynamics and disentangles the effects of past earnings. Productivity coefﬁcients in
this case capture short run elasticities after inertia or stickiness in wages has been taken into account.
Equation 2.3, is worked in differences in order to prevent spurious estimates of the elasticity if wages
and productivity were integrated.
2.5 Results
Outcomes obtained from the estimation of Equations 2.1 to 2.3 are reported in Tables 2.2 and
2.3. Table 2.1 reports the results of a similar exercise for the baseline case in which microdata
coming from ﬁrms surveys is disregarded37. Such results relies on aggregate industrial productivity
measures38 and correspond to those one should expect after accessing to common public sources of
information.
Disregarding both, ﬁrms and workers heterogeneity, and abstracting from any kind of disaggrega-
tion, our preferred speciﬁcation yields elasticities way below 1 and hovering around 0.54. After
distinguishing between mobility groups, we already observe that the aggregate ﬁgure of 0.54 is
closely resembled by that of the incumbent workers (0.55) whereas the new-hires group yields a
higher value of 0.67. Nevertheless, these naive estimates are subject to potential biases stemming
35Elasticities for Movers are more difﬁcult to predict given the absence of a theoretical model. One could expect an
intermediate outcome as some movements may result from voluntary decisions and hence wage bargaining could be unrelated
to the productivity observed in the absorbing sector (this is, one could expect wages of voluntary movers to be at least rigid to
reductions) while some other movements may result from involuntary events that would put to the worker into a less favorable
position to bargain a non-productivity-driven salary.
36In order to cope with potential endogeneity issues, internal instruments are used in all the cases. First lags are used as
instruments for Equations 2.1 and 2.3. In the case of Equation 2.2 the instrumentation follows the Arellano and Bond system
GMM estimation.
37In this case we abstract from Fixed Effects as aggregate data does not have cross sectional variation across industries.
This also prevents the estimation of dynamic panels a la Arellano and Bond and hence the dynamic speciﬁcation in the
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from the assumption of homogeneity, for both ﬁrms and workers.
Table 2.1 lifts the workers homogeneity constraint ﬁrst (i.e. it keeps exploiting aggregate proxies
of productivity instead of the actual estimates of ﬁrms labor productivity) and reveals a number of
ﬁndings. First, Column labeled as Unconditioned suggests downward biased estimates when com-
pared to those reported under the column of Conditioned wages. Like in Haefke et al. (2008) and
Solon et al. (1994) we ﬁnd strong evidence for composition bias because of worker heterogeneity.
This negative heterogeneity bias prevails in every case throughout the Table in which the elasticity
coefﬁcient happens to be signiﬁcant.
Second, a distinctive ﬁnding when using aggregate productivity measures is the high similarity
between estimates for different mobility groups. This will change dramatically after reﬁning the
productivity measures and it will be likely reﬂective of the inﬂuence of ﬁrms idiosyncratic factors
affecting differently to the productivity of speciﬁc ﬁrm at different industrial sectors. In fact, ﬁrms
heterogeneity is not only a result after accounting for management or scale or technology or quality
of the capital factor but also for the quality of its labor factor. Thus, workers heterogeneity should
also play a role in this instance. Broader measures considering plain workers headcounts (such as
product per worker) neglect differentiated complementarities between factors of different quality
that should be translated into distinct productivity measures. Third, Panels A, B and C show the
corresponding outcomes for All, Formal and Informal workers. It is not surprising to observe that
Panels A and B keep much similarity as a signiﬁcant portion of the manufacturing sector hires for-
mal workers and aggregate measures of productivity are likely picking formal ﬁrms productivity39.
Observed higher elasticities for Informal workers would suggest more ﬂexibility of wages in this
sector in case productivity measures were representative of informal ﬁrms but they are not. Hence
we cannot make such a conclusion at this stage. Fourth, estimates obtained under the Dynamic
speciﬁcation are in between those high values coming from the Static estimation and those low and
non-signiﬁcant values coming from ﬁrst differences40.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the values of the wage-productivity elasticities  observed for the differ-
ent j groups when conditional wages and ﬁner measures of productivity are taken into account.
Table 2.2 reports results corresponding to the estimation of Equations 2.1 to 2.3 for the whole
sample of workers and for two alternative deﬁnitions of productivity. Columns (1) to (4) show re-
sults after considering Product per Worker (a broadly used proxy of productivity), but measured at
a ﬁrm level rather than at the whole economy level. Given the limitations that this broad measure
carries41, another contribution of this study is the incorporation of a reﬁned measure of productivity
into the analysis: Columns (5) to (8) exploit our preferred deﬁnition of productivity, the Olley-Pakes
productivity estimate computed by Muendler (2004)42.
Similar to the case of aggregate productivity measures, we observe dynamic short run elasticities
values in between those obtained under the static and ﬁrst difference speciﬁcations. Yet we do not
report the results of the unconditional estimates they also lie below those obtained after controlling
for workers heterogeneity in most of the cases. In contrast to the previous case, recognition of ﬁrms
39Notice here that Panels A to C are distinguishing formality for the Left Hand Side only. This is reﬁned later and is done
here as a ﬁrst approximation using aggregate measures of productivity.
40The dynamic speciﬁcation remains as preferred as the Static one most likely contains unit roots and the ﬁrst-differences
are possible affected by over differentiation
41A measure of output per product does not fully recognize the effects of factor complementarity nor the effects of factor
concentration. This is, it varies as a function of both other input factors and the efﬁciency with which the factors of production
are used. Such other factors include -but are not limited to- physical capital and managerial activities, which in turn our actual
labor productivity measure takes into account.
42See Section 2.2.2.
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Table 2.1: Wage-Productivity Elasticity. Conventional Aggregate Approach.
All New Hires Movers Stayers All New Hires Movers Stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Static
Elasticity 0.729*** 0.852*** 0.750*** 0.750*** 1.249*** 1.118*** 1.198*** 1.270***
[0.077] [0.085] [0.079] [0.079] [0.095] [0.181] [0.102] [0.105]
R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.28 0.3
Dynamic
Elasticity 0.543*** 0.672*** 0.564*** 0.555*** 0.935*** 1.008*** 0.937*** 1.015***
[0.089] [0.101] [0.088] [0.093] [0.130] [0.184] [0.128] [0.135]
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.39 0.14 0.33 0.35
In First Differences
Elasticity 0.205 0.075 0.197 0.236 0.46 0.129 0.659 0.425
[0.519] [0.527] [0.549] [0.509] [0.533] [0.938] [0.574] [0.544]
Static
Elasticity 0.774*** 0.894*** 0.752*** 0.791*** 1.213*** 0.982*** 1.119*** 1.286***
[0.078] [0.087] [0.078] [0.079] [0.093] [0.204] [0.103] [0.105]
R-squared 0.17 0.2 0.15 0.17 0.33 0.08 0.26 0.31
Dynamic
Elasticity 0.573*** 0.676*** 0.564*** 0.587*** 0.954*** 0.985*** 0.939*** 1.045***
[0.091] [0.104] [0.088] [0.094] [0.123] [0.209] [0.125] [0.136]
R-squared 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.38 0.08 0.29 0.35
In First Differences
Elasticity 0.23 0.156 0.247 0.225 0.541 0.9 0.867 0.321
[0.516] [0.494] [0.550] [0.508] [0.532] [1.155] [0.578] [0.543]
Static
Elasticity 1.109*** 1.059*** 1.056*** 1.297*** 1.672*** 1.642*** 1.569*** 1.415***
[0.085] [0.094] [0.088] [0.094] [0.144] [0.281] [0.176] [0.289]
R-squared 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.32 0.31 0.16 0.24 0.09
Dynamic
Elasticity 0.826*** 0.884*** 0.795*** 0.944*** 1.293*** 1.395*** 1.365*** 1.259***
[0.116] [0.117] [0.112] [0.132] [0.183] [0.293] [0.197] [0.306]
R-squared 0.35 0.28 0.31 0.39 0.35 0.17 0.26 0.1
In First Differences
Elasticity 0.227 -0.136 0.094 0.772 -0.107 -0.153 -0.073 2.405**






225 monthly observations are included in the Static and Dynamic speciﬁcations and 224 in the speciﬁcation in
First (Annual) Differences.
Instrumental Variable Estimation uses as internal instrument the twelfth lag of the independent variable for the
Static and Dynamic speciﬁcations. In the case of the model in First (Annual) Differences, the instrument is the
ﬁrst-month lag of the annual difference of the log-productivity.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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heterogeneity brings in differentiated conditioned elasticities according to workers mobility group.
In particular, and paying attention to our preferred speciﬁcation (Panel B) and to our preferred deﬁni-
tion of productivity (Columns 5 to 8)43, expected patterns emerge: a close resemblance of elasticities
computed for all workers to those computed for stayers at either low or non signiﬁcant values, high-
est (close to 0.7) and signiﬁcant elasticities for new hires and also considerable (0.4) and signiﬁcant
elasticities for movers44.
Results related to wages’ inertia also merit attention. For instance, and consistent to the nature of the
mobility groups, the memory of the process determining wage variations is nil and non-signiﬁcant
for new hires, signiﬁcant and positive for movers and above 0.7 and signiﬁcant for stayers.
Most of these ﬁndings give empirical grounds to the contention that in the Brazilian manufactur-
ing labor market the less mobile the workers are, the more sticky their wages are and -also consistent
with this- the lower the contribution of productivity to explain their wage variation.
These results add to the rent-sharing strand45 with consistent ﬁndings to those obtained by Hae-
fke et al. (2008) for the United States economy. Carlsson et al. (2009) also get results in favor to
this strand for the Swedish case but without differentiated effects between mobility groups. As in
Carneiro (1999) they stress the importance of insider effects yet they argue these are equally impor-
tant to any kind of worker (entrant or incumbent). One reason that may drive the different outcome
of Haefke et al. (2008) and Carlsson et al. (2009) exercises is the level of disaggregation of the
data they exploit for the productivity variable. While the former exploits aggregate measures of pro-
ductivity, the later got access to workers-ﬁrms matched data. In such a way Carlsson et al. (2009)
can control for ﬁrms ﬁxed effects besides workers unobserved heterogeneity. As they note, recent
contributions have found mixed results in a related vein: Gertler & Trigari (2009), ﬁnd that once
one looks at equivalent workers within the same ﬁrm, there are no observable differences between
incumbents and new hires in the response of wages to the aggregate unemployment rate in US data
for the period 1990 to 1996. Carneiro et al. (2009) also controlling for ﬁrm and individual ﬁxed
effects ﬁnd a higher elasticity of wages to the aggregate unemployment rate for new hires than for
incumbents in Portugal for the period 1986 to 2005. However, Carneiro et al. (2009) also ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant differences in the wage productivity elasticities across the two groups.
In our case and as explained before, sources of information for workers and ﬁrms are not matched
even when both register information at an individual level. Hence, yet we cannot compare workers
within ﬁrms, we can account for ﬁrms characteristics as it is implied in our productivity deﬁnition.
In these lines, another dimension in which ﬁrms characteristics allow a reﬁnement of our analysis
is ﬁrm’s labor informality46. In particular even if it is not possible to measure the share of workers
43The limitations of the broad measure of productivity may be contaminating the results presented in Columns (1) to (4)
and, for instance, probably driving the negative elasticity found in Column (4) of Panel B. Thus we present these results for
expositional purposes to make the point that while results based on broad measures may seem at odds, reﬁned measures or
productivity yield better outcomes and reveal a coherent and consistent story.
44Elasticity is close to 1 for new hires and close to 0.6 for movers using the production per worker deﬁnition. In spite of
this, negative and signiﬁcant elasticities for incumbents and overall are found. This is most likely due to the fact that even
after mitigating some of the imprecision that this ratio brings in for the aggregate case -deduced from the improvement of the
elasticities for the different mobility groups- it still ignores the variation induced through factor complementarities that the
Solow residual adjusted a la Olley-Pakes does take into account.
45As already suggested in section 2.4.1, two contending traditions can be referred as theoretical frames to study wage-
productivity elasticites. In the competitive model, wages depend on labor market conditions and not on the particular situation
of the ﬁrm or its sector of operation. On the other hand, in rent-sharing models wages depend on ﬁrms proﬁtability and
movements in demand and productivity.
46Provided the evidence in favor of higher and differentiated volatility of conditional wages across workers of different
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Table 2.2: Wage-Productivity Elasticity. All Salaried Workers and All Firms.
All New Hires Movers Stayers All New Hires Movers Stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Elasticity 0.986*** 1.221*** 1.229*** 0.696*** 0.489*** 0.550*** 0.580*** 0.348***
[0.106] [0.166] [0.122] [0.120] [0.055] [0.090] [0.062] [0.062]
R-squared 0.57 0.35 0.52 0.49 0.52 0.26 0.43 0.48
Observations 108 106 108 108 108 106 108 108
Memory 0.923*** 0.137 0.402*** 0.905*** 0.674*** 0.105* 0.512*** 0.745***
[0.061] [0.087] [0.125] [0.053] [0.037] [0.055] [0.077] [0.042]
Elasticity -0.254** 1.047*** 0.678** -0.445*** 0.194*** 0.634*** 0.382*** 0.038
[0.108] [0.217] [0.269] [0.090] [0.033] [0.103] [0.071] [0.043]
Hansen 0.59 0.72 0.62 0.64 0.72 0.82 0.73 0.73
AR(2) 0 0.04 0.05 0.37 0 0.12 0.18 0.08
Observations 108 105 108 108 144 141 144 144
Elasticity 2.356** 1.599 2.908 2.256* 0.874* 0.739 1.161** 0.915
[1.182] [1.429] [1.918] [1.220] [0.486] [0.708] [0.584] [0.559]
Observations 90 87 90 90 90 87 90 90
B. Dynamic
C. In First Differences
Output per Worker  Labor Productivity
A. Static
Notes:
Wages are conditional on workers characteristics.
Robust standard errors in brackets. Hansen and AR(2) p-values reported for the dynamic panel.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
within ﬁrms under informal arrangements, it is possible to proxy this -at a ﬁrm level- using two
indicators: ﬁrms’ size and the share of white-collar workers. ILO’s deﬁnition of informality as well
as regional evidence47 relates informality to smaller ﬁrms. Likewise, same empirical evidence ﬁnds
a close relation between informal labor and workers qualiﬁcations. Given the high similarity of the
outcomes obtained when using the share of (blue)white-collar workers as the variable to approxi-
mate ﬁrm’s (in)formality we just report results stemming from the use of ﬁrm’s size.
Table 2.1 already advanced some discussion about the implication of informality in this context.
Table 2.3 report results of a similar exercise after constraining the sample of ﬁrms. This is done
under the suspicion that smaller ﬁrms (size being determined by the number of workers) are more
keen to hire informally. We trim the ﬁrms sample dropping ﬁrst to ﬁrms belonging to percentiles 1
labor sectors -as it is shown in Figure 2.2- we decompose the labor force according to formality sectors.
47Perry et al. (2007) show that 40% of the Brazilian informal labor force works in ﬁrms with 5 or less employees and
60% in ﬁrms with 10 or less workers.
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to 548 and second to ﬁrms belonging to percentiles 6 to 10. In such a way we are aimed at checking
the sensitivity of the results after indirectly controlling for degrees of ﬁrms’ formality.
Table 2.3 focuses on our preferred speciﬁcation and reports a number of interesting ﬁndings. First,
results considering Formal workers exclusively (Columns 1 to 4) for all ﬁrms (Panel A) are quite sim-
ilar to those reported in Table 2.2. This is consistent with the fact that eventhough the high degree of
informality in the Brazilian labor market, the manufacturing sector is still signiﬁcantly populated by
formal workers. Second, overall elasticity and elasticities for incumbent formal workers get closer
while elasticity for New-hires goes up by about 50 percent getting close to 0.9. Third, earnings per-
sistence keeps previous patterns: very high for stayers, moderate for Movers and only signiﬁcant at
10 percent for New-Hires. Fourth, Formal New Hires start to show elasticities with increasing val-
ues (up to 1) after small ﬁrms (informal absorbers) have been put aside. Fifth, long run elasticities
keep the same patterns after combining the effects of short run elasticities and the degree of income
persistence. Columns (1) to (4) of Panel C relates formal workers earnings to productivity of ﬁrms
of size above the ﬁrst decile and thus these estimates should be preferred when analyzing the formal
sector. Fifth, yet we are aware of the limitations of the data to identify the informal ﬁrms subspace,
Panel A reports estimates for the sample containing all ﬁrms, including the smallest ones49. Going
from Panel C to Panel A, one observes slight changes.
Overall, two messages emerge from the results obtained for Informal workers and All Firms:
there is less variation across elasticities according to workers’ mobility groups (elasticities goes
from 0.6 for stayers to 0.8 for new hires) and earnings persistence is much lower or non signiﬁcant
as compared to those observed in the Formal case. Both features are consistent with the nature
of Informal contracts, where long tenures and wage rigidities are unlikely, regardless the worker
mobility group.
2.6 Income Risk
By using standard conditional and unconditional elasticities, previous section has documented the
direct contribution of productivity volatility to income volatility for different groups of workers. In-
trinsic to the study of income volatility is the notion of income risk and thus we expand our study
to see what are the permanent and transitory effects of such productivity shocks into income risk for
each type of worker.
To this end, we ﬁrst deﬁne the income process as in Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) and then we com-
pute the values of the variance of the permanent and transitory shocks using the Carroll & Samwick
(1997) projection methodology.







t +  
j
it (2.4)
where we use the same notation as before and x
0j
it contains the same set of characteristics as
before. In this case j does not include to the group on new hired workers as our observed unit is now
an individual per month rather than an industry by year and hence we cannot follow the wages of
newly hired before hiring. We also disregard time or industry ﬁxed effects as we run the model for
each available section and because we incorporate yearly industrial productivity later.
48The percentiles allude to the distribution of ﬁrms sorted according to their size.
49One cannot constraint the sample to only those ﬁrms belonging to the ﬁrst percentiles as the loss of degrees of freedoms
results dramatic.
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Table 2.3: Wage-Productivity Elasticity by Labor Sector and Firm Size.
All New Hires Movers Stayers All New Hires Movers Stayers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. All Firms
Memory 0.587*** -0.276* 0.504*** 0.771*** 0.289*** -0.03 0.152 -0.194***
[0.039] [0.146] [0.041] [0.037] [0.043] [0.133] [0.094] [0.070]
Elasticity 0.103*** 0.904*** 0.229*** -0.004 0.610*** 0.824*** 0.704*** 0.562***
[0.036] [0.146] [0.048] [0.036] [0.064] [0.139] [0.084] [0.202]
Long run Elasticity 0.25 0.71 0.46 0.00 0.86 0.80 0.83 0.47
Hansen 0.57 0.88 0.54 0.73 0.82 0.88 0.88 0.92
AR(2) 0.59 0.72 0.48 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.4 0.23
B. Firms > 0.5th Decile
Memory 0.530*** -0.371*** 0.446*** 0.778*** 0.240*** -0.046 0.097 -0.203***
[0.059] [0.135] [0.047] [0.038] [0.047] [0.142] [0.084] [0.073]
Elasticity 0.151*** 1.007*** 0.279*** -0.012 0.656*** 0.846*** 0.759*** 0.564***
[0.056] [0.173] [0.057] [0.037] [0.082] [0.164] [0.072] [0.205]
Long run Elasticity 0.32 0.74 0.50 -0.05 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.47
Hansen 0.60 0.84 0.55 0.73 0.81 0.86 0.86 0.84
AR(2) 0.38 0.97 0.67 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.52 0.22
C. Firms > 1st Decile
Memory 0.528*** -0.387*** 0.403*** 0.822*** 0.235*** -0.034 0.081 -0.205***
[0.074] [0.134] [0.048] [0.036] [0.051] [0.145] [0.086] [0.075]
Elasticity 0.142** 0.981*** 0.297*** -0.057* 0.621*** 0.761*** 0.727*** 0.620***
[0.062] [0.144] [0.053] [0.033] [0.074] [0.158] [0.072] [0.200]
Long run Elasticity 0.30 0.71 0.50 -0.28 0.81 0.74 0.79 0.52
Hansen 0.60 0.89 0.54 0.73 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.93
AR(2) 0.50 0.41 0.66 0.23 0.39 0.39 0.72 0.2
Observations 108 141 108 144 136 131 136 124
Formal Informal
Notes:
Wages are conditioned on workers’ characteristics and Productivity is the Olley-Pakes adjusted productivity
described in Section 2.2.2.
Results correspond to the estimation of Equation 2.2. Columns (1) and (3) consider the ﬁrst lag of productivity
as additional internal instrument.
Robust standard errors in brackets. Hansen and AR(2) p-values reported.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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We assume that  
j
it, the residual current income after controlling by characteristics, can be decom-
posed into a martingale permanent component p
j











where the permanent conditioned income p
j








Deﬁning a d-period income difference as
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Under the assumption that the errors j and j are white noise and uncorrelated with each other








j are the variances of the permanent and transitory shocks to income respec-
tively and V ar(d 
j
it) can be estimated for each individual by
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it is a mean-zero disturbance.
Thus the speciﬁcation to be estimated is:







where observations are distinguished by the length of the difference d. The projection method
simply does OLS individual by individual of ^ V ar(d 
j
it) = f ^ V ar(1 
j
it);:::; ^ V ar(n 
j
it)g0 on
[dit 2it], where dit = f1it;:::;nitg0, 2it = f2it;:::;2itg0.
Given the frequency of our panel data, d 
j
it can represent income differences of d = 1;d =






Table 2.4 presents estimates corresponding to Equation 2.5 for the earnings of Formal and Infor-
mal workers for a number of exercises. First, we run the experiment for the entire period 1982-2002
(Columns 1 and 5). This is to have a measure of the variance of the permanent and transitory com-
ponents exploiting as much information as available on the income dimension. Presumably, this
measure yields the most consistent of our estimates. Second, we constrain the sample to those pe-
riods for which we dispose ﬁrm’s productivity information but without including the volatility in
productivity (Columns 2 and 6). This is to have benchmark measures and use them to quantify the
impact after including the productivity shocks. Finally we incorporate the information on productiv-
ity50 into the speciﬁcation of Equation 2.451 and compute the corresponding estimates of Equation
50Starting from the information originally recorded at ﬁrm level we aggregate our different measures of productivity by
industrial sector and year disregarding ﬁrm size. Controlling for ﬁrm size does not yield noticeable variations in the estimates
discriminating by formality sectors and hence we decide to include all ﬁrms when computing these productivity aggregates.
51We include productivity and squared productivity measures as additional covariates.
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Table 2.4: Permanent and Transitory shocks by Labor Sector and Mobility Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. All workers
sh
2 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
se
2 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.123***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 632713 202259 202259 202259 78086 27022 27022 27022
R-squared 0.124 0.164 0.165 0.165 0.138 0.158 0.161 0.161
B. Stayers
sh
2 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.008 0.014** 0.013** 0.014***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005]
se
2 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.111*** 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.086***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 392266 124549 124549 124549 24689 8353 8353 8353
R-squared 0.115 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.12 0.182 0.192 0.201
C. Movers
sh
2 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.030***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
se
2 0.101*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.147*** 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.137***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Observations 234495 75746 75746 75746 49441 17312 17312 17312
R-squared 0.141 0.177 0.18 0.179 0.156 0.19 0.193 0.193
Formal Informal
Note: Estimates correspond to Equation 2.5. Columns (1) and (5) include all available months from 1982 to
2002 but they do not control for productivity shocks. Columns (2) and (6) include periods for which data on
productivity shocks is available but they do not control for productivity shocks. Columns (3) to (4) and (7) to
(8) control for productivity shocks according to different proxies of productivity: output per worker (3 and 7)
and labor productivity (4 and 8).
Standard errors in brackets.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
2.5 (Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8).
Results show a number of salient features. First, a comparison between the outcomes obtained
including data for the eighties (Columns 1 and 5, for which productivity data at ﬁrms level is not
available) and those obtained after constraining the period to that for which there is information
about ﬁrm’s productivity but do not control for it (Columns 2 and 6) reveals a slight upward bias
in the estimates of the later sample for both, permanent and transitory components in the case of
Formal workers. In the case of Informal workers we observe a slight bias in the same direction for
just the estimates of the permanent component whereas a slight negative bias for the estimates of
the transitory one. Given that major reforms with effects on wages and productivity took place in
early and mid nineties, it is not surprising to observe that permanent and transitory effects on income
volatility seems to be slightly higher when constraining the analysis to just that period. Second, and
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consistent with the estimates found for other Latin American countries52 we observe a dominant tran-
sitory component (four times -or more- the size of the variance of the permanent income shocks) in
the constitution of income volatility53. This dominance of the transitory component persists regard-
less the mobility group or the formality sector. Third, the variance decomposition of formal workers
earnings display slightly lower values in the transitory component for stayers compared to that ob-
served for movers while the permanent component is virtually the same. In the case of informal
workers, the permanent component for movers is as much as two times the value observed among
stayers. Variance of earnings of informal movers show the highest participation of temporary volatil-
ity. Overall, Informal workers display more income risk and among them, movers depict earnings
volatility with the highest permanent and transitory components. Fourth, the effects after including
productivity are negligible for Formal workers. Columns 3 and 4 show unchanged ﬁgures compared
to Column 2. In the Informal group, estimates of the permanent component remain unchanged as
well whereas a reduction of up to 10% (Column 8, Panel B) becomes noticeable in the transitory
counterpart.
Related to the last point two observations merit further attention. First, unfortunately and due to
data limitations explained before, we cannot appropriately match productivity shocks that are spe-
ciﬁc to a ﬁrm with those shocks observed in speciﬁc workers’ incomes. Hence we cannot conclude
precisely, as in Guiso et al. (2005), about how likely are the ﬁrms to insure workers against perma-
nent and transitory shocks. However and in spite of the data limitations we can still capture part
of the idiosyncratic components of the ﬁrms’ productivity values54 allowing for industry cross sec-
tional variation rather than using a systemic measure of productivity as in other studies. Thus, results
shown in Table 2.4 broadly support Guiso et al. (2005) ﬁndings in the sense that for Formal workers
(and hence ﬁrms), inclusion of (non-systemic) productivity shocks is not reﬂected into a recompo-
sition of workers income risk. In other words, this could be suggestive of formal ﬁrms providing
insurance to workers against such shocks. On the other hand, Informal workers earnings volatility
reﬂects an increase of the transitory component when productivity is left out as part of the residual
(Column 6) of Equation 2.4. In other words, roughly 10% of the transitory volatility observed in
informal earnings can be attributed to ﬁrms’ productivity shocks. A second observation is that the
income risk analysis that we portray at this section is deeply rooted into the second moments space.
This is in contrast to the analysis done in the previous section where wage-productivity elasticities
are drawn from the space of ﬁrst moments. This is not to confuse orthogonality observed between
productivity shocks and workers income volatility with unitary elasticities observed between wages
and productivity.
Overall a deeper analysis of this section merits a study on its own and here we are aimed at just
getting broad estimates of measures relating workers wages to ﬁrms productivity, taking as much
advantage as possible of the sources of variation that we got from both, ﬁrms and workers data.
2.7 Conclusion
An empirical assessment of the wages-productivity relation is done for the Brazilian manufacturing
sector. Two main messages emerge. First, an analysis of wage-productivity elasticities suggests an
heterogeneous response of workers wages to ﬁrms labor productivity. Such a response varies accord-
52Krebs et al. (2010) ﬁnd comparable estimates for Argentina and Mexico.
53This comes at stark contrast with ﬁndings for the US by Heathcote et al. (2008) where the permanent component is
dominant. Also for the US, Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) offers a set of ﬂexible results, according to individuals’ educational
attainment (less educated individuals display income volatilities with higher permanent components relative to the transitory
counterpart) whereas in Carroll & Samwick (1997) the transitory component doubles the permanent one.
54In part because we aggregate based upon individual ﬁrms, in part because we aggregate at an intermediate -industry-
level.
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ing to the degree of workers’ mobility and formality but it overall supports a rent sharing approach in
the setting of wages: almost unitary elasticities observed for entrants whereas low or non signiﬁcant
elasticities for incumbents along low (for new hires) and high (for stayers) persistence of incomes in
the formal sector. Correspondingly, yet keeping new hires earnings as the most ﬂexible, we observe
less dissimilar elasticities across mobility groups for informal workers along very low persistence
of earnings regardless the degree of mobility. Second, an analysis of income risk suggests that the
more formal and less mobile the workers are, the less their income risk (with higher participation
of transitory volatility - compared to permanent volatility - in the income variance decomposition).
It also suggests that productivity shocks enhance the transitory component on informal workers in-
come volatility whereas it is allegedly insured by ﬁrms in the formal sector, whose workers’ earnings
volatility remains unaffected after controlling for such shocks.
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R&D and Development. An Instrumented
Semiparametrical Approach 1
Edwin A. Go˜ ni-Pacchioni2
Abstract
Thecontributionofthisstudyistwofold. First, usingaworld-widecrosscountrydatasetcovering
the last forty years, it maps the contribution of R&D to the process of economic growth of countries
across the whole spectrum of economic development by exploiting methods of varying estimation.
Second it addresses the potential existence of double causation between economic growth and invest-
ment in R&D by exploiting internal (past investments in R&D) and external instruments (Intellectual
Property Rights). Our ﬁndings suggest the existence of an inverted U relationship between the level
of development of a country and the contribution of investments in R&D to its economic growth.
Our ﬁndings also support the existence of complementarity effects between production factors when
making adjustments by quality to the labor factor.
3.1 Introduction
This paper provides empirical evidence of nonlinear contributions of investment in R&D to the
process of economic growth: low but increasing at low levels of economic development and low
and non-increasing in countries close to the economic frontier. At early phases of development,
low-income countries endowed with poor institutions, unskilled labor and many other barriers to
economic progress fail to avail themselves of technological improvements. At mid advanced stages
of development, the complementarity effect between production factors (i.e. skilled labor ripping
the beneﬁts of innovative technologies) and the lack of stealing and crowding out effects in the pro-
cess of technological absorption (rather than creation) make the marginal return of R&D to reach its
peak. Countries at the highest plateau also perceive low returns to R&D investments, most proba-
bly due to the stealing and crowding out effects in the process of technological creation in spite of
1We thank to Luigi Guiso, Omar Licandro, Massimiliano Marcellino and Morten Ravn for their helpful academical
advice in the theoretical and econometric arenas; to Bill Maloney and Daniel Lederman for sharing part of the dataset used
in this paper and for insightful and provocative discussions that conduced to the exploration of the ideas studied in this paper;
to Zongwu Cai, Mitali Das, Huaiyu Xiong and Xizhi Wu for sharing their SPlus codes useful for the estimation of the ﬁrst
step of the IV procedure; to the participants of the EUI Macro Seminars for their valuable suggestions. The usual disclaimers
apply.
2Department of Economics, European University Institute (Edwin.Goni@EUI.eu) and London School of Economics
(Edwin.Goni@EUI.eu) and London School of Economics (E.A.Goni-Pacchioni@lse.ac.uk)
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their most favorable conditions for economic growth. Because this heterogeneity in the responses
to technological improvements might be induced by the heterogeneity - measured by the distance to
the economic frontier - among recipients and originators we revisit the simplest speciﬁcation used to
model economic growth. In our model we allow for the contribution of each argument (investment in
physical capital, investment in R&D and growth in the labor force) to vary according to the distance
to the economic frontier.
In this sense, the paper attempts to control for a variety of possible estimation issues in estimat-
ing R&D returns. First, it updates and extends the parametrical approach followed by Lederman &
Maloney (2005), where the use of the GMM estimators allows maximum exploitation of the num-
ber of observations and to control for unobserved ﬁxed effects in a dynamic panel context. Further,
in the semiparametrical approach, the use of Varying Coefﬁcients allows the assessment of more
accurate pointwise estimates that vary according to the level of development of a speciﬁc country
in a period of time. Second, we also attempt to control for the possible endogeneity of R&D that
cast doubt on many estimates of R&D. Barro & SalaiMartin (1995, pp.352), for instance, ﬁnd the
reported rates of return to be implausibly high and speculate that they are due to reverse causality
going from productivity growth to R&D expenditures. Existing industry or ﬁrm level studies within
country rely on internal instruments which weak exogeneity has been questioned. Yet, we also start
with internal instruments, and since we work at the country level, we are also able to exploit policy
changes that could have a better claim to be exogenous. Thus, as in Lederman & Maloney (2005),
we also use the evolution of intellectual property rights protection as external instrument 3. Our
ﬁndings suggest that using either internal or external instruments the average non-varying returns
to R&D are on the order of magnitude found in other studies. We also ﬁnd that this non-varying
returns constitute too aggregate measures as when we allow the returns to vary according to the level
of economic development, a non constant contribution becomes apparent.
In this extent, the paper also follows Grifﬁth et al. (2004) in testing to see if rates of return are
substantially higher in non frontier countries due to the importance of the second face of R&D. Us-
ing level of development as a measure of distance we conﬁrm their ﬁnding of increasing returns with
distance from the frontier but just up to certain level of development. Beyond this point, more distant
countries experience decreasing returns.
In the last section of the paper we speculate on what complementarities may be driving the effect.
We adjust labor with quality (attainment) and ﬁnd that the heterogeneity in the responses of growth
to R&D investments persists yet the contributions of the other factors oscillate close around the para-
metrical non varying estimates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 debriefs existing theoretical and
empirical contributions related to our topic. Section 3.3 provides the sources of our information and
some stylized facts related to this data. Section 3.4 presents the general speciﬁcation to be estimated.
Section 3.5 brieﬂy explains the econometric methods necessary to perform varying estimation. Re-
sults of these estimations are described in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 explores the complementarity
effects of productive factors after adjusting by labor quality. Section 3.8 concludes.
3They show that this variable is speciﬁcally correlated with R&D, and at the same time it has a strong exogenous
component due to pressures exerted by advanced country governments and their strengthening under the TRIPS provisions
negotiated within the context of the Uruguay trade round.
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3.2 R&D and Heterogeneity
3.2.1 Previous theoretical contributions
From a microfounded perspective, theoretical contributions are rooted in the notion of creative de-
struction coined by Schumpeter (1934) and thoroughly examined by the work of Aghion and Howitt
during the last decade. As they explain, their work portrays a free enterprise economy that is con-
stantly being disturbed by technological innovations from which some people gain and others lose,
an economy in which competition is a Darwinian struggle whose survivors are those that succeed
in creating, adopting and improving new technologies. A vast cascade of work stemming from the
Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction exists in the theoretical arena.
Our work does not add in this particular theoretical strand but complements it from empirical
grounds. Our study addresses the empirical counterpart of existing extensions of the creative de-
struction models aimed at explaining potential convexities in the contribution of knowledge and
innovation into the process of economic growth. One of these extensions is the offsetting effect of
distance from the frontier. A number of potential arguments can be contended to explain this.
For instance, Young (1993a) argues that while the traditional approach to creative destruction models
implies substitutability of older technologies by newer ones, it ignores the equally important com-
plementarity effect between technologies4. This implies a life cycle of new technologies in which
ﬁrst they are complements and after substitutes of old technologies. The tension between these two
effects produces a stylized life cycle in which new technologies initially ﬁnd further invention com-
plementary, but then, as they develop mature and large markets, ﬁnd that the dominant effect of
further invention is substitution.
In a companion study, Young (1993b) is more generic and integrates the two major types of models
of endogenous technical change: invention (Romer, 1990) and learning by doing Lucas (1988)5 A
recognition that most products of research at the moment of their invention may be broadly infe-
rior to more mature technologies alerts one to the important role of both production experience and
complementary inventive activity in actualizing the productive potential for new technologies. Ex-
perience in production increases productivity of new technologies. Thus both, the rate of invention
and the rate at which production experience accumulates determines the life cycle - and hence dis-
counted proﬁtability - of new technologies.
Acemoglu et al. (2007) provide an alternative model. They analyze the impact of contractual in-
completeness and technological complementarities on the equilibrium technological choice: ﬁrms
choose technology corresponding to the range of intermediate inputs used in production (a greater
range increases productivity by allowing greater specialization) and offer contracts to suppliers speci-
fying the required investments in contractible activities. Suppliers choose non-contractible activities
in anticipation of the ex-post bargaining payoffs. Greater contractual incompleteness reduces in-
vestments in non-contractible and contractible activities and leads to the adoption of less advanced
technologies. Their model shows that among countries with identical technological opportunities,
those with better contracting institutions specialize in sectors with greater complementarities among
inputs.
4This is because oftentimes new inventions creates rather than destroy rents for older technologies: when created, new
technologies are too expensive or with many few applications and they impulse for older technologies to become more
efﬁcient before they are deﬁnitely displaced.
5As Young explains, models of the ﬁrst group, focus on factors that inﬂuence the incentive to consciously innovate such
as institutional framework or market size. Models of the second group focus on factors that incentive to produce different
types of goods.
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3.2.2 Previous empirical contributions
In the context of the theoretical background referred in the previous section, and keeping close
attention to the effects of factor complementarities, our work adds to two families of empirical con-
tributions.
Heterogeneity
Empirical studies on growth have become popular and important references to understand and test
in reality models produced by macro theorist. However, many critiques have been posted to con-
ventional applied methods. Pack (1994) conveys some of them and concludes that the production
function interpretation is further muddled by the assumption that all countries are on the same inter-
national production frontier, that regression equations that attempt to sort out the sources of growth
also generally ignore interaction effects and that the recent spate of crosscountry growth regressions
also obscures some of the lessons that have been learnt from the analysis of policy in individual coun-
tries. Durlauf (2001), also argue that a problem with conventional growth analysis is the assumption
of parameters homogeneity. All in all, if true, problems of the implementation of these empirical
efforts suffer from imposing strong homogeneity assumptions, they stem from conventional theoret-
ical setups that are epitome in the mainstream of the literature but that hardly ﬁnd echo in the less
developed part of world. For instance, it is hard to argue that complementarity between production
factors occurs at the same intensity in OECD countries as in LDCs for many reasons (institutional
barriers, lack of education, multiple externalities and non-convexities reﬂected in evident market im-
perfections, etc. as it is argued in the studies referred in Section 3.2.1), and in this context, the case
of R&D investments turns to be of our particular interest: if these expenditures assure high economic
growth rates what prevents LDCs to spend every available resource into this kind of investment?6
Kourtellos (2002) remarks that at a statistical level, evidence of misspeciﬁcation (generally in the
form of nonlinearities) is stressed in a number of studies that suggest that the assumption of a single
linear model when applied to all countries turns to be invalid. As he digests, Durlauf & Johnson
(1995) employs a tree-regression approach to uncover multiple regimes in the data while Hansen
(2000) proposes a threshold regression model that leads to a formal test for the presence of a regime
change. Liu & Stengos (1999) employ a semiparametric speciﬁcation test and an additive semipara-
metric partially linear model to identify nonlinear growth patterns. Canova (1999) uses a predictive
density approach, Desdoigts (1999) employs an exploratory projection pursuit (density estimation)
while Kourtellos (2001) uses a projection pursuit regression. All of these ﬁnd evidence to argue in
favor of the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria that should conduce to classify countries
into different convergence clubs. In the same vein, theories such as the one of Azariadis & Drazen
(1990) suggest that countries that are identical in their structural characteristics but differ in initial
conditions may cluster around different steady state equilibria in the presence of increasing returns
to scale from some factor of production, market imperfections, non-convexities in the production
function, etc. In other words, the introduction of initial conditions such as level of initial human
capital, initial income distribution, non-convexities, externalities and capital market imperfections
may lead to the emergence of club convergence (Galor, 1996). Our study lifts the restriction of
constant contributions of productive factors to production’s growth and implicitly it admits multiple
equilibria by allowing the coefﬁcients of return to vary across countries and across time.
Complementarity
In line with the theoretical contributions referred earlier, our argument has a second component
as heterogeneity translates into non linear returns of R&D allegedly because of complementarity
6See Maloney & Rodriguez-Clare (2007) for a discussion in this vein.
58
Goñi-Pacchioni, Edwin Antonio (2011), Essays on Labor and Development Economics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27875E. Go˜ ni-Pacchioni / R&D and Development. An Instrumented Semiparametrical Approach.
effects.
Arguable poor complementarity between productive factors in countries where the innovation pro-
cess fails to avail economic growth was already sustained by Acemoglu & Zilibotti (2001), who
argue that technologies used in LDCs are developed in OECD and thus are designed to make op-
timal use of skilled labor force. This induces a mismatch between factors (skill complementarity
or skill bias) that makes LDCs economies less productive. Technology-skill mismatch can lead to
signiﬁcant productivity differences even when LDCs have access to all the technologies used in the
North. Investors know this and therefore they don’t invest in newest technologies prompting asym-
metric returns.
In general, cross country analysis of the effects of R&D on growth is recent in the literature. As
just explained, signiﬁcant part of this effort has been placed in a North-South framework in which
technological improvements take place into two different forms: (i) Northern developed economies
tend to innovate and create new technologies while (ii) the Southern developing economies tend
to imitate and absorb (adopt) such innovations (Chin & Grossman, 2004; Grossman & Helpman,
1991; Deardorff, 1992; Chen & Puttitanun, 2005). Yet among the existing empirical contributions,
most of them have focused in the U-shape relations between protection to intellectual property and
development (Maskus, 2000; Primo Braga & Fink, 2000; Chen & Puttitanun, 2005), some recent
contributions follow the approach of differentiated technological development. For instance, Grif-
ﬁth et al. (2004) claim that R&D has two faces: in addition to the conventional role of stimulating
innovation, it enhances technology transfer (absorptive capacity); Aghion et al. (2006) also examine
the contribution of human capital to economy-wide technological improvements through these two
different channels (imitation and innovation) under the assumption that more developed countries
are endowed with more skilled labor and hence is suited to seize the investments in tangible and
intangible capital.
3.3 Data and some stylized facts
3.3.1 Data
We use an unbalanced panel of 75 countries covering the period 1960 - 20007. The dataset comprises
a number of variables coming from different sources.
R&D
The R&D series from 1960-2000 were compiled by Lederman & Saenz (2005) from national sur-
veys that use a common deﬁnition of expenditures that includes fundamental and applied research as
well as experimental development. In the lines of the discussion of the purpose of R&D investment
(aimed at creating/innovating or aimed at absorbing/imitating technology), the data of R&D consid-
ers not only the traditional investments for development of new technologies expected in advanced
countries, but also investments in the adoption and adaptation of existing technologies more likely to
be labeled as R&D into developing countries8. Lederman & Saenz (2005) constructed these series
7The spell covering 2001-2005 is disregarded because the few data points available for R&D investment for that period.
8Referring to the same dataset, Lederman & Maloney (2005) argue that though it would be desirable to study the evo-
lution, rate of return, and determinants of private R&D, it is still justiﬁable to work with aggregate R&D for two reasons.
First, because the data sources divide R&D not into private and public R&D, but rather into productive and non-productive
sectors, the latter accounting for roughly 20% of the total. They point out that the deﬁnition of ”productive sector” includes
both public and private for proﬁt and not-for proﬁt ﬁrms while ”non-productive sector” includes R&D ﬁnanced or undertaken
by the executive branch of government. Since the productive sector may well include public utilities or other state owned
enterprises, the exercise of analyzing how its R&D evolves and its rate of return relative to that of non-productive sector is
less interesting than the public/private sector split would be. Second, Lederman & Maloney (2005) also argue that such a
59
Goñi-Pacchioni, Edwin Antonio (2011), Essays on Labor and Development Economics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/27875E. Go˜ ni-Pacchioni / R&D and Development. An Instrumented Semiparametrical Approach.
combining data published by UNESCO, the OECD, the Ibero American Science and Technology In-
dicators Network (RICYT) and the Taiwan Statistical Data Book, following the deﬁnitions convened
in the OECD Frascati Manual 9.
Educational attainment and other
We draw this information from Barro & Lee (2010). Attainment accounts for the average years
of education of the adult population (25-64 years) as proxy of total human capital. Data on other
productive factors come from 2009 Penn World Tables V6.310.
IPR
This data comes from an updated version of Ginarte & Park (1997)11. This quinquennially index
of property rights protection encompasses ﬁve components measuring each country’s IPR laws cov-
erage and enforcement. The components are the coverage of patent laws across seven industries,
membership in three key international agreements, loss of protection due to three potential reasons
(namely working requirements, compulsory licensing, and revocation of patents), three types of
enforcement mechanisms, and the duration of patents relative to international standards. The com-
posite index ranges between zero and ﬁve with higher values indicating stronger IPR protections and
enforcement.
3.3.2 Stylized facts
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are borrowed from Lederman & Maloney (2005). It is clear from Figure 3.1 that
R&D expenditures/GDP rise with development as does the rate of increase. Figure 3.2 shows how a
few select countries from several regions compare to the predicted value.
Lederman & Maloney (2005) emphasize that countries such as Korea, Finland, and Israel show
substantial ”take offs” relative to the median trajectory. Two Latin American countries, Argentina
and Mexico, which had similar levels of income as Korea and Israel prior to their take off hover
on or below the predicted value for their level of development. Both China and India appear to be
following more in the footsteps of the ”take off” countries than the Latin Americans. As we sug-
gested previously referring to the real role of R&D to yield economic growth, Lederman & Maloney
(2005) also stresses the concern of whether the unusually high levels of R&D in some countries, and
particularly the dramatic takeoffs of Finland, Israel, Korea, and Taiwan were justiﬁable investments
and to what degree do they owe this to their R&D investments.
Such an evidence is indicative of strong heterogeneity in the contributions and effectiveness of
R&D investments regardless the clustering criteria one may use (e.g. natural resource intensive, ex-
port oriented, manufacturing intensive, etc.) to look for common patterns. In an extent, by sorting
according to economic development we indirectly encompass this myriad of clustering criteria.
In line with the previous discussion, Figure 3.3 summarizes our initial prior. The Figure reveals
two regions of high mass concentration when comparing the distribution of countries according to
division seems to occasionally lead to some critical issues in categorization. For instance, if a public company ﬁnances its
R&D from retained earnings, this will count as productive sector R&D. If instead that R&D is ﬁnanced by a transfer from the
treasury to the ﬁrm, it counts as ”non-productive” R&D. For several countries in their (and our) sample, there were striking
shifts in composition from one year to the next suggesting sensitivity to accounting practices. In contrast, the total R&D
series were reasonably stable. Besides these two reasons, many developing countries tabulate only the aggregate values and
as they are a primary focus of this paper, we want to include as many as possible.
9Proposed Standard practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Development 2002.
10http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php
11We are grateful to Walter Park who kindly shared the updated version of his original indicator (Park, 2001, 2008)
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GDP per capita (log of constant US$)
Source: Lederman & Maloney (2005)
Note:Figure 3.1 plots the predicted and observed levels of R&D (expressed as a share of GDP) as function of
the log GDP per capita. The predicted value is generated from a regression of the log of the ratio of total R&D
expenditures to GDP on log GDP per capita and its squared term.






























Source: Lederman & Maloney (2005)
their levels of development (distance to the economic frontier) with their distribution according to
a set of covariates that potentially inﬂuence economic growth (proportion of R&D over GDP, Edu-
cational Attainment, IPR). This initial evidence suggests that there exists substantial heterogeneity
across countries. As we show later, this heterogeneity is reﬂected in the substantially varying contri-
bution of some productive factors on growth. Such variation appears to be related to the distance to
the economic frontier and also to the quality of the labor factor approximated with its average edu-
cational attainment. Preliminary evidence shown in Figure 3.3 portrays the presence of a two steady
state equilibria in the process determining aggregate economic output which appears to be induced
by certain initial conditions. This, in turn, resembles the the twin peaks found by Quah (1997) in the
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Figure 3.3: Twin Peaks, Kernel Smoothed Bivariate Density  











































































Note: Computations are based (Duong, 2007) ks procedure implemented for the software R. The method im-
plements diagonal and unconstrained data-driven bandwidth matrices for kernel density estimation. Data used
in each graph spans the whole sample (casewise and timewise) as described in the Data Section. Graphs on
the left column represent the contour levels of the bivariate densities plotted in the right column. Ordered pairs
lying outside the outer contour line represent combinations of a Variable (R&D/GDP, IPR, Attainment) and the
Distance to the Economic frontier which are not frequently observed in different periods/countries.
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cross-country limiting distribution of income.
Before starting our analysis, we report quinquennial averages of the most important variables in-
volved in the study, for two groups of countries: OECD and non-OECD. Table 3.1 shows the evolu-
tion of annual economic growth rates, educational attainment and IPR. These points estimates pro-
vides a rough summary of all the initial ﬁndings about heterogeneity and complementarity referred
in the previous discussion.
Table 3.1: Summary of Indicators
(Average per quinquennium)
Growth Investment Labor growth Attainment R&D IPR
OECD countries
1961 - 1965 0.061 0.275 0.014 7.144 0.013 2.603
1966 - 1970 0.054 0.272 0.011 7.223 0.012 2.719
1971 - 1975 0.039 0.278 0.012 8.020 0.012 2.703
1976 - 1980 0.032 0.255 0.010 8.466 0.013 3.069
1981 - 1985 0.021 0.228 0.010 8.739 0.016 3.278
1986 - 1990 0.030 0.228 0.008 9.197 0.017 3.523
1991 - 1995 0.020 0.206 0.008 9.670 0.018 4.173
1996 - 2000 0.035 0.213 0.007 10.090 0.020 4.410
Non OECD countries
1961 - 1965 0.059 0.200 0.025 2.873 0.003 1.505
1966 - 1970 0.051 0.198 0.024 3.011 0.002 1.446
1971 - 1975 0.047 0.219 0.026 3.809 0.004 1.371
1976 - 1980 0.058 0.261 0.027 4.269 0.006 1.357
1981 - 1985 0.024 0.235 0.025 4.968 0.005 1.622
1986 - 1990 0.038 0.229 0.023 5.477 0.006 1.643
1991 - 1995 0.044 0.231 0.022 5.926 0.005 2.520
1996 - 2000 0.037 0.229 0.020 6.689 0.004 3.179
Notes: Growth denotes annual GDP growth rates; Investment is expressed as a share of GDP; Labor growth
denotes labor force annual growth rates; Attainment denotes educational attainment in years of schooling; R&D
denotes gross investments in R&D as a fraction of GDP; IPR denotes the Park’s Intellectual Property Rights
Index.
3.4 Model






where Y is the level of output, A is the efﬁciency with which factors are used (TFP), K the level
of physical capital, L the labor stock and S the stock of accumulated R&D, can be rewritten as
12See (Jones & Williams, 1998).
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Here rx is the rate of return on factor X, x is the share of investment in X over Y, and 
x is the
output elasticity of factor X.
Consistent with the approach followed by other authors (Lederman & Maloney, 2005; Bravo-
Ortega & Lederman, 2008), we follow Griliches (1995) and compute the rate of return of production
factors by estimating the following speciﬁcation:
yi;t = t(zi;t) + (zi;t)Xi;t + (zi;t)Yi;t 1 + "i;t
where yi;t represents real growth rates13, t is a sample-wide ﬁxed time effect, Yi;t 1 is the
lagged income14, Xi;t the matrix of covariates or conditioning variables1516 and "i;t is a time-country
speciﬁc white noise. Finally, zi;t represents the varying inducing covariate which in our baseline
case is the distance to the economic frontier. For expositional purposes, we simplify the former
expression into:
yi;t = 
(zi;t)Xi;t + "i;t (3.2)
The suggested approach to specify the determinants of economic growth dates back to Mansﬁeld
(1965) and Griliches (1986). As Jones & Williams (1998) note, most of the literature aimed at
estimatingreturnsinthistraditionisbasedonneoclassicalgrowthmodelsinwhichR&Dissimplyan
alternative form of capital investment. Such an approach ignores many of the distortions associated
with research that are formalized by the new growth theory17. We take advantage of this in the
sense that yet the differentiated effect among creators and absorbers, in part induced by the creative
destruction process, is not captured by any argument in the last equation, it is reﬂected in the varying
estimates of the contribution of R&D (and indirectly of IPR after instrumenting) to growth. This
variation is shown to depend on the degree of economic development which in turn is related to the
clustering of originators and imitators of technological progress.
3.5 Estimation
Our estimation strategy follows two related avenues. First we estimate a simple Varying Coefﬁcient
Model in which the inducing source of variation is given by the initial level of GDP per capita of each
cross section unit relative to the GDP per capita of the country at the frontier at each quinquennium.
Then we acknowledge the possibility of endogeneity attributable to simultaneous causation of the
R&D investment argument in our speciﬁcation. We do so by instrumenting this variable using two
kind of instruments: internal and external. We use the lagged value of R&D Investments as the
internal instrument and the Intellectual Property Rights Index provided by W. Park (Park, 2001,
2008) as the external one.
13Measured as the log difference between real GDP in a quinquennium t and real GDP in the precedent quinquennium
t   1 for each country i.
14Log of real GDP for country i. Average value for the quinquennium t   1.
15In this case, growth of labor and investment in both physical and innovative capital expressed as a share of income, all
expressed as quinquennium averages.
16All, left hand side and right hand side variables are demeaned by country to remove country ﬁxed effects.
17Including monopoly pricing, intertemporal knowledge spillovers, congestion externalities and creative destruction.
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Table 3.2: Impact of R&D into growth. A Non Varying Parametrical Approach
No IV Internal External No IV Internal External No IV Internal External
R&D (Gross) 0.262 0.176 1.074** 0.743*** 0.503* -0.103 0.743*** 0.846** 1.009**
[0.180] [0.202] [0.492] [0.220] [0.302] [0.805] [0.265] [0.402] [0.510]
Investment 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.272*** 0.268*** 0.271*** 0.266***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.030] [0.026] [0.027]
Labor Growth 0.840*** 0.812*** 1.095*** 0.239 0.223 0.185 0.239 0.4 0.420*
[0.131] [0.134] [0.198] [0.226] [0.227] [0.238] [0.272] [0.244] [0.246]
Initial GDP 0 0 -0.002 -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.042*** -0.041***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
F(Cragg-Donald) 37.72 13.6
Sarpan p-value 0.11 0.10
AR(2) p-value 0.43 0.42
No IV Internal External No IV Internal External No IV Internal External
R&D (Net) 0.757** 0.619* 2.109** 1.309*** 1.679*** -0.182 1.309*** 2.333*** 2.049**
[0.313] [0.371] [0.955] [0.339] [0.543] [1.426] [0.408] [0.745] [0.936]
Investment 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.262*** 0.259*** 0.273*** 0.262*** 0.255*** 0.254***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028]
Labor Growth 0.858*** 0.840*** 1.038*** 0.218 0.226 0.188 0.218 0.395 0.395
[0.124] [0.127] [0.176] [0.224] [0.225] [0.235] [0.269] [0.252] [0.251]
Initial GDP -0.001 0 -0.002 -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.043***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009]
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
F(Cragg-Donald) 29.16 10.28
Sarpan p-value 0.25 0.14
AR(2) p-value 0.38 0.37
POOL POOL WITH FE PANEL
POOL POOL WITH FE PANEL
Notes:
Dependent variable: Average intra-quinquennial yearly GDP growth.
The ﬁrst column (No IV) in each block of results shows standard estimates without instrumenting R&D. The
second column shows the results of the IV estimation using internal instruments (intra-quinquennial average of
the ﬁrst lag of R&D Investments) and the third column shows the results of the IV estimation using external
instruments (Park’s IPR).
The ﬁrst block (POOL) shows the OLS estimates on a pooled sample including only an intercept in addition to
the explanatory variables. The second block (POOL WITH FE) includes in addition country and period Fixed
Effects. The third block includes country Fixed Effects and period dummy variables. The last two columns of
the third block reports GMM system estimates.
Standard errors in brackets.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
3.5.1 Non Varying Coefﬁcient (Parametrical Benchmark)
Table 3.2 reports the conventional parametrical estimates of the non varying coefﬁcient version of
Equation 3.2. These constitute our benchmark estimates. A number of issues merit attention. First,
we report results for gross and net (of depreciation) R&D investments (see Appendix 3.9.3). Hall &
Mairesse (1995) in their work on French and the US ﬁrms construct stocks of physical and R&D cap-
ital through a perpetual inventory method rather than looking at investments18. They, as Grilliches
& Lichtenberg (1984), ﬁnd that the point estimate on R&D rises somewhat with an assumed rate of
depreciation. We found similar results as the net R&D returns double the gross ones. Second, re-
turns of physical investment prove to be quite robust to all of our speciﬁcations hovering between 0.2
and 0.3. The estimated coefﬁcients for the rest of the factors vary considerably across speciﬁcations.
For instance, signiﬁcant returns to gross R&D varies between 0.5 and 1.1. These ﬁgures are in line
with those found by Coe & Helpman (1995) and also by Lederman & Maloney (2005). However,
18Grifﬁth et al. (2004) assume a negligible rate of depreciation, and Jones & Williams (1998) assume a zero depreciation
rate, partly on the grounds that existing studies suggest the best ﬁt occurs without adjustment.
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the sensitivity of the results to respeciﬁcations, as well as the diverse estimates available from other
existing contributions (see Section 3.1) constitute a ﬁrst reason to explore varying returns. Third,
introduction of Fixed Effects to the pooled speciﬁcations yields higher estimates of the returns to
R&D and turns estimates of coefﬁcient associated to labor’s growth non-signiﬁcant. Finally, instru-
menting yields signiﬁcant variation in R&D coefﬁcients yet the directions are not clear as the results
of the pool regressions with Fixed Effects and the results of the panel GMM system estimators are
opposite. These limitations constitute a second reason to pursue the Varying Coefﬁcient estimation
as it may be the case that constancy is a too strong assumption that prompts unstable coefﬁcients in
the parametrical setup. Yet the panel GMM systems constitute our preferred speciﬁcation in the non
varying parametrical setup, pool Fixed Effects constitute our benchmark speciﬁcations to compare
the results of the semiparametric Varying Coefﬁcient approach. This is because current state of art
in the technology of IVVC estimation allow to mimic pooled estimation.
Table 3.3: Impact of R&D into growth. A Semi Varying Parametrical Approach
No IV Internal External No IV Internal External No IV Internal External
R&D III 1.335 0.655 6.42 1.399 3.684** 6.492 1.444 2.404 -0.852
[0.906] [1.424] [6.494] [1.185] [1.716] [11.556] [1.358] [1.737] [0.772]
R&D IV 0.089 0.074 5.589 0.459 0.531 -8.313 0.937* 0.293 0.356
[0.383] [0.451] [4.267] [0.484] [0.638] [12.163] [0.555] [0.961] [0.393]
R&D V -0.541 -1.066 6.95 0.028 -0.798 -17.466 0.439 -0.342 -0.801
[0.529] [0.650] [4.837] [0.678] [0.936] [21.588] [0.777] [1.176] [0.553]
R&D VI 1.277*** 0.938* 6.426* 0.934** 0.545 -1.609 1.233** 1.098 1.839***
[0.448] [0.555] [3.412] [0.435] [0.569] [4.554] [0.498] [0.687] [0.395]
R&D VII 0.306 0.302 4.291 0.3 0.328 -1.608 0.637 0.855* 0.463*
[0.277] [0.333] [2.762] [0.337] [0.439] [3.429] [0.386] [0.519] [0.250]
R&D VIII 0.282 0.263 3.065 0.273 0.279 -0.878 0.638* 0.969** 0.487**
[0.225] [0.269] [1.893] [0.323] [0.420] [2.323] [0.370] [0.488] [0.193]
R&D IX 0.383* 0.339 2.931* 0.136 0.15 -0.894 0.455 0.825* 0.384**
[0.200] [0.237] [1.652] [0.288] [0.367] [1.899] [0.330] [0.433] [0.166]
R&D X 0.191 0.136 2.333* 0.007 -0.004 -0.859 0.277 0.721* 0.136
[0.174] [0.206] [1.401] [0.286] [0.353] [1.551] [0.328] [0.416] [0.144]
Investment 0.215*** 0.200*** 0.119* 0.247*** 0.252*** 0.342*** 0.234*** 0.282*** 0.193***
[0.020] [0.023] [0.068] [0.028] [0.028] [0.129] [0.032] [0.031] [0.016]
Labor Growth 0.738*** 0.692*** 1.278*** 0.438* 0.428* 0.308 0.423 0.393 0.797***
[0.114] [0.128] [0.408] [0.250] [0.246] [0.783] [0.287] [0.266] [0.087]
Initial GDP -0.001 0 -0.003 -0.035*** -0.043*** -0.009 -0.048*** -0.046*** 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.007] [0.051] [0.008] [0.009] [0.001]
Observations 227 227 227 222 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 0.557 0.879 0.606
PANEL POOL POOL WITH FE
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Assuming that the contribution of all other covariates but R&D investments into economic
growth remains constant at any stage of economic development (semiparametrical results will show
later that this assumption holds empirically), we allow R&D returns to vary within the parametrical
setup but in a discrete arbitrary fashion. In particular, we interact R&D with dummies that take val-
ues of 1 when the observation belongs to a speciﬁc decile of the distribution of our variation inducing
variable (distance to the economic frontier19). Thus, lower deciles correspond to observations very
far from the frontier. For reasons that will become apparent later we deliberately omit the interac-
tions of the ﬁrst two deciles. Table 3.3 shows the results of such an exercise for gross R&D20. Two
19The distance is computed as the difference of logs of GDP per capita of a country and GDP per capita of the frontier
country for each quinquennium.
20Yet we do not report them, results for net R&D are qualitatively equivalent.
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facts merit attention here. First, coefﬁcients for all the explanatory variables except R&D remain in
the neighborhood of the initial estimates. Second, R&D contributions noticeably vary across deciles
showing an inverted U pattern with a signiﬁcant peak in the sixth decile. This ﬁnding confers us the
third reason to pursue the varying estimation.
This initial informal assessment shows that conventional parametrical methods suffer of at least
two problems in this context. First, non-varying parametrical estimation imposes constancy (and
hence homogeneity) of the returns across observed units and second, varying parametrical estima-
tion consumes too many degrees of freedom and hence affects both the point estimates and the
standard errors. According to Ahmad et al. (2005), the semiparametric varying coefﬁcient model
has the advantage that it allows more ﬂexibility in functional forms than a parametric linear model
or a semiparametric partially linear model, and, at the same time, it avoids much of the “curse of
dimensionality” problem, as the nonparametric functions are restricted only to part of the variable z.
The rest of this section brieﬂy describes the essentials of the two methods of estimation, Varying
Coefﬁcients (VC) and Instrumental Variables Varying Coefﬁcients (IVVC) that are relevant for our
analysis. It also describes the procedure to estimate the optimal variable bandwidth within a varying
coefﬁcient environment.
3.5.2 Varying Coefﬁcient (VC)
We start the estimation procedure with the simplest approach. This approach is based on the work
on varying coefﬁcients of Hastie & Tibshirani (1993) and Fan & Zhang (1999, 2000), which follows
the conditional linear assumptions given by Eq.(2) with
E(yijXi = Xi;zi = zi) = 
(zi)0Xi
V ar(yijXi = Xi;zi = zi) = 2
gi(zi)
such that the random sample fzi;Xign
i=1 is drawn from a distribution Fz;X . Notice that from
now own i refers to a country-period observation rather than denoting to just a country as it was
before. This is just to avoid notational complications in the next subsections.
For each given point z0
21, we approximate the functions 




l=0 cjl(z   z0)l











cjl(zi   z0)lXij]2Kh(zi   z0) (3.3)
whereKh(:) = (1=h)K(:=h)andK(:)istheEpanechnikovkernelK(z) = (3=4)(1 z2)I(jzj 





















21This movinganchor is theargument that willinduce the variation inthe weighting functionsof the optimizationproblem
3.3 and hence generating varying estimates.
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^ yi = (^ y1;:::; ^ yn)0 = X1(X0
1WX1) 1X0
1Wy
and, under local homoskedasticity,







where = = (x11;:::;x1n;:::;xp1;:::;xpn) denotes the vector of observed covariates.
3.5.3 Instrumental Variables Varying Coefﬁcient (IVVC)
The Instrumental Variables Varying Coefﬁcient approach we follow in this section is based on the




Y = g(X;Z1) + "
g(X;Z1) =
Pd
j=0 gj(Z1)Xj = X0g(Z1)
E("jZ ) = 0
(3.6)
where Y is an observable scalar random variable, gj(:) are the unknown structural functions of
interest, X0  1;X = (X0;X1;:::;Xd)0 is a (d + 1) dimension vector consisting of d regressors,
g(Z1) = (g0(Z1);:::;gd(Z1))0, and Z is a (m + l) dimension vector consisting of a m-dimension
vector Z1 of exogenous variables and a l-dimension vector Z2 of instrumental variables.
The reduced form associated to the previous problem can be stated as:






gj(Z1)j(Z ) = 0(Z )g(Z1) (3.7)
where j(Z ) = E(XjjZ ) and (Z ) = (1;1(Z );:::;d(Z ))0 = E(XjZ )
Comparing equation 3.2 to equation 3.7, one observes that gj(:) is just a vector of functional co-
efﬁcients of (Z ). Hence, gj(:) could be recovered from a local linear regression of Y on (Z ).
Given that j(Z ) are unknown, this suggests a two-stage estimation method. The ﬁrst step esti-
mates j(Z ) by a regression of X on (Z), while the second step estimates gj(:) by a regression of
Y on (Z) and the ﬁrst estimate ^ j(Z ). In other words, while the ﬁrst stage involves estimation of
the conditional expectations E(XjjZ ), the second stage substitutes the estimated conditional expec-
tations in place of (Z ) in 3.7.
Details of the two stages estimation procedure are provided in Appendix 3.9.1.
The estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix takes the form:
^  = (1=n)^ S
 1
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where:
^ Sn;0 is deﬁned as before
^ 0 = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 ^  i^ 0
 i^ 2
i Lh2(Zi1   z1)
^ 0 = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 ^  i^ 0
 i ^ g(Z )i^ i^ 0
i ^ g(Z )iLh2(Zi1   z1)
^ 0 = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 ^  i^ 0
 i^ 0
i ^ g(Z )iLh2(Zi1   z1)
^ i = Yi  
Pd
j=0 ^ gj(Zi1)^ j; i(Zi)
^ i = Xi   ^  i
3.5.4 Bandwidth Selection
Kernel smoothing methods - like the one just described - are non trivially affected by the bandwidth
selection. Larger bandwidth may gain on variance side, but loses on bias side. For the case of IVVC,
Cai et al. (2006) note that the second stage estimation is not sensitive to the choice of the ﬁrst stage
bandwidth so long as h1 is chosen small enough such that the bias in the ﬁrst stage is not too large.
To select the bandwidth for the ﬁrst stage ﬁtting and for the initial pilot bandwidth required in the
second stage we look for a minimizer of the integrated residual squares criterion (IRSC) as in Fan
& Gijbels (1995). In implementing the second step, the choice of bandwidth can be carried out
as in a standard nonparametric regression. Yet there appears to be no results in the literature for a
data-driven bandwidth selection with optimal properties (Newey et al., 1999) we follow Zhang &
Lee (2000) optimal variable bandwidth selection procedure as they show that this procedure is supe-
rior to the theoretical optimal constant bandwidth and to the bandwidth obtained by cross validation
methods. Section 3.9 describes the technical details of the procedure of varying optimal bandwidth
selection.
We implement all the estimation procedures using the software R. The next section describes the
results.
3.6 Results
Our ﬁndings support two main ideas: ﬁrst, that the heterogeneity observed in the economic de-
velopment of different countries matters in their capacity to seize opportunities to grow thanks to
technological improvements and second, that this might happen because productive factors fail to
complement one with the other in the productive process.
3.6.1 Varying Coefﬁcients
Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of the VC related to Investment in Physical Capital, Labor Growth
and Initial Output when mapped against the distance to the economic frontier. The three horizontal
lines crossing each graph correspond to the OLS pool estimates with Fixed Effects along the the 95%
Conﬁdence Interval. Top Panel of Figure 3.5 has the corresponding results for gross R&D returns22.
A number of interesting observations arise.
First, all coefﬁcients plotted in Figure 3.4 show relative constancy for almost the whole spectrum
of the varying inducing variable. However, while investment in physical capital yields a roughly
positive homogenous contribution to the growth of underdeveloped and developing economies, this
marginal contribution decays for very large economies (Oulton & Young 1996 ﬁnd evidence that
22For the case of R&D, the three horizontal lines depicted for the case of the external instrument correspond to the coef-
ﬁcients and conﬁdence interval coming from the parametrical estimation using pooled ﬁxed effects with internal instruments.
This is because the parametrical estimates with external instruments yield non signiﬁcant and odd estimates.
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the importance of investment in physical capital may fall as countries grow richer). Something
analogous is observed in the contribution of labor growth: roughly constant contributions for under-
developed and developing countries but increasing at the very high end of the spectrum (Becker et al.
1990 and Galor & Weil 2000 models stylize economies where higher plateaus of development are
characterized by higher educational levels, lower fertility rates and higher rates of return to human
capital investment).
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Second, we observe that in all cases, the non varying estimates are consistent with the average
values of the varying ones. Moreover, the conﬁdence interval of the non varying results lie within the
corridor depicted by the conﬁdence interval of the varying coefﬁcients. Again, this happens almost
everywhere except for the very high end of the spectrum. We exploit the argument of complementar-
ity and cope with this in a later section.
Third, evident non linear returns to investment in R&D are observed across the spectrum of the
distance to the frontier (non varying estimates and conﬁdence interval cross more than once to the
varying estimates and varying conﬁdence intervals): allegedly, at early stages of development, lack
of complementarity effects between factors prevents economies to seize the opportunities provided
by newer technologies. In turn, mid developed countries might face reduced costs of catching up via
absorption and imitation while most advanced economies show similar returns than those observed
in LDCs probably due to higher costs of innovation both, in the process of creation (expanding the
frontier) and in the process of destruction (stealing and crowding out effects). Arguments found in
the theoretical literature for these results are in the lines of the work of Aghion et al. (2001) and all
the related literature of Schumpeterian growth, while consistent evidence is found in empirical work
such as Grifﬁth et al. (2004), Acemoglu & Zilibotti (2001), etc.
Among the Varying Coefﬁcients just described, one is of our utmost interest23: the contribution
of investments in R&D to growth. For this reason and given the potential reverse causation between
economic growth and the R&D investments variable that would generate inconsistent estimates, we
reﬁne our computations by implementing the IVVC estimation. To this end, we use the lag of R&D
investments and an Intellectual Property Rights index as internal and external instruments respec-
tively.
3.6.2 Instrumental Variables Varying Coefﬁcients
Valid instrumental variables must be relevant and exogenous. As described by Conley et al. (2007)
and Kray (2008), it is very difﬁcult to perfectly satisfy the orthogonality and exclusion conditions
in empirical work. Yet IPR is not immune to this critique, we contend it might fulﬁll both required
conditions. Empirical studies on the relationship between IPRs and innovations/growth, including
Deolalikar & Lars-Hendrik (1989); Gould & Gruben (1997); Lach (1995); Thompson & Rushing
(1996, 1999); Maskus & McDaniel (1999), and Crosby (2000) have taken IPR as exogenous. We
continue in the same tradition in spite of compelling evidence collected in contributions that argue in
favoroftheendogenousdeterminationofthisvariable(Ginarte&Park,1997;Maskus,2000;Maskus
& Penubarti, 1995; Chen & Puttitanun, 2005) contending that IPR and institutional development -
well known determinant of growth- are close related. We still use IPR as exogenous instruments for
a number of reasons (we endorse here the arguments provided by Lederman & Maloney (2005)).
First, there is a strong correlation between IPR and R&D investments (instrument relevance), in
other words, if there is a channel through which IPRs would exert some effect on economic growth
that is the innovation channel, i.e. through the incentives it confers to make innovation-oriented
technological investments after protection of the appropriability rights of rents are established.
Second, regarding the instrument exogeneity, it seems unlikely that the correlation is driven by those
potential R&D investors demanding protections since much of the variation of the index appears
driven by external forces: most advances in IPR protection in recent years appear driven by pressure
from the United States, Europe and Japan in the context of trade rounds where protection of IPRs
23For which in turn, a non varying evolution seems improbable after the evidence provided by both, the semi-varying
parametric and varying semiparametric approaches
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Figure 3.5: Varying Return of R&D Investment
Varying Coefficient
Instrumented Varying Coefficient (Internal Instrument)
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has, in fact, not been driven by a perception of their beneﬁt per se (in fact, perhaps it is the reverse)
for developing countries, but rather as a price to pay for greater access to advanced country markets.
Third, regarding the exclusion restriction, Lederman & Maloney (2005) run a number of standard
parametrical experiments to verify the validity of the exclusion restriction of IPRs in the equation
that determines economic growth and conclude that even if ”...it might be argued that governments
would have implemented stricter IPRs protections in anticipation of further growth, thus contaminat-
ing the instrument, ... (evidence suggests that) the concern that lagged R&D or growth would lead
to expectations of higher innovative effort in the future, and hence a need to establish intellectual
property rights, seems ill founded.”
Bottom Panels in Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the IVVC related to Investment in R&D when
mapped against the distance to the economic frontier and when lagged R&D Investments and IPR
are used as internal and external instrument for R&D investment respectively. Varying Coefﬁcient
estimates of R&D, still follow an inverted U shape, yet with some different patterns for the different
set of instruments. This is consequence of the quality of the instruments in the correction of the
endogeneity bias.
Figure 3.5 combined with information reported in Appendix 3.9.4 allow us to read the evolution of
the point estimates at speciﬁc anchors used to compute each estimate24. A number of observations
are worth it to remark.
First, we can delimit three regions according to the distance to the economic frontier: LDCs (ob-
servations to the left of -3 -approximately- in the horizonal axis), developing (somewhere between
-3 and -1.5 approximately) and developed economies (observations lying to the right of -1.5). Each
of these clusters show a very distinct contribution of R&D to growth as we discussed previously.
Second, after instrumenting we observe three distinct behaviors according to the region of devel-
opment. For regions closer to the frontier, both internal and external instruments indicate biased VC
that underestimate the actual parameters (IV coefﬁcients show higher values) with more incidence
when the internal instrument is used. For mid-developed regions, the external instrument still points
towards a negative bias -yet more modest than that observed for developed countries- whereas the
internal instrument favors lower instrumented estimates. For regions far from the frontier, internal
instruments point towards negative bias again while external instruments cause meager effects on
the new estimates. All of these patterns will persist or get strengthened after adjusting labor by its
quality as will be shown in the next section. Limitations of internal instruments25 as well as a stable
pattern observed in the direction of the bias across the whole spectrum of economic development
make us to consider the estimates using external instruments as our preferred outcomes26.
Third, assuming that imitation/absorption of technology is more distinctive of developing countries
while innovation/creation is more distinctive of developed ones, we can track the performance of
24Each point estimate does not strictly refer to the coefﬁcient of ”a country-period” unit but to the estimated coefﬁcient
based on all observations after they have been weighted according to a function of the difference between the value of
the variation-inducing variable of the speciﬁc country-period used as anchor (z0 in the terminology used in the Estimation
section) and the value of the variation-inducing variable - distance to the economic frontier - of the other observations not
used as anchor (zi in the terminology used in the Estimation section). Therefore it is reasonable to refer as each point estimate
as representative of the ”country-period” unit of the anchor as all observations are weighted according to their distance to it.
25Namely, weak exogeneity, loss of degrees of freedom, etc.
26Focusing on the externally instrumented estimates, the asymmetric response to the instrumenting process observed
according to levels of development may be reﬂecting the degree of effectiveness of the instrument to act according to the level
of development. This property is desirable as it does not violate the exclusion restriction (growth rates are not necessarily
correlated to development) and at the same time allows for a ﬂexible -and arguably more accurate- determination of the size
of the bias.
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speciﬁc countries and see if their classiﬁcation was unchanged, upgraded or downgraded across pe-
riods. For example, we observe that very developed countries like the US, UK or Germany have
experienced the same rate of return to R&D during the last forty years and they have been always
in the region of innovating countries. In the other end, Sub Saharan countries like Zambia, Togo
or Kenya have remained in the less developing area with negative returns to R&D. There are also
upgrading cases like Brazil, Chile or Colombia which jumped from the less developed cluster to the
developing pool and the recent Western European emerging economies Spain, Ireland and Finland
which made their way from developing to developed countries hand in hand with innovation oriented
policies. Finally, Argentina is the only country in our sample that appears to have jumped back and
gotten more distant to the frontier after forty years and hence the country exhibits better returns to
R&D now than during the sixties. Alongside with these re-classiﬁcations, returns to R&D for same
countries at different stages of development reﬂect our contentions: upgrading LDCs absorbers jump
from meager returns (below 0.5 and even negative for the lowest end) to overwhelming rates (up to 2
approximately) when they become developing imitators. Similarly, upgrading imitators that become
developed innovators experience a reduction in their returns (that then hover between 0.5 and 1).
3.7 Complementarity effects and Robustness Check. Adjust-
ment by labor quality.27
Evidence shown in the previous section supports our argument about the heterogeneous contribution
of R&D investments to growth according to the stage of development of the recipient/originator of
the innovation efforts. Besides the clear inverted U shape we observe in the coefﬁcient accompa-
nying R&D investments, Figure 3.4 shows some degree of heterogeneity in the returns of physical
investment and in the share of the labor factor. One possible explanation is the high complementary
effect that is specially notorious in high income countries. This complementary effect should be at
least partially acknowledged (i.e. the heterogeneity picked up in the returns of physical investment
and labor growth at the high end should be mitigated) after adjusting by factor quality. In the case
of labor, quality can be approximated by average educational attainment of the population.
Typical production functions in growth models (up to 1966) consider output determined by tan-
gible capital and effective labor. However, even then, some models had already recognized the
marginal productivity of education. In old dated models this marginal productivity is a function of
the inputs and of the current technology and can remain positive forever even if the technology is
stationary. Nelson & Phelps (1966) model considers that education has a positive payoff only if the
technology is always improving (i.e. education and technology are in great extent complementary).
Their hypothesis is that educated people make good innovators so that education speeds the process
of technological diffusion. To address this, they propose a model of technological diffusion in which
the rate at which latest theoretical technology is realized in improved technological practice depends
upon educational attainment and upon the gap between the theoretical level of technology and the
level of technology in practice. With this idea, we follow Caselli (2004), who in the tradition of Hall
& Jones (1999), augments the labor factor according to its quality (understood as a the average hu-






where h = exp((s)), s is the average years of schooling, and (s) a piecewise linear function
27This Section is signiﬁcantly indebted to the advise and guidance of Bill Maloney who suggested the quality adjustment
of Labor factor.
28We thank Aart Kray for his suggestions on this regard.
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Table 3.4: Impact of R&D into growth. A Non Varying Parametrical Approach controlling by Labor
Quality
No IV Internal External No IV Internal External No IV Internal External
R&D (Gross) 0.262 0.176 1.074** 0.743*** 0.503* -0.103 0.743*** 0.846** 1.009**
[0.180] [0.202] [0.492] [0.220] [0.302] [0.805] [0.265] [0.402] [0.510]
Investment 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.272*** 0.268*** 0.271*** 0.266***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.030] [0.026] [0.027]
Labor Growth 0.840*** 0.812*** 1.095*** 0.239 0.223 0.185 0.239 0.4 0.420*
[0.131] [0.134] [0.198] [0.226] [0.227] [0.238] [0.272] [0.244] [0.246]
Initial GDP 0 0 -0.002 -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.042*** -0.041***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
F(Cragg-Donald) 37.72 13.6
Sarpan p-value 0.11 0.10
AR(2) p-value 0.43 0.42
No IV Internal External No IV Internal External No IV Internal External
R&D (Net) 0.757** 0.619* 2.109** 1.309*** 1.679*** -0.182 1.309*** 2.333*** 2.049**
[0.313] [0.371] [0.955] [0.339] [0.543] [1.426] [0.408] [0.745] [0.936]
Investment 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.262*** 0.259*** 0.273*** 0.262*** 0.255*** 0.254***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028]
Labor Growth 0.858*** 0.840*** 1.038*** 0.218 0.226 0.188 0.218 0.395 0.395
[0.124] [0.127] [0.176] [0.224] [0.225] [0.235] [0.269] [0.252] [0.251]
Initial GDP -0.001 0 -0.002 -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.043***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009]
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
F(Cragg-Donald) 29.16 10.28
Sarpan p-value 0.25 0.14
AR(2) p-value 0.38 0.37
POOL POOL WITH FE PANEL
POOL POOL WITH FE PANEL
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
with varying slopes29.
Table 3.4 is a modiﬁed version of Table 3.2 after adjusting the labor factor. Besides the fact that
the returns to physical investment remain almost unaffected, two major effects are observed when
comparing these two tables. First, the returns of R&D are slightly lower in the new sets of results.
Second, the labor term is reduced dramatically, reaching even negative (see Pritchett 2001 for
a possible explanation) and signiﬁcant (or barely signiﬁcant) values. Again we do not argue much
in favor of these parametrical non-varying outcomes as our argument endorses a varying estimation.
Still, we report these results as they constitute new reference values drawn from the parametrical
setup that we use to compare our IVVC results after adjusting by quality of labor.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 are modiﬁed versions of Figures 3.4 and 3.5 respectively after adjusting the
labor factor. In Figure 3.6 we observe that the divergence of the coefﬁcients related to the adjusted
labor growth rates in countries close to the frontier has been mitigated. In Figure 3.7 we observe that
the inverted U is still present in the returns of R&D investments. The conﬁdence interval for these
estimates slightly gets better compared to those observed in the case of non adjusted labor and the
direction of the bias observed after doing external instrumentation becomes evidently non-positive.
Thus, yet the parametrical estimates do not necessarily improve after adjusting the labor factor, the
non varying estimates do. overall, the adjusted IVVC results strengthen the idea of complementarity
of factors (labor adjusted by quality complements at a non varying rate to the physical capital) and
of heterogeneous contribution of R&D (the inverted U is still present with slightly better accuracy).
29((s) = 0:134sifs  4; (s) = 0:1344+0:101(s 4)if4 < s  8; (s) = 0:1344+0:1014+0:068(s 8)
if 8 < s)
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Figure 3.7: Varying Return of R&D Investment (controlling by Labor Quality)
Varying Coefficient
Instrumented Varying Coefficient (Internal Instrument)
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3.8 Conclusions
When mapping the contribution of R&D to economic growth in a cross country environment: (i)
Acknowledgment of heterogeneity matters: clusters, clubs, regions, types or any other qualiﬁcation
denoting heterogenous effects for heterogeneous observations play an important role to understand
the contributions of innovation/imitation to growth. Our ﬁndings suggest the existence of an inverted
Urelationshipbetweenthelevelofeconomicdevelopmentofacountryandthecontributionofinvest-
ments in R&D to its economic growth. (ii) Acknowledgment of endogeneity matters: endogeneity
bias originated by reverse causation of the innovation variable pushes the VC estimates downwards
for developed economies. Our IVVC estimates cope with this issue by exploiting internal and exter-
nal instruments. (iii) Evidence supports the existence of complementarity effects between productive
factors: even when all countries have equal access to new technologies or comparable amounts of
R&D investments, the technology-skill mismatch in productive factors can lead to sizeable differ-
ences in the returns to innovation efforts, we experiment by adjusting the labor factor by educational
attainment and partially cope with this issue.
Yet it is not our aim to prescribe optimal policies, our ﬁndings may have some policy implications.
These implications are related to the acknowledgement of the differentiated potential gains from
R&D investments according to the particular initial conditions that each country has. Our results
would suggest that efforts coming from governments aimed at promoting this kind of investments
are expected to yield better outcomes in contexts with highly complementary factors (i.e. educated
labor force) and a sector of technology developers/innovators (absorbers/imitators) of low (high)
density. It becomes apparent that for countries that lie too far from the economic or technological
frontier, government priorities should focus more intensively into improving the quality of human
capital rather than into devoting resources to prompt technological innovations that would not be
fully exploited due to the lack of complementarity effects.
3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Two Steps in IVVC estimation
First Stage
Assuming that j(:) has a continuous second derivative, for Zk in a neighborhood of Zi, a Taylor
expansion can approximate j(Z )k  ij+(Zk Zi)0ij where ij = j(Zi) and ij = 0
ij(Zi).
By jackknife sampling, we use all observations except the ith observation in estimating j(Zi). We
get a typical local weighted least squares estimator as follows:
Pn
k6=ifXkj   ij   (Zk   Zi)0ijg2Kh1(Zk   Zi)
where Kh1(:) = K(:=h1)=hm
1 +l. K(:) is a kernel function in <m +l, and h1 = h1n > 0 is the
bandwidth in the ﬁrst step that controls the degree of smoothing in estimation. Minimizing the last
expression with respect to ij and ij gives the local linear estimate of j(Zi):
^ j; i(Zi) = ^ ij = e0
1( ~ Zi
0
Wi ~ Zi) 1 ~ ZiWi ~ Xj (3.9)
where
e0





1 (Z1   Zi)0
. . .
. . .
1 (Zn   Zi)0
1
C
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and
Wi = diagfKh1(Z1   Zi);:::;Kh1(Zn   Zi)g
Second Stage
Assuming that the functions fgj(Z1)g have a continuous second derivative at any given point z1,




















 is the Kronecker product. Then the conditional mean in model (2) can be approximated








































fbj + (Zi1   z1)0cjg^ j; i(Zi)]2Lh2(Zi1   z1) (3.10)
,
where Lh2(:) = L(:=h2)=hm
2 . L(:) is a kernel function in <m, and h2 = h2n > 0 is the
bandwidthinthesecondstepthatcontrolsthedegreeofsmoothinginestimation. Minimizingthelast
expression with respect to b and fcjg gives the local linear estimate of bj(z1) and cj(z1).Therefore
the minimizers of (4) are given by





where H2 = diagf1;:::;1;h2;:::;h2g is a (d + 1)(m + 1)  (d + 1)(m + 1) matrix with the
ﬁrst (d + 1) diagonal elements being 1’s and the rest diagonal elements h2’s,
^ Sn = ^ Sn(z1) =
 ^ Sn;0 ^ S0
n;1
^ Sn;1 ^ Sn;2







^ Sn;0 = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 Lh2(Zi1   z1)^  i^ 0
 i,
^ Sn;1 = (1=nh2)
Pn
i=1 Lh2(Zi1   z1)f^  i 
 (Zi1   z1)g^ 0
 i,
^ Sn;2 = (1=nh2
2)
Pn
i=1 Lh2(Zi1   z1)f^  i 
 (Zi1   z1)gf^  i 
 (Zi1   z1)g0,
^ Tn;0 = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 Lh2(Zi1   z1)^  iYi and
^ Tn;1 = (1=nh2)
Pn
i=1 Lh2(Zi1   z1)f^  i 
 (Zi1   z1)gYi.
That gives the two-stage local linear estimated of the coefﬁcient functions and in particular,
^ g(z1) = ^ b = e0H
 1
2 ^ S 1
n ^ Tn = e0^ S 1
n ^ Tn,
where is e = (1;:::;1;0;:::;0)0 is a (d + 1)(m + 1) vector whose ﬁrst (d + 1) elements are one
and the remaining elements are zero.
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3.9.2 Optimal Bandwidth Estimation
The optimal variable bandwidth for the varying coefﬁcient model is given by:
^ hopt = Argminh\ MSE(^ 
(z)jZ )
where \ MSE(^ 




(z)jZ ) = b0(z)
(z)b(z) + tr(
(z)Cov(z)jZ ))
where b(z) = bias((^ 
1(z)jZ );:::;bias((^ 
p(z)jZ )) and 
 is a matrix with (i;j)th elements equal
to rij(z) with rij(z) = E(XiXjjz = z), for i;j = 1;2;:::;p:
Bias
























 (1;0) + c0
2 
 (0;1))0

















The quantity s can be estimated by using a local polynomial regression of order g(g > q) with a
bandwidth h:




where W = diag(Kh(z1   z0);:::;Kh(zn   z0)). The initial bandwidth h is obtained by
the minimizer of the integrated residual squares criterion (IRSC) as in Fan & Gijbels (1995)30.
30h = Argmin(IRSC(h)) =
R
RSC(z0;h)dz0,
where RSC(z0;h) = (1 + (q + 1)V )
Pn
i=1(yi  ^ yhi)2Kh(zi z0)
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Covariance
The conditional covariance is given by
Cov(^ 








where 	 = diag(2(z1);:::;2(zn)). Under local homoscedasticity the covariance can be ap-
proximated by:
Cov(^ 





















The estimate of the element rij in 
 will be obtained based on (Zl;XliXlj);l = 1;:::;n, using the
local polynomial ﬁt of order g with bandwidth h0 = Op(h):
^ rij = e0
1;g(V0W0V) 1V0W0Uij






















The estimates of the three elements combined (bias, covariance and omega), considering q = 1
















Given the weighting matrix e0
1;g(V0W0V) 1V0W0, ^ rij could be negative semi-deﬁnite
(leading to a negative semi-deﬁnite 
 matrix and therefore to potential non-positive MSE) we use
the covariance matrix repairing algorithm proposed by Dong & Yaoi (2007). To repair ill-posed
covariance matrices, the algorithm adds a positive value to the diagonal of 
. The value we chose is
the absolute value of the minimum eigenvalue (which is negative if 
 is ill-posed) of 
, multiplies
a self-adapted positive coefﬁcient of 1.5 (as in Dong & Yaoi 2007). Alternatively we also computed
^ rij as ^ rij = je0
1;g(V0W0V) 1V0W0jUij. Both approaches yield virtually the same optimal
variable bandwidths (except for the cases of extreme left values of the ordering variable in which the
repair method cannot yield reliable outputs).
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3.9.3 Depreciated (net) investment in physical capital and R&D.
Starting from gross values of R&D expenditures, we get ”net” values, by applying the perpetual
inventory method with a pre-sample growth rate of 0.05 as in Hall & Mairesse (1995). However, we
depart from Hall and Mairesse in two regards. First, we work with average data by quinquennium
rather than by year and therefore we assume constant expenditures within quinquennia. Second, we
use a depreciation rate of 0.05 instead of 0.1531. Though not ideal, this correction gives us an idea of
the order of magnitude of differences between the contributions of gross and net R&D investments.
Based on the following equation:
St = (1   )St 1 + Rt 1
where St is the capital stock of R&D, Rt is the gross ﬂow, and  is the depreciation rate, it is
easy to show that:
Rnett = Rt   Rt 1   (1   )Rt 2   (1   )2Rt 3   (1   )3Rt 4   :::
and hence we can incorporate depreciation issues without the need of generating stocks. With
the assumption of a constant Rt within quinquennium we have:
Rt = Rq for t = t;:::;t   4
Rnett = Rqj(1      (1   )   (1   )2   (1   )3)   Rqj 1((1   )4 + :::)   :::  
Rq1((1   )n 4 + (1   )n 3 + (1   )n 2 + (1   )n 1 + (1   )n 1
g+)
where Rnett is the variable in net terms,Rq1 is the observation of the ﬁrst quinquennium, and g
is the pre-sample growth rate.
Finally, we calculate this equation for every period within a quinquennium and calculate the av-
erage of the coefﬁcient multiplying each Rqj
Rnett 1 = Rqj(1      (1   )   (1   )2)   Rqj 1((1   )3 + :::)   :::
Rnett 2 = Rqj(1      (1   ))   Rqj 1((1   )2 + :::)   :::
Rnetq = Rqj(1   4
5   3
5(1   )   2





5(1   ) + 3
5(1   )2 + 4
5(1   )3 + (1   )4+
+4
5(1   )5 + 3
5(1   )6 + 2




31With a depreciation rate of 0.15, average net R&D investments amounts one third of their gross values whereas they
amount one half when  = 0:05
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3.9.4 Values of Inducing Variables
Distance to the Economic Frontier
Distance to Distance to Distance to Distance to Distance to
Economic Frontier Economic Frontier Economic Frontier Economic Frontier Economic Frontier
MWI 1966-1970 -5.98 MUS 1981-1985 -3.33 GRC 1966-1970 -2.31 ITA 1981-1985 -1.24 CAN 1996-2000 -0.61
IND 1966-1970 -5.56 GTM 1981-1985 -3.31 URY 1971-1975 -2.29 BEL 1971-1975 -1.22 FRA 1996-2000 -0.60
IND 1976-1980 -5.32 ECU 1996-2000 -3.31 MYS 1996-2000 -2.28 CYP 1991-1995 -1.22 BEL 1991-1995 -0.60
PAK 1966-1970 -5.29 ECU 1991-1995 -3.26 HUN 1996-2000 -2.28 AUT 1971-1975 -1.21 BEL 1996-2000 -0.60
UGA 1991-1995 -5.28 IRN 1991-1995 -3.19 HUN 1991-1995 -2.25 SWE 1966-1970 -1.21 BEL 1986-1990 -0.59
IND 1981-1985 -5.28 TUR 1971-1975 -3.19 ZAF 1986-1990 -2.25 ISR 1961-1965 -1.20 GBR 1991-1995 -0.59
IND 1971-1975 -5.26 TUR 1981-1985 -3.15 BRA 1986-1990 -2.22 AUS 1976-1980 -1.19 FRA 1991-1995 -0.59
UGA 1996-2000 -5.12 JOR 1981-1985 -3.15 PAN 1986-1990 -2.17 FRA 1971-1975 -1.18 NOR 1961-1965 -0.57
KEN 1966-1970 -5.10 TUN 1991-1995 -3.13 PRT 1971-1975 -2.13 AUS 1971-1975 -1.17 NLD 1991-1995 -0.57
PAK 1976-1980 -5.02 CHL 1976-1980 -3.12 MEX 1981-1985 -2.12 FIN 1976-1980 -1.16 FRA 1986-1990 -0.56
BGD 1971-1975 -5.01 THA 1991-1995 -3.11 ARG 1966-1970 -2.11 ESP 1986-1990 -1.15 AUT 1991-1995 -0.55
PAK 1971-1975 -4.98 GTM 1986-1990 -3.08 CHL 1996-2000 -2.10 AUS 1981-1985 -1.15 DEU 1996-2000 -0.55
TGO 1991-1995 -4.89 TUR 1976-1980 -3.07 VEN 1981-1985 -2.09 NZL 1991-1995 -1.13 NLD 1986-1990 -0.55
PAK 1981-1985 -4.88 TUN 1996-2000 -3.05 PRT 1976-1980 -2.07 FRA 1976-1980 -1.12 NLD 1996-2000 -0.54
BGD 1991-1995 -4.80 ROM 1991-1995 -3.05 HUN 1986-1990 -2.00 BEL 1976-1980 -1.12 DEU 1991-1995 -0.54
ZMB 1996-2000 -4.78 PER 1991-1995 -3.04 VEN 1996-2000 -1.99 AUT 1976-1980 -1.12 AUT 1986-1990 -0.54
LKA 1971-1975 -4.77 SLV 1991-1995 -3.04 MEX 1996-2000 -1.98 GBR 1971-1975 -1.12 CHE 1976-1980 -0.53
IND 1986-1990 -4.72 SLV 1971-1975 -3.02 PRT 1981-1985 -1.97 CAN 1971-1975 -1.11 GBR 1986-1990 -0.53
THA 1966-1970 -4.71 ROM 1996-2000 -3.01 TTO 1996-2000 -1.95 ESP 1991-1995 -1.10 AUT 1996-2000 -0.53
IND 1991-1995 -4.71 BRA 1971-1975 -3.00 CYP 1981-1985 -1.93 ESP 1996-2000 -1.09 GBR 1996-2000 -0.53
TGO 1986-1990 -4.69 KOR 1971-1975 -2.98 MEX 1991-1995 -1.92 GBR 1976-1980 -1.09 FIN 1986-1990 -0.52
LKA 1981-1985 -4.59 PER 1981-1985 -2.96 URY 1991-1995 -1.92 GBR 1981-1985 -1.09 CAN 1986-1990 -0.50
CHN 1986-1990 -4.57 SLV 1986-1990 -2.95 VEN 1976-1980 -1.92 BEL 1981-1985 -1.07 HKG 1996-2000 -0.47
IND 1996-2000 -4.54 PER 1971-1975 -2.95 VEN 1991-1995 -1.91 NLD 1971-1975 -1.06 CHE 1981-1985 -0.46
SEN 1996-2000 -4.53 PER 1976-1980 -2.95 ISR 1966-1970 -1.90 FRA 1981-1985 -1.06 SWE 1996-2000 -0.44
SEN 1991-1995 -4.47 JAM 1981-1985 -2.93 VEN 1971-1975 -1.87 FIN 1981-1985 -1.05 CHE 1971-1975 -0.44
CMR 1966-1970 -4.47 SLV 1996-2000 -2.92 ARG 1981-1985 -1.87 NZL 1996-2000 -1.05 SWE 1991-1995 -0.42
ZMB 1966-1970 -4.45 PER 1996-2000 -2.92 ARG 1976-1980 -1.85 AUT 1981-1985 -1.05 DNK 1991-1995 -0.36
KEN 1961-1965 -4.44 COL 1996-2000 -2.87 MEX 1986-1990 -1.84 CAN 1976-1980 -1.05 USA 1961-1965 -0.33
CHN 1991-1995 -4.41 CHL 1981-1985 -2.87 ITA 1966-1970 -1.83 NLD 1976-1980 -1.03 SWE 1986-1990 -0.33
ZMB 1971-1975 -4.32 KOR 1961-1965 -2.86 KOR 1986-1990 -1.83 NLD 1981-1985 -1.03 ISL 1996-2000 -0.33
GHA 1961-1965 -4.31 THA 1996-2000 -2.84 URY 1996-2000 -1.80 IRL 1986-1990 -1.02 DNK 1996-2000 -0.30
PAK 1986-1990 -4.30 HUN 1971-1975 -2.80 VEN 1986-1990 -1.80 USA 1966-1970 -1.02 ISL 1991-1995 -0.29
PAK 1996-2000 -4.25 CRI 1971-1975 -2.79 ARG 1971-1975 -1.76 CAN 1981-1985 -0.99 DNK 1986-1990 -0.24
PHL 1966-1970 -4.25 KOR 1976-1980 -2.78 HKG 1961-1965 -1.75 ISL 1971-1975 -0.96 USA 1991-1995 -0.22
THA 1976-1980 -4.19 BRA 1976-1980 -2.73 GRC 1961-1965 -1.75 NOR 1971-1975 -0.95 NOR 1991-1995 -0.21
TUN 1966-1970 -4.16 MUS 1986-1990 -2.72 ESP 1971-1975 -1.73 JPN 1961-1965 -0.92 USA 1996-2000 -0.18
EGY 1976-1980 -4.14 CRI 1981-1985 -2.71 ARG 1991-1995 -1.72 NZL 1986-1990 -0.91 ISL 1986-1990 -0.17
THA 1961-1965 -4.08 CRI 1976-1980 -2.71 IRL 1971-1975 -1.69 IRL 1991-1995 -0.91 CHE 1996-2000 -0.15
GUY 1981-1985 -4.00 BRA 1981-1985 -2.70 GRC 1976-1980 -1.68 SWE 1971-1975 -0.89 USA 1986-1990 -0.15
THA 1981-1985 -3.99 MEX 1966-1970 -2.70 GRC 1981-1985 -1.66 ISL 1976-1980 -0.86 NOR 1986-1990 -0.13
PHL 1971-1975 -3.98 MYS 1986-1990 -2.68 ESP 1981-1985 -1.65 ISR 1991-1995 -0.86 NOR 1996-2000 -0.09
IDN 1991-1995 -3.97 JOR 1986-1990 -2.65 FIN 1966-1970 -1.64 SWE 1981-1985 -0.86 JPN 1986-1990 -0.09
CHN 1996-2000 -3.94 TUR 1991-1995 -2.65 IRL 1976-1980 -1.63 SWE 1976-1980 -0.85 CHE 1991-1995 -0.07
EGY 1981-1985 -3.93 ROM 1986-1990 -2.63 ESP 1976-1980 -1.62 NOR 1976-1980 -0.82 JPN 1996-2000 -0.02
LKA 1996-2000 -3.93 PER 1986-1990 -2.62 ARG 1996-2000 -1.59 ISR 1986-1990 -0.81 JPN 1991-1995 -0.01
PHL 1976-1980 -3.89 HUN 1976-1980 -2.62 KOR 1991-1995 -1.58 JPN 1971-1975 -0.81 CHE 1986-1990 0.00
PHL 1981-1985 -3.82 TUR 1986-1990 -2.60 ARG 1986-1990 -1.52 DNK 1981-1985 -0.81 NOR 1986-1990 -0.13
GTM 1966-1970 -3.75 KOR 1981-1985 -2.60 PRT 1986-1990 -1.50 DNK 1971-1975 -0.79 NOR 1996-2000 -0.09
IDN 1996-2000 -3.74 JAM 1986-1990 -2.59 IRL 1981-1985 -1.50 DNK 1976-1980 -0.79 JPN 1986-1990 -0.09
ECU 1971-1975 -3.73 TUR 1996-2000 -2.58 ITA 1971-1975 -1.43 USA 1971-1975 -0.77 CHE 1991-1995 -0.07
PHL 1991-1995 -3.67 MYS 1991-1995 -2.55 CAN 1966-1970 -1.41 ISR 1996-2000 -0.76 JPN 1996-2000 -0.02
BOL 1991-1995 -3.66 ZAF 1981-1985 -2.55 JPN 1966-1970 -1.41 CHE 1966-1970 -0.76 JPN 1991-1995 -0.01
BOL 1996-2000 -3.64 HUN 1981-1985 -2.50 ISR 1971-1975 -1.40 AUS 1991-1995 -0.76 CHE 1961-1965 0.00
PHL 1986-1990 -3.60 POL 1991-1995 -2.49 GRC 1996-2000 -1.38 USA 1976-1980 -0.74 CHE 1986-1990 0.00
ECU 1976-1980 -3.53 URY 1966-1970 -2.49 NZL 1971-1975 -1.38 JPN 1976-1980 -0.74
IRN 1981-1985 -3.52 CHL 1986-1990 -2.48 NZL 1976-1980 -1.37 ITA 1996-2000 -0.73
KOR 1966-1970 -3.51 MUS 1996-2000 -2.44 PRT 1991-1995 -1.36 ITA 1991-1995 -0.73
COL 1971-1975 -3.48 ZAF 1991-1995 -2.43 PRT 1996-2000 -1.35 ITA 1986-1990 -0.72
SYR 1996-2000 -3.48 BRA 1991-1995 -2.42 ISR 1976-1980 -1.35 IRL 1996-2000 -0.71
JOR 1976-1980 -3.48 CRI 1991-1995 -2.41 GRC 1991-1995 -1.34 NOR 1981-1985 -0.71
PHL 1961-1965 -3.46 MEX 1971-1975 -2.41 ITA 1976-1980 -1.34 USA 1981-1985 -0.68
GTM 1971-1975 -3.43 PAN 1991-1995 -2.40 KOR 1996-2000 -1.33 AUS 1996-2000 -0.67
COL 1976-1980 -3.42 TTO 1966-1970 -2.40 VEN 1961-1965 -1.30 ISL 1981-1985 -0.67
HND 1961-1965 -3.41 BRA 1996-2000 -2.39 ARG 1961-1965 -1.29 AUS 1986-1990 -0.67
THA 1986-1990 -3.41 CHL 1991-1995 -2.37 ISR 1981-1985 -1.28 FIN 1996-2000 -0.64
EGY 1991-1995 -3.40 CRI 1986-1990 -2.35 NOR 1966-1970 -1.28 GBR 1961-1965 -0.63
GTM 1976-1980 -3.36 PAN 1996-2000 -2.35 FIN 1971-1975 -1.25 CAN 1991-1995 -0.63
EGY 1996-2000 -3.34 CRI 1996-2000 -2.34 GRC 1986-1990 -1.25 JPN 1981-1985 -0.62
COL 1981-1985 -3.33 POL 1996-2000 -2.32 ISL 1966-1970 -1.24 FIN 1991-1995 -0.62
Country Period Country Period Country Period Country Period Country Period
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Fiscal redistribution and income inequality in Latin
America1
Edwin A. Go˜ ni-Pacchioni2
J. Humberto L´ opez3
Luis Serv´ en4
Abstract
This paper documents and compares the redistributive performance of Latin American and West-
ern European ﬁscal systems. It ﬁnds that (i) taxes and transfers widen the difference in income
inequality between the two country groups, because (ii) the redistributive impact of the ﬁscal system
is very large in Europe and very small in Latin America; and (iii) where ﬁscal redistribution is signiﬁ-
cant, it is achieved mostly through transfers rather than taxes. While the priorities of pro-equity ﬁscal
reforms vary across Latin American countries, overall the prospects for major ﬁscal redistribution
lie mainly in raising the volume of resources available for transfers, and improving their targeting,
rather than increasing the progressivity of Latin America’s tax systems.
4.1 Introduction
According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2006, Latin America ranks at the top
among world regions in terms of inequality, second only to Sub Saharan Africa. Inequality in Latin
America is pervasive - it extends to every aspect of life, from the distribution of income and assets,
to access to education and health services, and political voice and inﬂuence.
High inequality is viewed by many as intrinsically bad on moral and ethical grounds5. But in ad-
1An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the conference ”Pol´ ıticas Econ´ omicas para un Nuevo Pacto Social
en Am´ erica Latina”, Barcelona, October 2006. We are grateful to David Taguas, Jos´ e de Gregorio, Jean-Jacques Dethier,
ﬁve anonymous referees, and conference participants for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Iamele Rigolini and
Emmanuel Skouﬁas for sharing with us their data ﬁles on the incidence of taxes and transfers, and Karla Breceda for her
assistance with the processing of the tax incidence data. The views expressed here are ours only and do not necessarily reﬂect
those of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent. The usual disclaimers apply.
2Department of Economics, European University Institute (Edwin.Goni@EUI.eu) and London School of Economics
(E.A.Goni-Pacchioni@lse.ac.uk)
3CentralAmericaManagementUnit, LatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanregion, TheWorldBank(hlopez@worldbank.org)
4Development and Economic Research Group, The World Bank (lserven@worldbank.org)
5See Bank (2006) for a review of the philosophical arguments for equity.
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dition high inequality can be a powerful drag on development and prosperity, for several reasons.
First, for given average income levels, higher income inequality means higher poverty. And the mag-
nitude of this effect is far from negligible: according to Perry & Serv´ en (2006), if Latin America had
the levels of inequality found in developed countries, its current poverty rate would be halved. High
poverty is not only a tragedy in itself but, as a rapidly expanding literature has argued, it can also
be a source of underdevelopment traps in which ﬁnancial market imperfections and institutional con-
straints prevent the poor from contributing to the growth process6. This in turn retards growth and
makes poverty self-perpetuating. Indeed, the international evidence is consistent with this growth-
deterring effect of poverty (e.g., L´ opez & Serv´ en (2006b)).
Second, the other side of the coin is that high inequality also weakens the impact of aggregate
income growth on poverty: the more unequal income distribution is, the faster the rate of growth
required to achieve a given reduction in poverty7. Combined with the mechanism just described, the
result is that inequality lies at the core of the vicious circles of stagnation and poverty in which many
developing countries appear to be stuck.
Third, high inequality can also be a source of distributive conﬂict and social tension, which tend
to undermine the legitimacy of policies and institutions as well as their stability, and in particular
weaken property rights, thus discouraging investment and thereby growth8.
These considerations have brought social equity to center stage in the Latin American policy de-
bate. Indeed, recent major contributions to that debate portray social equity as one, or even the, key
organizing principle for the region’s development strategy, and some retrospective assessments of
Latin America’s performance under the so-called ’Washington Consensus’ of the 1990s blame the
reforms’ neglect of equity considerations for the region’s limited achievements over the 1990s and
2000s9. On both counts, equity has become a central concern for development policy across the
region, echoing the views of Latin American citizens, who overwhelmingly perceive the distribution
of income as ’unfair’ or ’very unfair’ and believe that the state should take responsibility for reducing
the gap between rich and poor10.
High income inequality usually reﬂects an unequal distribution of assets, such as land and human
capital. Across countries, asset inequality and income inequality are closely associated - e.g., the
cross-country correlation between the Gini coefﬁcients of the distribution of income and the distribu-
tion of human capital, as proxied by years of schooling is above .75, while the correlation between
the Gini indices of the distribution of income and the distribution of land is around .50 (de Ferranti
et al., 2004). And asset distribution is highly unequal in Latin America. For example, the Gini coef-
ﬁcient of the distribution of operational holdings of agricultural land is about .81 for Latin America
(Deininger & Olinto, 2000), while in other world regions it hovers around .60; similarly, for the dis-
tribution of years of schooling, the Gini coefﬁcient is .42 in Latin America, against .27 in industrial
countries11.
6See for example Azariadis & Stachurski (2005).
7See Bourguignon (2004) and L´ opez & Serv´ en (2006a) for some quantitative estimates of the order of magnitude of this
effect.
8Alesina & Rodrik (1994) and Alesina & Perotti (1996) present empirical evidence of the adverse effect of inequality on
investment through these channels.
9See for example Birdsall & de la Torre (2001); Kuczynski & Williamson (2003); de Ferranti et al. (2004); Perry &
Serv´ en (2006).
10According to the regional opinion poll Latinobarometro, 79 percent of those surveyed in 2009 regarded the distribution
of income in their countries as unfair or very unfair. In an earlier 1996 poll, over 90 percent of all respondents agreed or
strongly agreed with the view that the state should take charge of reducing inequality.
11Asset inequality has deep roots in Latin America, which some authors (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2000; Acemoglu et al.,
2001) trace to the pattern of specialization during colonial times, heavily reliant on natural resources - especially mining
and sugar production - and on the use of subordinate labor. In this view, the colonists developed institutions (related, for
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But high inequality can also reﬂect the failure of ﬁscal policy to perform its redistributive func-
tion - one of Musgrave (1959)’s three classic ﬁscal functions12- through appropriate use of taxes and
transfers to correct socially-undesirable distributive outcomes arising from market forces, given the
prevailing distribution of assets. The evidence shows that industrial-country governments are highly
effective at this redistributive function, but developing-country governments are not, and in fact they
are often part of the problem rather than the solution13.
If inequality is above socially tolerable levels, as the survey evidence cited above suggests, in gen-
eral policy action has to take a dual approach. On the one hand, it should target the deep roots of
inequality, through interventions aiming to broaden asset ownership and equality of opportunity -
e.g., by expanding access to education and health. But this is likely to be a long-term process with
much of the payoff accruing in the distant future. On the other hand, policy should ensure, through
the necessary ﬁscal reforms, that the ﬁscal system performs its redistributive function effectively.
In this paper we document and compare the performance of Latin American and Western European
ﬁscal systems. Our use of internationally-comparable data on tax and transfer incidence, allows us
to adopt a comparative perspective that extends the literature in two dimensions. First, and perhaps
the most novel result of this paper, we show that the biggest contrast between the two regions in
terms of income inequality concerns the distributional impact of the tax and transfer system. In con-
trast with industrial countries, in most Latin American countries the ﬁscal system is of little help in
reducing inequality. This is the combined result of two adverse factors. One is that transfers do help
redistribution, but in general not much, especially if only cash transfers are considered. The other is
that the scope for active ﬁscal redistribution is severely constrained by the region’s low levels of tax
collection, which (with a couple of exceptions) are well below the international norm - a fact that
also underlies the shortcomings of Latin America’s public sectors in the other classic functions of
efﬁciency and stability.
Second, wherever there is signiﬁcant ﬁscal redistribution, it is achieved through transfers - espe-
cially in-kind transfers - rather than taxes. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Harberger
(2003) and, more recently, OECD (2008), and extends to other Latin American countries the earlier
ﬁndings of Engel et al. (1999) for Chile. In addition, however, the paper’s quantitative results show
that the redistributive impact of transfers can be quite considerable, in contrast with Harberger’s con-
clusion that they were at best moderately more potent than taxes in this regard. In effect, we ﬁnd that
transfers largely responsible for the wide disparity in income inequality between the European and
Latin American countries examined. From the policy perspective, the ﬁnding that the redistributive
role of the tax system is in fact relatively minor also means that distributional concerns should not
dictate the choice between income tax and VAT-based strategies to raise revenue collection, even for
policy makers mindful of equity concerns.
On the whole, the evidence we present shows ample room for enhancing the distributive perfor-
mance of Latin America’s ﬁscal systems through appropriate ﬁscal reform - with speciﬁc reform
priorities determined by country circumstances. Our analysis is subject to some caveats, however.
First, we focus on annual income rather than lifetime income, thus neglecting intertemporal issues
such as redistribution over the life-cycle). This may lead to overstating inequality as well as the
regressivity of indirect taxation (Fullerton & Rogers, 1993). Second, we rely on standard incidence
analysis, leaving aside incentive effects of ﬁscal interventions whose proper consideration would
example, to land use and political control) that helped perpetuate their political dominance and their wealth, resulting in a
highly unequal distribution of assets that has persisted until today.
12The other two are efﬁciency and stabilization; see Musgrave (1959).
13For a discussion of the anti-poverty effect of taxes and transfers in industrial countries see Smeeding (2006). For a
comparison of industrial and developing countries see Chu & Gupta (2000).
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require a fully-speciﬁed general equilibrium model. Similarly, our discussion of the incidence of
transfers on income inequality focuses on who beneﬁts from spending on average, rather than at the
margin, and thus we ignore possible systematic differences between average and marginal incidence
- which could lead us to underestimate the redistributive impact of transfer increases. Third, our
analysis only considers the impact of income and consumption taxes and ignores the distributive im-
pact of other taxes (e.g. on international trade) that are relatively important in some Latin American
countries (especially in Central America). Fourth, our analysis is constrained by data limitations,
particularly when broadening its focus to include also the distributive impact of indirect taxes and
in-kind transfers. This requires combining data from different sources and, for some countries, dif-
ferent years. While we believe this is of little consequence for our qualitative conclusions, these
data limitations may introduce some margin of error in the quantitative results. And ﬁfth, our use of
Western European countries as benchmark of comparison should also be taken as a reﬂection of data
availability, rather than a normative statement about the desirability (or lack thereof) of the ’Euro-
pean model’ as a speciﬁc choice between redistributive activism and efﬁciency costs. Related to this,
we do not discuss the institutional constraints and implementation challenges that Latin American
countries would have to overcome should they wish to expand signiﬁcantly the role of taxes and/or
transfers as redistributive vehicles14.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we compare the distributional impact
of taxes and transfers in Latin America and in Western Europe. Section 4.3 explores in detail why
Latin America’s ﬁscal policy is largely ineffective at reducing income inequality. Finally, Section
4.4 closes with some concluding thoughts.
4.2 Income inequality and ﬁscal redistribution in Latin America
The centerpiece of our analysis is an assessment of the redistributive performance of Latin America’s
ﬁscal systems. For this purpose, we document the facts concerning income inequality across Latin
America before and after various ﬁscal interventions. We use a comparative perspective putting side
by side the experience of two groups of countries from Latin America and Western Europe.
The country sample we use for this analysis is determined by the availability of suitable income
distribution data. It comprises the six largest Latin American economies15, which together account
for 75% of the region’s population and over 80% of its 2008 GDP, and up to 15 countries from
Western Europe. However, not all of the latter countries possess complete information, and there-
fore some of the cross-regional comparisons presented below cover a smaller group of European
economies. The Appendix describes in detail the data sources.
Before proceeding, it will be useful to deﬁne some terms. We use the term market income to re-
fer to income before taxes and government transfers - thus its distribution is largely determined by
market rewards to the private assets and efforts of individuals, and by the underlying distribution
of those private assets. However, from a welfare perspective a more relevant measure is disposable
income - i.e., household income after government cash beneﬁts (e.g. pensions, unemployment in-
surance, social assistance transfers) have been received and direct taxes have been paid. Disposable
income, rather than market income, is the relevant measure of the spending capacity of the differ-
ent households. In addition, we use below two other deﬁnitions of household income. The ﬁrst
one is gross income, equal to market income plus government cash beneﬁts or, equivalently, total
household income before taxes. The second is what we shall call, for want of a better term, post-tax
14See for example Dethier (2007) for a discussion of the difﬁculties that developing countries would likely encounter if
they tried to raise social security coverage to levels similar to those found in the developed world.
15Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
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income, which deducts from gross income all taxes, both direct and indirect, and thus offers a proxy
for households’ purchasing power. It allows a comprehensive view of the incidence of the overall
tax burden, particularly in countries that rely heavily on indirect taxation.
Comparing the degree of inequity of the distribution of the various income deﬁnitions we can get a
summary measure of the distributional effects of the three ﬁscal interventions that distinguish them
- direct taxes, indirect taxes, and transfers. This is done in Table 4.1, which reports the value of the
Gini coefﬁcients for the four alternative measures of income. For the moment we focus on the ﬁrst
three columns of the table.
Income inequality is commonly measured in terms of the distribution of disposable income. The
corresponding Gini coefﬁcients appear in column 3 of the table, and they conﬁrm that, by this def-
inition of income, Latin America is much more unequal than Europe16. The Gini coefﬁcients of
disposable income average .50 for the Latin American countries considered, against just .31 for the
European countries. In fact, the Latin American country with the lowest Gini coefﬁcient in this sam-
ple (Chile) has inequality levels above those of the most unequal European country (Portugal)17.
The distribution of disposable income is the combined result of the distribution of market income
and the redistributive action of the state through direct taxes and cash transfers. Columns (1) and (2)
in 4.1 help identify the role of each of these ingredients. The Gini coefﬁcients of market income,
shown in column 1, reveal a much less marked contrast across regions than that emerging from
column (3). In fact, whereas the average Gini coefﬁcient of market income for the Latin American
countries, at .52, is only 2 percentage points above that of disposable income, the Gini coefﬁcients of
market income for the European countries are substantially higher than those for disposable income:
the average of the former for the 15 countries in the sample is now .46, a whopping 15-percentage
points higher than the average of the latter.
Thus, one important message from this analysis is that the equity gap between the two groups
of countries is much narrower in terms of market income than in terms of disposable income. In
other words, most of the difference between the levels of disposable income inequality in the two
regions is due to the different impact of taxes and transfers: they reduce market income inequality
considerably in Europe, and very little in Latin America. Indeed, before direct taxes and transfers
are considered, several countries in Europe possess Gini indices comparable to those typically found
in Latin America. This is the case, for example, of Ireland and the UK, whose Gini coefﬁcients
of market income are estimated at .53 and .52 respectively. Even the Nordic countries, commonly
praised for their levels of equity, show relatively high inequality of market incomes. The Gini indices
of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are .49, .49 and .45 respectively. The most egalitarian countries
in the sample in terms of market incomes are Austria and the Netherlands, with Gini coefﬁcients of
.38 and .39 respectively. These values are in sharp contrast with the Gini coefﬁcients of disposable
income of the same set of European countries, which are much lower. The difference is especially
marked in the cases of Denmark or Ireland, where taxes and transfers lower the Gini coefﬁcient by
20 and 19 percentage points respectively. Even the European countries that redistribute the least
through the tax-beneﬁt system (Italy, Greece and Portugal) still manage to lower their Gini indices
by more than 10 percentage points.
The natural question is whether the dramatically different redistributive impact of the tax-beneﬁt
system in Latin America and Europe reﬂects mostly the action of transfers, taxes, or both. The redis-
16The Gini coefﬁcient estimates in the table are close to those reported by de Ferranti et al. (2004) and Bank (2006). For
disposable income, they report an average Gini coefﬁcient of about .5 for Latin America and an average Gini coefﬁcient of
.31 for European countries.
17This result continues to hold in a broader sample of Latin American countries, because the lowest Gini in the region
(Uruguay’s) is .42.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
LAC 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.51
Argentina 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48
Brazil 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55
Chile 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.47
Colombia 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.54
Mexico 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49
Peru 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51
EU15 * 0.46 0.36 0.31 0.34
Austria 0.38 0.30 0.25 N.A.
Belgium 0.47 0.36 0.29 0.30
Denmark 0.49 0.35 0.29 N.A.
Finland 0.49 0.36 0.32 0.35
France 0.42 0.35 0.31 0.34
Germany 0.43 0.33 0.28 N.A.
Greece 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.38
Ireland 0.53 0.39 0.34 0.35
Italy 0.48 0.41 0.37 0.40
Luxembourg 0.41 0.30 0.24 0.25
Netherlands 0.39 0.30 0.26 0.27
Portugal 0.49 0.43 0.38 0.41
Spain 0.47 0.40 0.35 0.37
Sweden 0.45 0.33 0.29 0.33
UK 0.52 0.39 0.34 0.36
Source: Author’s calculation (see Data Appendix).
Notes: Income deﬁnitions considered are the following: (1) Market Income: Income before taxes and
government transfers; (2) Gross Income: Market Income plus government cash transfers; (3) Disposable
Income: Gross Income minus direct taxes; (4) Post Tax Income: Disposable Income minus indirect taxes.
The average Gini coefﬁcients computed for the European sample excluding Austria, Denmark and Germany
(as in Column 4) for the Market, Gross and Disposable Income are 0.47, 0.37 and 0.32 respectively. Likewise,
the average Gini coefﬁcients computed for the European sample including only those countries considered in
Table 4.4 for the Market, Gross, Disposable and Post-tax Income are 0.47, 0.37, 0.32 and 0.34 respectively.
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tributive effect of public transfers can be inferred comparing the Gini coefﬁcients of gross income
in column (2) of the table with those of market income. This again reveals a sharp contrast between
the two regions. Public transfers contribute only slightly to lower inequality in Latin America - the
Gini coefﬁcients of gross income are at best 1-2 percentage points lower than those of market in-
come, and in some countries (Argentina, Colombia, Peru) there is virtually no difference between
the former and the latter. However, transfers play a big role in the European countries, where the
difference between the Gini coefﬁcients of the two income deﬁnitions averages 10 percentage points.
This conceals substantial variation across countries: in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the UK, and Swe-
den public transfers bring the Gini coefﬁcient of gross income 12-14 percentage points below that
of market income. In Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg, the effect is sizable too - some 10-11
percentage points. At the other extreme, in Portugal transfers lower the Gini coefﬁcient by just 6
percentage points.
As for the effect of direct taxes, the contrast between regions is less dramatic. The redistributive
impact of direct taxes can be inferred by comparing the Gini coefﬁcients of gross and disposable
income shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.1. Like in the case of transfers, the conclusion
is that direct taxes reduce the levels of income inequality much more in European countries than in
Latin America. For example, direct taxation lowers the Gini coefﬁcient of household income by 6-7
percentage points in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg, and by an average 5 percentage
points for the ﬁfteen European countries considered. In turn, in the Latin American countries direct
taxes are also progressive - with the exception of Brazil - but their impact on inequality is very weak:
on average, the Gini coefﬁcients decline by just 1 percentage point, with very little variation across
countries.
Thus, the second important message that emerges from the previous discussion concerns the rela-
tive redistributive roles of direct taxes and transfer beneﬁts. Among the Latin American countries
considered, both are of roughly similar (and modest) magnitude, but in the European countries trans-
fers play a much bigger role than taxes: of the 15 percentage-point difference between the average
Gini coefﬁcients of market and disposable income across European countries, about two-thirds (10
percentage points) are due to transfers18.
Asweshalldiscussbelow, thesetwobasicmessagesremainunchangedifwetakealess-conventional,
broader view of ﬁscal redistribution that encompasses also indirect taxation as well as in-kind trans-
fers.
4.3 What limits ﬁscal redistribution in Latin America?
To summarize, the empirical evidence suggests that the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers
is much bigger in Europe than in Latin America. But why exactly?
Engel et al. (1999) provide an analytical framework that helps answer this question. In their frame-
work, the redistributive impact of a country’s ﬁscal system is shaped by three factors. First, the
volume of tax collection – as tax collection capacity ultimately determines the feasible volume of
transfers. Second, the incidence of taxation. Third, the incidence of transfers. We next assess how
Latin America fares in each of these three areas.
18This dominant role of transfers over taxes is stressed by Harberger (2003) and corroborated by the ﬁndings reported in
OECD (2008).
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4.3.1 Tax collection
The overall volume of tax collection sets an upper bound on redistributive and other expenditures.
This raises the question of whether Latin America’s tax revenues are too low to permit adequate
redistribution on the expenditure side. Of course, there is no such a thing as an optimal level of taxa-
tion that applies to all countries in all circumstances, and in setting the level of taxes countries have
to trade off the excess burden of taxation against the social value of the public goods and services
(such as education or infrastructure) and/or the distributional changes to be funded with them. These
costs and beneﬁts are likely to be affected by a host of country-speciﬁc factors.
Tax collection has been on the rise in Latin America in recent years. Since the early 1990s it has
grown by an average of 2-3 percent of GDP (Cetr´ angolo & G´ omez-Sabaini, 2007). But in spite of
the rising trend, collection volumes remain well short of the international norm. Figure 4.1 shows
that almost all Latin American countries lie below the regression line relating tax collection to the
level of development, as measured by per capita GDP. Indeed, the median country in the region col-
lects 3 percentage points of GDP less than would be expected given its level of development19.
Why is tax collection so low in Latin America? Conceptually, there are two possible reasons:
low statutory tax rates, and narrow tax bases. Of course, each of the two may play differently for
different taxes. Table 4.2 offers a comparative perspective on tax rates across world regions, for
both income and value added taxes. Latin America’s income tax rates are at the low end of the
spectrum, for both personal and corporate income. Indeed, income tax rates have declined across the
region over the last two decades. The average top personal income tax rate fell from 49.5 percent in
1985 to under 30 percent in 2004. Likewise, the average top corporate tax rate declined from 43.9
percent in 1986 to 26.6 percent in 2004. As for VAT rates, they have followed the opposite trend:
the regional average of countries’ general rates rose from 12 percent in 1992 to 15 percent in 2004
19A similar result is obtained by Perry & Serv´ en (2006) when they relate average collection during the 1990s (rather than
in the late 2000s) to per capita GDP.
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Table 4.2: Comparative perspective on Tax Rates
Individuals Corporate VAT
East Asia Pacific 33.50 31.50 10.00
Latin America and the Caribbean 29.00 26.60 15.00
Middle East & North Africa 48.00 40.00 17.00
OECD 45.00 35.00 17.25
South Asia 39.50 41.00 15.00
Sub Saharan Africa 38.00 36.00 17.50
Region
Tax Rate
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eichhorn (2006), World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006,
OECD tax Database, Doing Business Database. Figures are group averages (of top rates in case of personal and
corporate taxes) and refer to latest available year.
(G´ omez-Sabaini, 2006). Still, Table 4.2 shows that they are not high by international standards.
What about tax bases? Narrow tax bases can be the result of plain tax evasion, or too generous
tax concessions and loopholes. One rough way of gauging tax bases is by looking at tax productivity,
deﬁned as actual revenues (as a percentage of GDP) relative to the prevailing nominal rates20. This
exercise is reported in Table 4.3. VAT productivity is comparable in Latin America to that observed
in other world regions, including rich countries, although the regional average conceals signiﬁcant
cross-country variation21. For income taxes, however, Latin America places far behind industrial
countries, even below Sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that the problem behind Latin America’s
low income tax receipts is primarily one of narrow tax bases rather than tax rates.
Tax evasion is rampant across the region, although precise ﬁgures are obviously hard to calculate.
Some recent estimates place evasion rates in the 45-60 percent range for both the personal and the
corporate income tax (Jim´ enez et al., 2010). Even for the VAT the estimates are quite large. Some
rough calculations suggest that a 30 percent reduction in evasion would increase tax revenues by 17
percent in Argentina, 14 percent in Brazil and 12 percent in Chile (Pessino & Fenochietto, 2004).
The practice of tax evasion in Latin America is encouraged by weak tax administrations across
the region. Indeed, opinion polls show that large majorities of individuals perceive tax collection as
largely arbitrary and unfair – only 23 percent of those surveyed by Latinobar´ ometro in 2003 thought
tax collection was ’impartial’. The culture of evasion is likely further promoted by the overwhelm-
ingly negative views about the state’s capacity to spend wisely - in the same survey, just 15 percent
of respondents believed that tax revenues would be put to good use.
A key factor behind poor tax compliance (and hence tax collection) is informality, which is per-
vasive in Latin America. The size of the ’shadow economy’ relative to the formal one is estimated
to average around 40 percent, the highest ﬁgure across world regions, equaled only by Sub-Saharan
Africa22. Maloney & Saavedra (2007) also argue that tax collection has a strong negative association
20In the case of the income tax, our productivity measure is based on the top marginal rate.
21Across the region, VAT productivity ranges from less than 25 percent in Mexico to over 50 percent in Honduras (Martner
& Aldunate, 2006). The calculations in the table use GDP to approximate the VAT base. Using aggregate consumption instead
yields similar qualitative results.
22See Eichhorn (2006) and Loayza & Sugawara (2009).
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Table 4.3: Tax Collection and Tax productivity
Income VAT Income VAT
East Asia Pacific 45.24 30.51 0.19 0.42
Latin America and the Caribbean 28.15 60.87 0.05 0.23
Middle East & North Africa 49.64 24.38 0.07 0.09
ÒECD 38.36 41.22 0.16 0.39
South Asia 34.60 39.52 0.08 0.24




(% of tax revenue)
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eichhorn (2006), World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006,
OECD tax Database, Doing Business Database.
with informality, with higher informality coming along with lower tax revenue, even when the level
of development is held constant.
Informality, of course, is not exogenous, but the combined result of poor public services (that re-
duce the beneﬁts of formality), weak tax administration, and the tax structure itself, in addition to
other factors. Payroll taxes in particular are widely viewed as providing a major incentive to infor-
mality, and still account for a considerable fraction of total direct tax collection in Latin America -
as high as 50 percent in Brazil (Martner & Aldunate, 2006). More broadly, the overall tax burden
facing formal ﬁrms - combining corporate taxes and VAT along with payroll contributions– is higher
in Latin America than in other world regions, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa23, and this
gives small ﬁrms a strong incentive to remain informal24.
Aside from evasion, tax concessions - exemptions, deductions, and other loopholes - play a ma-
jor role in narrowing income tax bases across Latin America. In many countries, households with
above-average income levels are exempt from the personal income tax because of very high min-
imum personal exemption levels. The average level of the minimum taxable income is twice the
region’s per capita income, and in some countries it is much higher (Figure 4.2)25. High personal
exemptions combined with a plethora of deductions severely reduce effective income tax rates, espe-
cially for the rich. As a result, tax rates highly progressive on paper collect little revenue in practice
because the higher rates only kick in at extraordinarily high levels of income, so they are rarely, if
ever, effective (Tanzi, 2000).
The limited collection of income taxes has prompted some experimentation with alternative taxes
- such as gross asset taxes and taxes on ﬁnancial transactions. The former is essentially a minimum
tax, typically applied at a rate of 1 percent. While easy to administer and potentially effective against
evasion, it is not devoid of efﬁciency problems (G´ omez-Sabaini, 2006). In turn, taxes on ﬁnancial
transactions were originally introduced in several countries as emergency collection devices, but
they have proven hard to replace and have tended to persist given their low administration cost and
high revenue collection capacity - in spite of their distorting potential in terms of promoting ﬁnancial
23See Bank (2006).
24On the role of taxes in encouraging informality in Latin America, see Levy (2008) and de Paula & Scheinkman (2009).
25Shome (1995) reports that these minimum exemptions are higher in Latin America than in other developing regions.
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Source: Stotsky & Woldemariam (2002).
disintermediation26.
4.3.2 Tax incidence
The distributional implications of Latin America’s tax structure have been widely debated. On a pri-
ori grounds, the large weight of indirect taxes in the region’s total revenues leads to the presumption
that overall taxation is likely to be regressive or neutral at best, given the conventional wisdom that
income taxes are usually progressive while consumption taxes such as the VAT are not. In theory,
multiple rates for VAT and similar taxes could achieve some progressivity - at the cost of potentially
signiﬁcant administrative complication - by granting more favorable treatment to food and other
goods primarily consumed by the poor. Indeed, most Latin American countries make use of multi-
ple VAT rates. In practice, however, their redistributive effect is generally modest, because much of
the beneﬁt from reduced VAT rates accrues to the rich, due to their higher levels of expenditure27.
On the other hand, in a number of Latin American countries, the effective personal income tax
rates of the upper income brackets are only a fraction of the statutory rates, negating much of the
supposed progressivity of income taxes. In turn, payroll taxes are also usually regressive, since in
most countries they are capped, so that the average rate declines with the level of income.
The few available assessments of the incidence of taxes in Latin America tend to ﬁnd a neutral
or regressive effect. G´ omez-Sabaini (2006) (2006) summarizes the ﬁndings of individual studies
of ten Latin American countries. In eight of them the overall effect of the tax system is found to
26See Tanzi (2000).
27See Tanzi (2000) and Ebrill et al. (2001) for discussion. Conceptually, what matters for redistribution is the change
in VAT collected relative to the respective incomes of the rich and poor, compared with the change, similarly scaled, in the
public transfers accruing to each of the two classes that were being ﬁnanced out of the lost VAT collection. On the other hand,
the regressive effects of consumption taxes may be much reduced in an intertemporal framework, as already mentioned.
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be regressive; in the other two it is approximately neutral. Those studies, however, use disparate
methodologies, so that their results are not strictly comparable across countries.
The data assembled for this paper allow a more systematic look at the incidence of taxes across
the six major Latin American economies. A summary view is provided in Figure 4.3). For each
country, the left panel of the ﬁgure reports the share of total taxes paid by each quintile of the in-
come distribution. The ﬁgure shows that the upper quintiles tend to pay more taxes in all cases. For
example, the top quintile pays at least 50 percent of total taxes, and in some cases (Brazil, Mexico
and Colombia) as much as 70 percent. However, this is hardly surprising given that the top quintile
of the population also accounts for 55 to 65 percent of total income.
Indeed, a more informative measure of the tax burden is the effective tax rate that the different quin-
tiles pay on their income (i.e., taxes paid relative to gross income). This is shown in the right panel
of each ﬁgure. Relative to their income, the tax burden faced by poor households is not very different
from that faced by households at the top of the distribution, and in Peru and Brazil the former face
heavier tax burdens than the latter. However, different taxes have different incidence. Income taxes
are generally progressive and, in some cases (e.g., Brazil, Chile or Peru), highly so as contributions
come almost solely from the top quintile. Value added taxes, on the other hand, tend to be regressive.
How does this conﬁguration of taxes affect income inequality in Latin America? We already re-
viewed the effect of direct taxation on the distribution of disposable income. But, as shown in Table
4.3, the bulk of Latin America’s tax revenues arise from indirect taxes. Hence, a better way to as-
sess the distributional effect of overall taxation is by comparing columns (2) and (4) of Table 4.1,
which report the Gini coefﬁcients of gross income and post tax income, respectively (with the lat-
ter calculated, as noted, by subtracting indirect taxes from conventional disposable income)28. The
comparison shows that in Latin America the combined effect of direct and indirect taxes on income
inequality, as captured by the Gini index, is minimal. Taxes contribute to a decline of the Gini index
of 1 percentage point in Argentina and Mexico; an increase of 1 percentage point in Peru; and no
noticeable change in Brazil, Chile and Colombia.
Closer inspection of columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 4.1 further reveals that both direct and in-
direct taxes have very modest distributional effects in the Latin American countries considered -
although their respective impacts generally are of opposite signs. Comparison of columns (2) and
(3) indicates that direct taxes tend to be inequality-reducing, except in Brazil (where the Gini coef-
ﬁcient remains unchanged). On the other hand, comparison of columns (3) and (4) (i.e. the Gini
coefﬁcients of disposable and post tax income) indicates that indirect taxes cause a slight increase in
inequality. However, their estimated impact is very modest in all countries. The largest effect occurs
in Peru, where indirect taxation raises the Gini coefﬁcient by two percentage points.
To provide a comparative perspective, Table 4.1 also reports a similar exercise for a subsample
of European countries, based on data for the incidence of VAT receipts drawn from Baldini & Man-
tovani (2004). As already discussed, comparison of the average Gini coefﬁcients in columns (2) and
(3) indicates that direct taxation has a bigger redistributive impact in Europe than in Latin America.
This pattern persists if we look at the redistributive impact of overall taxation, in spite of the regres-
sive effect of indirect taxation. Comparison of columns (2) and (4) of Table 4.1 show that, in the
European countries for which the requisite data is available the Gini coefﬁcient of post-tax income
is, on average, 3 percentage points lower than the Gini coefﬁcient of gross income29. Put differently,
28In Table 4.1, data on post-tax income is not available for Austria, Denmark and Germany. However, it is easy to verify
that this is of no consequence for the qualitative and quantitative conclusions from the comparisons across country groups
described in the text.
29Similar results have been found for the United States by Pechman (1985, 1990), who analyzed the structure of the tax
burden in the US, concluding that the tax system has very little effect on the distribution of income, and for the UK by Jones
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in the majority of European countries shown the regressive effect of indirect taxes offsets almost half
of the progressive impact of direct taxes. There is some variation around this norm, however. For
example, theestimatedeffectofoveralltaxationisstronglyprogressiveinBelgiumandLuxembourg.
In summary, two main messages emerge from our analysis of tax incidence. First, the progressive
redistributive effect of direct taxation is weaker in Latin America than in Europe. But second, the
impact of overall taxation on inequality is, on the whole, fairly small. This applies to both the Latin
American countries under consideration and, with few exceptions, the European countries for which
data is available. The simple reason is that, in virtually all countries examined, the regressive effect
of indirect taxation offsets much of the progressive impact of direct taxes.
4.3.3 The redistributive effects of public spending
Section 4.2 showed that in European countries public transfers reduce sharply the degree of inequal-
ity of market incomes, while in Latin America public transfers achieve little on the inequality front.
There are two potential (not mutually exclusive) reasons for this difference. The ﬁrst is that the vol-
ume of transfers is much smaller in Latin America than in Europe. The second is that the targeting
of the given volume of transfers is less progressive in the former than in the latter region.
Regarding the volume of transfers, Latin America spends, on average, less than half of what is
spent in Europe. For example, Lindert & Shapiro (2006) ﬁnd that on average the six Latin American
countries considered in our study devote to transfers about 7.3 percent of GDP30. Of this total, about
6.3 percent of GDP goes to social insurance programs (such as pensions and unemployment insur-
ance) and about 1 percent of GDP to social assistance programs such as conditional cash transfers,
school meals, and scholarships. In contrast, according to Eurostat data EU-15 countries spend on
average 14.7 percent of GDP on cash transfers, most of which for social insurance programs. Thus
in principle, even if transfers were targeted just as progressively in Latin America as in Europe, we
should expect them to have much less of an impact in the former than in the latter region, given
the big difference in their total volume. Importantly, that difference reﬂects primarily the contrast
between the levels of tax collection in the two country groups, rather than their differential use of
tax revenues. Indeed, the ratio of total cash transfers to the tax collection of the general government
is roughly similar in both sets of countries - it averages 35.9 percent in EU-15 countries, and 36.6
percent in the six Latin American countries considered31.
But the problem is not only that Latin America spends relatively little on transfers. While in Europe
public transfers are distributed in nearly-egalitarian way across income quintiles, in Latin America
their targeting leaves much to be desired. This is shown in Figure 4.4, which reports for the Latin
American countries the share of transfers (both cash and in-kind) ﬂowing to each quintile of the
income distribution, as well as the quintile’s effective transfer receipt rate (i.e., transfers received
relative to total gross income). The ﬁgure shows that the upper quintiles tend to receive more trans-
fers in all countries shown. This reﬂects the dominant role of social insurance transfers (speciﬁcally,
public pensions and unemployment insurance), which possess nearly universal coverage in Europe,
(2008), who using 2006-07 data estimates that the Gini coefﬁcient of post tax income (.38) is 1 percentage point higher than
that of gross income (.37).
30This average, however, conceals substantial heterogeneity among the group, which includes high spenders like Ar-
gentina and Brazil, moderate spenders (Chile, Colombia) and low spenders (Mexico and Peru).
31These ﬁgures are based on total tax collection and transfer data from ECLAC and Eurostat. There is of course consider-
able variation across countries in both groups. Among the Latin American countries, cash transfers range from a low of 25
percent of tax collection in Peru to a high of 41 percent in Brazil. In Europe, the range goes from 27 percent in Ireland to 45
percent in Germany.
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Source: Author’s calculation (see Appendix)
Note: Panels on the left are expressed as percentage of total contribution of all quintiles; panels on the right are
expressed as percentage of the total gross income of each quintile
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Figure 4.4: Transfers by income quintiles
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Source: Author’s calculation (see Appendix)
Note: Panels on the left are expressed as percentage of total receipts of all quintiles; panels on the right are
expressed as percentage of the total gross income of each quintile
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but In Latin America typically accrue to the more afﬂuent and thus tend to be regressive32. For
example, in the case of pensions the data in de Ferranti et al. (2004) indicate that on average the
top two quintiles of the population attract more than 80 percent of the spending, while the bottom
quintile receives less than 3 percent33. Unemployment insurance is likewise regressive, although less
markedly so. About 65 percent of the spending goes to the top two quintiles, with the bottom quintile
obtaining less than 10 percent of the spending. Given that in Latin America poor households often
work in the informal sector, it is not surprising that they have little access to these beneﬁts aimed at
formal sector workers34.
This does not mean that all social programs are regressive. Indeed, there are programs, typically
in the social assistance area, that are well targeted. Lindert & Shapiro (2006) show that Latin Amer-
ica’s conditional cash transfer programs35 are strongly progressive, with close to 75 percent of the
resources accruing to the bottom two quintiles of the population. But in spite of their expansion in
recent years, these programs are still quantitatively small and therefore their redistributive capacity
is limited, at least in comparison with the large social insurance programs just reviewed. Thus, while
social assistance transfers are systematically targeted towards the needy, their redistributive effect is
largely outweighed by that of social insurance transfers.
So far, we have considered only cash transfers. It might be argued that in-kind transfers (such
as free public education) could dramatically change the conclusions of the analysis, particularly if
these transfers target the lower quintiles of the distribution. Indeed Figure 4.4 shows that in the
Latin American countries considered the distribution of in-kind transfers among the different gross
income quintiles is more progressive than that of cash transfers36. In fact, once in-kind transfers
are taken into account, the ﬁgure clearly shows that, as percentage of their gross income, the total
volume of transfers accruing to poorer households is bigger than that accruing to those at the top of
the income distribution.
Quantifying the redistributive effect of transfers in kind requires taking a stand on how accurately
their cost in terms of government spending reﬂects their value for the private individuals receiving
them. There is clear evidence across Latin America, as well as in some European countries, that
individuals often eschew public health and education services, available at low or zero cost, in favor
of costlier private services perceived to be of higher quality. Even if we ignore this fact, and take the
extreme view that the volume of public spending on health and education is an accurate measure of
their value to individuals, does inclusion of these in-kind transfers lead to a more upbeat assessment
of the redistributive performance of Latin America’s ﬁscal systems? To answer this question, Table
4.4 reports the Gini coefﬁcients of our various income deﬁnitions, recalculated after redeﬁning pub-
32For the case of Brazil, this is stressed by Baer & Jr (2008).
33The biggest problem with Latin America’s public pension systems from the point of view of equity probably is their
low coverage: they are far from universal, and usually exclude workers in the informal sector and in agriculture. In addition,
some special pension schemes for public sector employees are hugely regressive, as they offer extremely generous beneﬁts
to a privileged few, with the bulk of the cost ﬁnanced by taxpayers. For example, the deﬁcit of Brazil’s civil service pension
system, which covers only 13 percent of pensioners, amounted to nearly 4 percent of GDP in 2004. See Birdsall & Menezes
(2008).
34It could be argued that public social insurance programs are not ﬁnanced by direct taxation but by ’contributions’ and
therefore should be treated differently. For example, if pensions are viewed as an intertemporal transfer for an individual
rather than as an intergeneration transfer at a point in time, the beneﬁts of each household should be treated as deferred
consumption. In practice, however, the link between contributions and beneﬁts is tenuous at best, and the programs run
sizable deﬁcits ﬁnanced by general taxation. Indeed, according to Lindert & Shapiro (2006) public pension subsidies ﬁnanced
through general taxation absorb about 5 percent of GDP in some Latin American countries, a ﬁgure higher than total spending
on social assistance and, in some cases, higher than public spending on education and health.
35These include programs such as Bolsa Escola in Brazil, Subsidio Unico Familiar and Solidario programs in Chile,
Familias en Acci´ on in Colombia, and Oportunidades in Mexico.
36The incidence of in-kind transfers for the Latin American countries under consideration is computed using data from
ECLAC (2007). The data covers only public expenditure on Health and Education.
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lic transfers to include both cash and in-kind transfers. On average, the latter represent 7.6 percent
of GDP in the six Latin American countries under consideration. For comparative purposes, the
same information is reported for the seven European countries for which the necessary data could
be gathered; their in-kind transfers average 11.3 percent of GDP37.
For ease of reference, the ﬁrst column of Table 4.4 reproduces the Gini coefﬁcients of market
income from Table 4.1. The second column reports the Gini coefﬁcients of gross income, inclusive
of both cash and in-kind transfers. It is instructive to compare them with those in column (2) of
Table 4.1, which considers only cash transfers. The former are substantially lower than the latter for
all Latin American countries, by 4 percentage points on average. Comparing columns (1) and (2) of
Table 4.4, we conclude that the broader concept of transfers contributes on average to a reduction
of 5 percentage points in the Gini coefﬁcient of Latin American market income, compared with the
reduction of just 1 percentage point obtained in Table 4.1 when considering cash transfers alone.
The main exception is Peru, where consideration of in-kind transfers makes little difference - they
fail to enhance signiﬁcantly the poor redistributive performance of cash transfers.
Thus, in-kind transfers do enhance ﬁscal redistribution in Latin America. However, their inequality-
reducing effect is even bigger in the European countries shown in Table 4.4. Indeed, once in-kind
transfers are taken into account, the Gini coefﬁcient of gross income among the European countries
shown averages just 0.31 - that is, 16 percentage points lower than the average Gini coefﬁcient for
market income (instead of the 10-point difference in Table 4.1 when only cash transfers were con-
sidered). Thus, in-kind transfers actually widen the gap between the redistributive performances of
ﬁscal systems in Latin America and Europe.
To complete the picture, columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.4 show the distributional effects of direct and
indirect taxes once in-kind transfers have been considered. Like in Section 4.3.2, on average both
direct and indirect taxes exert little distributional impact in our sample of Latin American countries,
while in Europe the progressive effect of direct taxation is reﬂected in a reduction of 5 percentage
points of the Gini coefﬁcient of disposable income relative to that of gross income (the same result
found in Table 4.1). In turn, the difference between the Gini coefﬁcients of gross and post-tax in-
come averages 4 percentage points in the European countries considered, while it is nil on average
among Latin American countries38.
4.4 Concluding remarks
Latin America’s high inequality extends to virtually all aspects of social and economic life, and is
viewed by a large majority of the region’s citizens as deeply unjust. High inequality undermines the
stability and legitimacy of institutions and policies, and represents a powerful drag on Latin Amer-
ica’s development prospects. These reasons put social equity at the top of the region’s development
agenda.
A close inspection of the international evidence on income inequality reveals that the big difference
between Latin America and the more egalitarian countries of Western Europe lies not so much in the
37The data on total in-kind transfers of European countries is taken from Eurostat. Their incidence across income quintiles
Figures for Europe are is based on data drawn from EUROMOD (2007); see the Appendix for further details. Unlike in Latin
America, in the European countries considered the incidence across income quintiles of in-kind transfers is not much more
progressive than that of cash transfers.
38The seemingly milder regressive effect of indirect taxation among European countries shown in Table 4.4, relative
to that in Table 4.1, is mainly due to the different country sample. More precisely, the average Gini coefﬁcients of Table
4.1, when calculated over the 7 European countries in Table 4.4, would equal 0.47, 0.37, 0.32 and 0.34 for market, gross,
disposable, and post-tax-income, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
LAC 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.47
Argentina 0.49 0.45 0.44 0.44
Brazil 0.58 0.52 0.51 0.52
Chile 0.48 0.42 0.41 0.42
Colombia 0.54 0.49 0.48 0.48
Mexico 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.47
Peru 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.49
EU7 0.47 0.31 0.26 0.27
Belgium 0.47 0.30 0.22 0.22
Germany 0.43 0.27 0.21 N.A.
Greece 0.47 0.35 0.31 0.32
Ireland 0.53 0.32 0.26 0.27
Italy 0.48 0.35 0.31 0.32
Netherlands 0.39 0.25 0.20 0.21
UK 0.52 0.32 0.27 0.28
Source: Author’s calculation (see Data Appendix)
Notes: Income deﬁnitions considered in Columns (1) to (4) are the following: (1) Market Income: Income
before taxes and government transfers; (2) Gross Income: Market Income plus government cash and in-kind
transfers; (3) Disposable Income: Gross Income minus direct taxes; (4) Post Tax Income: Disposable Income
minus indirect taxes.
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extent of the inequality resulting from market forces, but in the redistributive power of the state. To
put it differently, the gap between the two regions in terms of income inequality is much bigger after
taxes and public transfers than before taxes and transfers, and this implies that a good deal of Latin
America’s excess inequality over international levels reﬂects the failure of the region’s ﬁscal systems
to perform their redistributive functions. And the magnitude of this failure is considerable: while in
European countries ﬁscal redistribution through direct taxes and cash transfers leads to an average
reduction of some 15 percentage points in the Gini coefﬁcient of the distribution of income, in Latin
America the reduction is on average just 2 percentage points. If indirect taxes- which in general are
mildly regressive - are taken into account as well, the redistributive performance of the ﬁscal system
declines slightly in both regions, but the big gap between them in terms of redistributive capacity
remains.
The evidence from rich countries also shows that the bulk of the state’s redistributive impact is
due to the effect of public transfers. In Europe they account for over two-thirds of the overall redis-
tributive effect. While direct taxes are modestly progressive, much of their effect is counteracted by
the regressive impact of indirect taxes, so that on the whole taxes achieve little redistribution.
The paper has examined also the distributional impact of in-kind transfers. The requisite information
is available only for a smaller sample of European countries, and only covers public expenditure on
health and education. The analysis is based on the tentative assumption that the volume of in-kind
transfers correctly measures their valuation by the individuals who receive them. The main con-
clusion is that in-kind transfers reinforce considerably the redistributive role of the state in Latin
America - where their progressive impact is much bigger than that of cash transfers – but do so even
more strongly in Europe. Thus, in-kind transfers actually widen the gap between both regions in
terms of the redistributive performance of the state.
Why does Latin America do so poorly at ﬁscal redistribution? The paper has reviewed three po-
tential explanatory factors, namely: (i) too low a volume of resources gets collected and transferred;
(ii) tax collection is regressive; (iii) transfers are poorly targeted. All three are at play, to different ex-
tents in different countries, but on the whole the conclusion is that the prospects for signiﬁcant ﬁscal
redistribution lie mainly in increasing the volume of resources available for redistributive spending,
and improving the targeting of expenditures. In contrast, the European experience suggests that even
signiﬁcant increases in the progressivity of Latin America’s tax systems - which at present appear to
be roughly neutral from the perspective of distribution – are likely to have only a modest effect on
the distribution of income. In other words, from the perspective of inequality reduction, the overall
volume of tax revenue, which shapes the capacity of the state to engage in redistributive spending, is
likely to be a more important priority than the progressivity of the revenue-raising system.
These considerations offer some guidance for the design of reforms to make Latin America’s ﬁscal
systems more conducive to equity. In general, such reforms will likely pose signiﬁcant institutional
and implementation challenges that deserve separate analysis. But the evidence presented in this
paper suggests that the speciﬁc reform priorities vary across countries. In some of them the top pri-
ority is to expand tax collection and thereby the volume of transfers; this is likely to be the case, for
example, in Mexico and Peru. In most countries, there is signiﬁcant scope for raising tax collection
by reducing tax concessions and loopholes, and especially improving tax administration to reduce
evasion, which is rampant across the region.
In other places, the biggest concern is instead to improve the targeting of transfers - indeed, major
cash transfer programs, such as social insurance, are in some cases quite regressive, and their reform
can make a big difference for overall inequality; this is the case, for example, of Brazil. In such
circumstances, raising tax collection, without improving the targeting of the spending it ﬁnances, is
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unlikely to help much.
Of course, making the tax system more progressive will also help everywhere, although in general
the quantitative impact on inequality is likely to be modest. This does not mean that the structure of
the tax system is irrelevant, but only that tax choices should be primarily based on the efﬁciency and
administration costs of different taxes - which lie beyond the scope of the incidence analysis in this
paper.
Although we have focused on the public sector’s distributive role, social equity is also affected
by how well the state does at performing its other two classic objectives of efﬁciency and stabiliza-
tion, because ultimately this affects the economic opportunities available to the poor and shapes the
distribution of market incomes. Through these indirect channels, ﬁscal policy can also have a major
impact on Latin America’s inequality. Regarding the stabilization objective of ﬁscal policy, for exam-
ple, one important, contribution to social equity relates to the prevention of crises. Macro-ﬁnancial
crises are almost invariably highly regressive because the costs of their resolution, in the form of
resource transfers to better-off investors, end up being borne by all taxpayers; furthermore, the poor
often are the most adversely affected at times of crises because they lack the assets to smooth out
adverse income shocks. Excessive public indebtedness and procyclical ﬁscal policies have been
key factors behind Latin America’s vulnerability to crises. This means that ﬁscal prudence, possibly
guided by formal ﬁscal rules that allow the operation of counter-cyclical policies - and particularly of
counter-cyclical social expenditures – is also an essential part of a ﬁscal agenda to reduce inequality
in Latin America.
4.5 Data and Methodology
Our analysis is based upon comparisons of Gini coefﬁcients of different income deﬁnitions – market
income, gross income, disposable income and after-tax income. To compute these Gini coefﬁcients,
we combine two types of information: ﬁrst, the distribution of disposable income and, second, the
incidence (or alternatively the distribution) of the taxes and transfers included in the various income
deﬁnitions39. Such information is drawn from the following sources:
4.5.1 Data for Latin America
Market Income
We draw information on the distribution of disposable income by quintile for Argentina (2001),
Brazil (1998), Colombia (2003), Mexico (2000) and Peru (2002) from the World Banks World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI). We obtain a measure of market income by quintile by adding direct
taxes and deducting transfers for each quintile to the respective disposable income. The information
on direct taxes and cash transfers by quintile comes from the sources described in 4.5.1 and 4.5.1.
Cash Transfers
The incidence of cash transfers is estimated on the basis of the information in Lindert & Shapiro
(2006) for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
Direct and Indirect Taxes
Direct and indirect tax incidence information is derived from Breceda & Saavedra (2009) for Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
39Given the organization of the original data sources, all the information for Latin American (European) countries consid-
ered in our sample is processed by income quintiles (deciles).
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Data on incidence and distribution of public social expenditure on health and education is drawn
from ECLAC (2007) for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
Special Case: Chile
Income distribution by income decile as well as direct and indirect tax incidence by income decile
is drawn from Table 5 of Engel et al. (1999). We infer the corresponding values by quintiles.
4.5.2 Data for European countries
Market Income, Cash Transfers and Direct Taxes
Data on market income, cash transfers and direct taxes comes from EUROMOD, which is a source
of harmonized microdata on the different income components before and after redistribution (see
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/index/statistics). Weuse
information available for the year 2001.
Indirect Taxes
Wedrawsimulateddataonvalueaddedtaxes(as%ofdisposableincome)fromBaldini&Mantovani
(2004). We add this information to the main dataset described in 4.5.2 and thereby obtain a measure
of post-tax income.
In-kind Transfers
The series of papers ”Distributional effects of imputed rents in seven European countries”, prepared
as part of the project ”Accurate Income Measurement for the Assessment of Public Policies” (see
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/research-and-policy-analysis-using-euromod/
aim-ap), examines the effects of imputed in-kind transfers in seven European countries (Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK). From this source we take the data on
the increase in disposable income due to in-kind transfers (education and health)40. The information
corresponds to years between 2002 and 2005, depending on the speciﬁc country. We merge this
information into the main dataset described in 4.5.2 and obtain measures of gross, disposable and
after tax income when cash and in-kind transfers are jointly considered.
40We draw information from working papers prepared for each country. The speciﬁc references to these working papers as
well as a compilation of the main results about the distributional effects of non-cash incomes in the joint sample of European
countries under study can be found in Sutherland & Tsakloglou (2009).
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